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Foreword 
 
 
Introduction 
The environment in which Australia’s Security and Intelligence Agencies operate 
is a complex and rapidly evolving one.  
Recent events such as the Boston bombings and the murder of a British Soldier on 
the streets of London remind us of the impact of terrorist attacks and the 
continued need for the Government and its Security and Intelligence Agencies to 
maintain vigilance, preparedness for and defence against terrorist attacks. 
The Committee recognises the need for our Security and Intelligence Agencies to 
be appropriately resourced and to be granted powers, which are often intrusive, to 
carry out their work. 
However, these intrusive powers must always be balanced by appropriate 
safeguards for the privacy of individuals and the community recognising that 
Australia is a democratic nation which values personal freedom and places limits 
on the Power of the State. 
The Inquiry into the reforms proposed by the Attorney General was one of the 
most complex and controversial inquiries ever undertaken by the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (the Committee).  
 
Conduct of Inquiry 
In May 2012, the then Attorney-General the Hon Nicola Roxon MP asked the 
Committee to inquire into a package of potential reforms to Australia’s national 
security legislation. 
Subsequent to this request, the Committee was provided with a discussion paper 
outlining the reforms the Australian Government was considering, as well as 
some on which the Government expressly sought the views of the Committee. 
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This discussion paper contained the terms of reference for this Inquiry which 
canvassed reforms in three areas: interception of communications and access to 
data under the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979; reform of the 
telecommunications security aspects of the Telecommunications Act 1997 and other 
relevant legislation; and reform of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001.  The terms of reference contained 18 
specific reform proposals containing 44 separate items across three different 
reform areas. 
Letters inviting submissions were sent to over 130 stakeholders in both federal and 
state government, the telecommunications industry, civil liberties and privacy 
non-government organisations, and peak legal bodies and associations with an 
expected interest in the reforms canvassed. 
The Committee received 240 submissions and 29 exhibits. Three submissions were 
received in largely identical terms from some 5,300 individual members of the 
public. These submitters expressed opposition to the reform proposals, 
particularly the proposed mandatory data retention proposal. 
 
Inquiry Challenges 
At the outset the Committee was faced with three key difficulties. Firstly, the 
terms of reference were very wide ranging as they contained 18 specific reform 
proposals containing 44 separate items across three different reform areas. 
Secondly, the lack of any draft legislation or detail about some of the potential 
reforms was a major limitation and made the Committee’s consideration of the 
merit of the reforms difficult. This also made it hard for interested stakeholders to 
effectively respond to the terms of reference. 
Thirdly, that one of the most controversial topics canvassed in the discussion 
paper —data retention—was only accorded just over two lines of text.  
This lack of information from the Attorney-General and her Department had two 
major consequences. First, it meant that submitters to the Inquiry could not be 
sure as to what they were being asked to comment on. Second, as the Committee 
was not sure of the exact nature of what the Attorney-General and her Department 
was proposing it was seriously hampered in the conduct of the inquiry and the 
process of obtaining evidence from witnesses. 
Importantly the Committee was very disconcerted to find, once it commenced its 
Inquiry, that the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) had much more detailed 
information on the topic of data retention. Departmental work, including 
discussions with stakeholders, had been undertaken previously. Details of this 
work had to be drawn from witnesses representing the AGD. 
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In fact, it took until the 7th November 2012 for the Committee to be provided with 
a formal complete definition of which data was to be retained under the data 
retention regime proposed by the AGD. 
 
In Conclusion 
The Committee welcomed the public response to the proposed reforms and 
evidence provided to the Committee was an important factor in its 
determinations. 
This report is undoubtedly comprehensive, given the number of reforms 
proposed. However, given the lack of detail and the absence of draft legislation, 
the Committee’s conclusions are often qualified or suggest areas where further 
work is needed. 
I would like to thank my colleagues on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security for their work on this Inquiry and in particular their 
commitment under enormous constraints to produce a unanimous report. 
Additionally, this Inquiry would not have been possible without the tireless work 
of the Committee Secretariat particularly the Committee Secretary Jerome Brown, 
Inquiry Secretary Robert Little and Senior Research Officer James Bunce.  
Additionally I would thank Mr Cameron Gifford and Mr Simon Lee who were 
seconded to the Committee’s Secretariat from the Attorney-General’s Department. 
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Terms of reference 
 
 
Having regard to: 
 the desirability of comprehensive, consistent and workable laws and 
practices to protect the security and safety of Australia, its citizens and 
businesses,  
 the need to ensure that intelligence, security and law enforcement 
agencies are equipped to effectively perform their functions and 
cooperate effectively in today’s and tomorrow’s technologically 
advanced and globalised environment, and  
 the fact that national security brings shared responsibilities to the 
government and the private sector: 
 
1. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is to inquire 
into potential reforms of National Security Legislation, as set out in the 
attachment and which include proposals relating to the: 
 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
 Telecommunications Act 1997 
 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
 Intelligence Services Act 2001 
 
2. The inquiry should consider the effectiveness and implications of the 
proposals to ensure law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies can 
meet: 
 the challenges of new and emerging technologies upon agencies’ 
capabilities  
 the requirements of a modern intelligence and security agency 
legislative framework, and to enhance cooperation between agencies, 
and 
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 the need for enhancements to the security of the telecommunications 
sector. 
 
3. The Committee should have regard to whether the proposed responses: 
 contain appropriate safeguards for protecting the human rights and 
privacy of individuals and are proportionate to any threat to national 
security and the security of the Australian private sector 
 apply reasonable obligations upon the telecommunications industry 
whilst at the same time minimising cost and impact on business 
operations in the telecommunications sector and the potential for follow 
on effects to consumers, the economy and international competition, 
and 
 will address law enforcement reduction of capabilities from new 
technologies and business environment, which has a flow-on effect to 
security agencies. 
 
4. The Committee should take account of the interests of the broad range of 
stakeholders including through a range of public, in camera and classified 
hearings. 
 
5. The Committee should provide a written report on each of the three elements 
of the National Security Legislation referral to the Attorney-General. 
 
The National Security Legislation the subject of the inquiry has three different 
elements and Objectives.  They relate to: 
 modernising lawful access to communications and associated 
communications data 
 mitigating the risks posed to Australia’s communications networks by 
certain foreign technology and service suppliers, and 
 enhancing the operational capacity of Australian intelligence 
community agencies. 
 
The proposals across the three different packages are separated into three different 
groupings: 
A. those the Government wishes to progress 
B. those the Government is considering progressing, and 
C. those on which the Government is expressly seeking the views of the PJCIS. 
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A - Government wishes to progress the following proposals: 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
1. Strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections under the lawful 
access to communications regime in the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act).  This would include the examination 
of: 
 the legislation’s privacy protection objective  
 the proportionality tests for issuing of warrants 
 mandatory record-keeping standards 
 oversight arrangements by the Commonwealth and State Ombudsmen 
2. Reforming the lawful access to communications regime. This would include:  
 reducing the number of agencies eligible to access communications 
information 
 the standardisation of warrant tests and thresholds 
3. Streamlining and reducing complexity in the lawful access to communications 
regime. This would include: 
 simplifying the information sharing provisions that allow agencies to 
cooperate  
 removing legislative duplication 
 
4. Modernising the TIA Act’s cost sharing framework to:  
 align industry interception assistance with industry regulatory policy 
 clarify ACMA’s regulatory and enforcement role 
 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
5. Amending the ASIO Act to modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant 
provisions 
 to update the definition of ‘computer’ in section 25A 
 Enabling warrants to be varied by the AG, simplifying the renewal of 
the warrants process and extending duration of search warrants from 
90 days to 6 months. 
6. Modernising ASIO Act employment provisions by:  
 providing for officers to be employed under a concept of a ‘level,’ rather 
than holding an ‘office.’ 
 Making the differing descriptions (‘officer,’ ‘employee’ and ‘staff’) 
denoting persons as an ‘employee’ consistent 
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 Modernising the Director-General’s powers in relation to employment 
terms and conditions 
 Removing an outdated employment provision (section 87 of the ASIO 
Act) 
 Providing additional scope for further secondment arrangements 
 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 
7. Amending the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to clarify the Defence Imagery 
and Geospatial Organisation’s authority to provide assistance to approved 
bodies. 
 
B. Government is considering the following proposals: 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
8. Streamlining and reducing complexity in the lawful access to communications 
regime – this would include:  
 Creating a single warrant with multiple TI powers 
 
9. Modernising the Industry assistance framework –  
 Implement detailed requirements for industry interception obligations 
 extend the regulatory regime to ancillary service providers not 
currently covered by the legislation  
 implement a three-tiered industry participation model  
 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
10. Amending the ASIO Act to create an authorised intelligence operations 
scheme. This will provide ASIO officers and human sources with protection 
from criminal and civil liability for certain conduct in the course of authorised 
intelligence operations. 
 
11. Amending the ASIO Act  to modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant 
provisions to:  
 Establish a named person warrant enabling ASIO to request a single 
warrant specifying multiple (existing) powers against a single target 
instead of requesting multiple warrants against a single target. 
 Align surveillance device provisions with the Surveillance Devices Act 
2007 
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 Enable the disruption of a target computer for the purposes of a 
computer access warrant 
 Enable person searches to be undertaken independently of a premises 
search 
 Establish classes of persons able to execute warrants 
12. Clarifying ASIO’s ability to cooperate with the private sector.  
13. Amending the ASIO Act to enable ASIO to refer breaches of section 92 of the 
ASIO Act (publishing the identity of an ASIO officer) to authorities for 
investigation. 
 
C. Government is expressly seeking the views of the Committee on the 
following matters: 
14. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
 Reforming the Lawful Access Regime 
 expanding the basis of interception activities 
 
15. Modernising the Industry assistance framework   
 establish an offence for failure to assist in the decryption of 
communications 
 institute industry response timelines 
 tailored data retention periods for up to 2 years for parts of a data set, 
with specific timeframes taking into account agency priorities, and 
privacy and cost impacts  
 
Telecommunications Act 1997 
16. Amending the Telecommunications Act to address security and resilience 
risks posed to the telecommunications sector. This would be achieved by: 
 by instituting obligations on the Australian telecommunications 
industry to protect their networks from unauthorised interference 
 by instituting obligations to provide Government with information on 
significant business and procurement decisions and network designs 
 Creating targeted powers for Government to mitigate and remediate 
security risks with the costs to be borne by providers 
 Creating appropriate enforcement powers and pecuniary penalties 
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Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
17. Amending the ASIO Act to modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant 
provisions by:  
 Using third party computers and communications in transit to access a 
target computer under a computer access warrant. 
 Clarifying that the incidental power in the search warrant provision 
authorises access to third party premises to execute a warrant 
 Clarifying that reasonable force may be used at any time during the 
execution of a warrant, not just on entry. 
 Introducing an evidentiary certificate regime. 
 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 
18. Amending the Intelligence Services Act to: 
 Add a new ministerial authorisation ground where the Minister is 
satisfied that a person is, or is likely to be, involved in intelligence or 
counter-intelligence activities.   
 Enable the Minister of an Agency under the IS Act to authorise 
specified activities which may involve producing intelligence on an 
Australian person or persons where the Agency is cooperating with 
ASIO in the performance of an ASIO function pursuant to a section 13A 
arrangement.  A Ministerial Authorisation will not replace the need to 
obtain a warrant where one is currently required. 
 Enable ASIS to provide training in self-defence and the use of weapons 
to a person cooperating with ASIS. 
 
  
 
List of abbreviations 
 
 
ACBPS 
ACC 
ACMA 
AGD 
AFP 
AMTA  
ASIO 
ASIC 
ASIS 
ASP 
CAD 
C/CSP 
CMC 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
Australian Crime Commission 
Australian Communications and Media Authority 
Attorney-General’s Department 
Australian Federal Police 
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service 
Application service provider 
Call associated data 
Carriers/Carriage Service Providers 
Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission 
DIGO 
DIO 
DPI 
DSD 
ECHR 
EU 
Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation 
Defence Intelligence Organisation 
Deep packet inspection 
Defence Signals Directorate 
European Covenant on Human Rights 
European Union 
xx  
 
 
GATT 
ICCPR 
IGIS 
IIA 
IMEI 
IP 
IPA 
IS Act 
ISP 
IT 
LENSA 
NPP 
NSW 
NSW CCL 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
Internet industry association 
International Mobile Equipment Identifier 
Internet protocol 
Institute of Public Affairs 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 
Internet Service Provider 
Information Technology 
Law enforcement and national security agencies 
National Privacy Principles 
New South Wales 
New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties 
OAIC 
ONA 
OTT 
PIC 
PJCIS 
RSPCA 
SD Act 
SMS 
TI 
TIA Act 
ToR 
UK 
UN 
URL 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
Office of National Assessments 
Over the top services 
Police Integrity Commission 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Surveillance Devices Act 
Short message service 
Telecommunications Interception 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1997 
Terms of reference 
United Kingdom 
United Nations 
Uniform resource locator 
 xxi 
 
 
US 
VPN 
WA 
United States 
Virtual private network 
Western Australia 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
List of recommendations 
 
 
2 Telecommunications Interception 
Recommendation 1 
The Committee recommends the inclusion of an objectives clause within 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, which: 
 expresses the dual objectives of the legislation – 
⇒ to protect the privacy of communications; 
⇒ to enable interception and access to communications in order to 
investigate serious crime and threats to national security; and 
 accords with the privacy principles contained in the Privacy Act 
1988. 
Recommendation 2 
The Committee recommends the Attorney-General’s Department 
undertake an examination of the proportionality tests within the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act). Factors to 
be considered in the proportionality tests include the: 
 privacy impacts of proposed investigative activity; 
 public interest served by the proposed investigative activity, 
including the gravity of the conduct being investigated; and 
 availability and effectiveness of less privacy intrusive investigative 
techniques. 
The Committee further recommends that the examination of the 
proportionality tests also consider the appropriateness of applying a 
consistent proportionality test across the interception, stored 
communications and access to telecommunications data powers in the 
TIA Act. 
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Recommendation 3 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 with a 
view to revising the reporting requirements to ensure that the 
information provided assists in the evaluation of whether the privacy 
intrusion was proportionate to the public outcome sought. 
Recommendation 4 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
undertake a review of the oversight arrangements to consider the 
appropriate organisation or agency to ensure effective accountability 
under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. 
Further, the review should consider the scope of the role to be 
undertaken by the relevant oversight mechanism. 
The Committee also recommends the Attorney-General’s Department 
consult with State and Territory ministers prior to progressing any 
proposed reforms to ensure jurisdictional considerations are addressed. 
Recommendation 5 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
review the threshold for access to telecommunications data.  This review 
should focus on reducing the number of agencies able to access 
telecommunications data by using gravity of conduct which may be 
investigated utilising telecommunications data as the threshold on which 
access is allowed. 
Recommendation 6 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the standardisation of thresholds for accessing the content of 
communications.  The standardisation should consider the: 
 privacy impact of the threshold; 
 proportionality of the investigative need and the privacy intrusion; 
 gravity of the conduct to be investigated by these investigative 
means; 
 scope of the offences included and excluded by a particular 
threshold; and 
 impact on law enforcement agencies’ investigative capabilities, 
including those accessing stored communications when investigating 
pecuniary penalty offences. 
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Recommendation 7 
The Committee recommends that interception be conducted on the basis 
of specific attributes of communications. 
The Committee further recommends that the Government model 
‘attribute based interception’ on the existing named person interception 
warrants, which includes: 
 the ability for the issuing authority to set parameters around the 
variation of attributes for interception; 
 the ability for interception agencies to vary the attributes for 
interception; and 
 reporting on the attributes added for interception by an authorised 
officer within an interception agency. 
In addition to Parliamentary oversight, the Committee recommends that 
attribute based interception be subject to the following safeguards and 
accountability measures: 
 attribute based interception is only authorised when an issuing 
authority or approved officer is satisfied the facts and grounds indicate 
that interception is proportionate to the offence or national security 
threat being investigated; 
 oversight of attribute based interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of attribute based 
interception. 
Recommendation 8 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
review the information sharing provisions of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 to ensure: 
 protection of the security and privacy of intercepted information; 
and 
 sharing of information where necessary to facilitate investigation 
of serious crime or threats to national security. 
Recommendation 9 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to remove legislative duplication. 
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Recommendation 10 
The Committee recommends that the telecommunications interception 
warrant provisions in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 be revised to develop a single interception warrant regime. 
The Committee recommends the single warrant regime include the 
following features: 
 a single threshold for law enforcement agencies to access 
communications based on serious criminal offences; 
 removal of the concept of stored communications to provide 
uniform protection to the content of communications; and 
 maintenance of the existing ability to apply for telephone 
applications for warrants, emergency warrants and ability to enter 
premises. 
The Committee further recommends that the single warrant regime be 
subject to the following safeguards and accountability measures: 
 interception is only authorised when an issuing authority is 
satisfied the facts and grounds indicate that interception is 
proportionate to the offence or national security threat being 
investigated; 
 rigorous oversight of interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of interception; and 
 Parliamentary oversight of the use of interception. 
Recommendation 11 
The Committee recommends that the Government review the application 
of the interception-related industry assistance obligations contained in 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and 
Telecommunications Act 1997. 
Recommendation 12 
The Committee recommends the Government consider expanding the 
regulatory enforcement options available to the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority to include a range of enforcement 
mechanisms in order to provide tools proportionate to the conduct being 
regulated. 
Recommendation 13 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to include provisions which clearly express 
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the scope of the obligations which require telecommunications providers 
to provide assistance to law enforcement and national security agencies 
regarding telecommunications interception and access to 
telecommunications data. 
Recommendation 14 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access Act) 1979 and the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to make 
it clear beyond doubt that the existing obligations of the 
telecommunications interception regime apply to all providers (including 
ancillary service providers) of telecommunications services accessed 
within Australia. As with the existing cost sharing arrangements, this 
should be done on a no-profit and no-loss basis for ancillary service 
providers. 
Recommendation 15 
The Committee recommends that the Government should develop the 
implementation model on the basis of a uniformity of obligations while 
acknowledging that the creation of exemptions on the basis of 
practicability and affordability may be justifiable in particular cases. 
However, in all such cases the burden should lie on the industry 
participants to demonstrate why they should receive these exemptions. 
Recommendation 16 
The Committee recommends that, should the Government decide to 
develop an offence for failure to assist in decrypting communications, the 
offence be developed in consultation with the telecommunications 
industry, the Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital 
Economy, and the Australian Communications and Media Authority.  It 
is important that any such offence be expressed with sufficient specificity 
so that telecommunications providers are left with a clear understanding 
of their obligations. 
Recommendation 17 
The Committee recommends that, if the Government decides to develop 
timelines for telecommunications industry assistance for law enforcement 
and national security agencies, the timelines should be developed in 
consultation with the investigative agencies, the telecommunications 
industry, the Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital 
Economy, and the Australian Communications and Media Authority. 
The Committee further recommends that, if the Government decides to 
develop mandatory timelines, the cost to the telecommunications 
industry must be considered. 
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Recommendation 18 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) be comprehensively revised with the objective 
of designing an interception regime which is underpinned by the 
following: 
 clear protection for the privacy of communications; 
 provisions which are technology neutral; 
 maintenance of investigative capabilities, supported by provisions 
for appropriate use of intercepted information for lawful purposes; 
 clearly articulated and enforceable industry obligations; and 
 robust oversight and accountability which supports administrative 
efficiency. 
The Committee further recommends that the revision of the TIA Act be 
undertaken in consultation with interested stakeholders, including 
privacy advocates and practitioners, oversight bodies, 
telecommunications providers, law enforcement and security agencies. 
The Committee also recommends that a revised TIA Act should be 
released as an exposure draft for public consultation. In addition, the 
Government should expressly seek the views of key agencies, including 
the: 
 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor; 
 Australian Information Commissioner; 
 ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that the 
draft legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
3 Telecommunications security 
Recommendation 19 
The Committee recommends that the Government amend the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 to create a telecommunications security 
framework that will provide: 
 a telecommunications industry-wide obligation to protect 
infrastructure and the information held on it or passing across it from 
unauthorised interference; 
 a requirement for industry to provide the Government with 
information to assist in the assessment of national security risks to 
telecommunications infrastructure; and 
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 powers of direction and a penalty regime to encourage 
compliance. 
The Committee further recommends that the Government, through a 
Regulation Impact Statement, address: 
 the interaction of the proposed regime with existing legal 
obligations imposed upon corporations; 
 the compatibility of the proposed regime with existing corporate 
governance where a provider’s activities might be driven by decisions 
made outside of Australia; 
 consideration of an indemnity to civil action for service providers 
who have acted in good faith under the requirements of the proposed 
framework; and 
 impacts on competition in the market-place, including: 
⇒ the potential for proposed requirements to create a barrier to 
entry for lower cost providers; 
⇒ the possible elimination of existing lower cost providers from 
the market, resulting in decreased market competition on pricing; 
and 
⇒ any other relevant effects. 
4 Australian Intelligence Community Legislation Reform 
Recommendation 20 
The Committee recommends that the definition of computer in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended by 
adding to the existing definition the words “and includes multiple 
computers operating in a network”. 
The Committee further recommends that the warrant provisions of the 
ASIO Act be amended by stipulating that a warrant authorising access to 
a computer may extend to all computers at a nominated location and all 
computers directly associated with a nominated person in relation to a 
security matter of interest. 
Recommendation 21 
The Committee recommends that the Government give further 
consideration to amending the warrant provisions in the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to enable the disruption of a 
target computer for the purposes of executing a computer access warrant 
but only to the extent of a demonstrated necessity. The Committee 
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further recommends that the Government pay particular regard to the 
concerns raised by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
Recommendation 22 
The Committee recommends that the Government  amend the warrant 
provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to 
allow ASIO to access third party computers and communications in 
transit to access a target computer under a computer access warrant, 
subject to appropriate safeguards and accountability mechanisms, and 
consistent with existing provisions under the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979. 
Recommendation 23 
The Committee recommends the Government amend the warrant 
provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to 
promote consistency by allowing the Attorney-General to vary all types 
of ASIO Act warrants. 
Recommendation 24 
Subject to the recommendation on renewal of warrants, the Committee 
recommends that the maximum duration of Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 search warrants not be increased. 
Recommendation 25 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to allow the Attorney-General to 
renew warrants. 
Recommendation 26 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to modernise the Act’s provisions 
regarding secondment arrangements. 
Recommendation 27 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to clarify the authority of the Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation to undertake its geospatial and imagery functions. 
Recommendation 28 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to create an authorised intelligence 
operations scheme, subject to similar safeguards and accountability 
arrangements as apply to the Australian Federal Police controlled 
operations regime under the Crimes Act 1914. 
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Recommendation 29 
The Committee recommends that should the Government proceed with 
amending the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to 
establish a named person warrant, further consideration be given to the 
factors that would enable ASIO to request a single warrant specifying 
multiple powers against a single target. The thresholds, duration, 
accountability mechanisms and oversight arrangements for such 
warrants should not be lower than other existing ASIO warrants. 
Recommendation 30 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to modernise the warrant provisions to 
align the surveillance device provisions with the Surveillance Devices Act 
2004, in particular by optical devices. 
Recommendation 31 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 not be amended to enable person searches to be 
undertaken independently of a premises search. 
Recommendation 32 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to establish classes of persons able to 
execute warrants. 
Recommendation 33 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to formalise ASIO’s capacity to co-
operate with private sector entities. 
Recommendation 34 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended so that ASIO may refer breaches of 
section 92 to law enforcement for investigation. 
Recommendation 35 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to clarify that the incidental power in 
the search and computer access warrant provisions includes entry to a 
third party’s premises for the purposes of executing those warrants. 
However, the Committee is of the view that whatever amendments are 
made to facilitate this power should acknowledge the exceptional nature 
and very limited circumstances in which the power should be exercised. 
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Recommendation 36 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to clarify that reasonable force can be 
used at any time for the purposes of executing the warrant, not just on 
entry, and may only be used against property and not persons. 
Recommendation 37 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to introduce an evidentiary certificate 
regime to protect the identity of officers and sources. The Committee also 
recommends that similar protections be extended to ASIO in order to 
protect from disclosure in open court its sensitive operational 
capabilities, analogous to the provisions of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the protections contained in the 
counter terrorism provisions in the Commonwealth Criminal code. 
The Committee further recommends that the Attorney-General give 
consideration to making uniform across Commonwealth legislation 
provisions for the protection of certain sensitive operational capabilities 
from disclosure in open court. 
Recommendation 38 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to add a new ministerial authorisation ground where the 
Minister is satisfied that a person is, or is likely to be, involved in 
intelligence or counter‐intelligence activities in circumstances where such 
an investigation would not currently be within the operational authority 
of the agency concerned. 
Recommendation 39 
The Committee recommends that where ASIO and an Intelligence Services 
Act 2001 agency are engaged in a cooperative intelligence operation a 
common standard based on the standards prescribed in the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 should apply for the 
authorisation of intrusive activities involving the collection of intelligence 
on an Australian person. 
Recommendation 40 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to enable ASIS to provide training in self‐defence and the use of 
weapons to a person cooperating with ASIS. 
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Recommendation 41 
The Committee recommends that the draft amendments to the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 
2001, necessary to give effect to the Committee’s recommendations, 
should be released as an exposure draft for public consultation. The 
Government should expressly seek the views of key stakeholders, 
including the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that the 
draft legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
5 Data Retention 
Recommendation 42 
There is a diversity of views within the Committee as to whether there 
should be a mandatory data retention regime. This is ultimately a 
decision for Government. If the Government is persuaded that a 
mandatory data retention regime should proceed, the Committee 
recommends that the Government publish an exposure draft of any 
legislation and refer it to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security for examination. Any draft legislation should 
include the following features: 
 any mandatory data retention regime should apply only to meta-
data and exclude content; 
 the controls on access to communications data remain the same as 
under the current regime; 
 internet browsing data should be explicitly excluded; 
 where information includes content that cannot be separated from 
data, the information should be treated as content and therefore a 
warrant would be required for lawful access; 
 the data should be stored securely by making encryption 
mandatory; 
 save for existing provisions enabling agencies to retain data for a 
longer period of time, data retained under a new regime should be for 
no more than two years; 
 the costs incurred by providers should be reimbursed by the 
Government; 
 a robust, mandatory data breach notification scheme; 
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 an independent audit function be established within an 
appropriate agency to ensure that communications content is not 
stored by telecommunications service providers; and 
 oversight of agencies’ access to telecommunications data by the 
ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
Recommendation 43 
The Committee recommends that, if the Government is persuaded that a 
mandatory data retention regime should proceed: 
 there should be a mechanism for oversight of the scheme by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security; 
 there should be an annual report on the operation of this scheme 
presented to Parliament; and 
 the effectiveness of the regime be reviewed by the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security three years after its 
commencement. 
 
  
 
Glossary1 
 
Communications data Information about a communication event, and not the 
content or substance of a communication. For 
landlines, this includes such data as the time and date 
calls were made and received. For mobile phones, it 
also includes the location of the communication event. 
For internet communications, it also includes the 
username, account name and in some cases the 
internet protocol addresses allocated to a user. A list of 
what constitutes communications data is included at 
Appendix G. 
Carriage service provider A company that supplies a carriage service to the 
public. This can refer to companies that resell time on 
a carrier network for telephony and internet access, as 
well as over the top content and service providers. 
Carrier The owner of a telecommunications network that 
supplies carriage services to the public. 
Content The content or substance of a particular 
communication, as opposed to the data relating to that 
communication. 
Data See Communications data. 
Data retention The storage of communications data. 
Encryption The encoding of data to prevent unauthorised access. 
Internet protocol A standard protocol for transmission of data from 
source to destination. 
 
1  All definitions are drawn from Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia Against 
Emerging and Evolving Threats, July 2012; and UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Access 
to Communications Data by the Intelligence and Security Agencies, UK Parliament, February 2013. 
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Internet telephony See Voice over the internet protocol. 
Internet service provider Any entity that provides access to the internet. 
Meta-data See Communications data 
Over the top providers A service or content on the internet that is not under 
the administrative control of a carrier or carriage 
service provider. This includes such services as voice 
over the internet protocol. 
Telecommunications 
data 
See Communications data 
Voice over the internet 
protocol 
Technology that allows real-time voice conversations 
over the internet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Introduction 
Background to the inquiry 
1.1 In May 2012, Attorney-General the Hon. Nicola Roxon MP asked the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (the Committee) to 
inquire into a number of potential reforms to Australia’s national security 
legislation. Subsequent to this request, the Committee was provided with a 
discussion paper outlining the reforms the Australian Government was 
considering, as well as some on which the government sought the views of the 
Committee. 
1.2 This discussion paper contained the terms of reference for this inquiry which 
canvassed reforms in three areas: interception of communications and access to 
data under the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979; reform of the 
telecommunications security aspects of the Telecommunications Act 1997 and other 
relevant legislation; and reform of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001.  The terms of reference contained 
18 specific reform proposals. 
1.3 The Committee formally adopted the proposed terms of reference on 6 July 2012. 
1.4 The Committee was faced with two key difficulties in its conduct of this inquiry. 
Firstly, the terms of reference were very wide-ranging, containing 44 separate 
items across three different reform agenda. Secondly, the lack of any draft 
legislation or detail about the potential reforms was a major limitation and made 
the Committee’s consideration of the merit of the reforms difficult. This also 
made it hard for interested stakeholders to effectively respond to the terms of 
reference. 
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Conduct of the inquiry 
1.5 The Chair of the Committee, the Hon. Anthony Byrne MP announced the inquiry 
via media release on 9 July 2012, and the inquiry was subsequently advertised in 
The Australian on 11 July 2012. The Attorney-General’s Department discussion 
paper was published on the Committee website. Letters inviting submissions 
were sent to over 130 stakeholders in both federal and state government, the 
telecommunications industry, civil liberties and privacy non-government 
organisations, and peak legal bodies and associations with an expected interest 
in the reforms canvassed. 
1.6 The Committee received 240 submissions and 29 exhibits. These are outlined in 
Appendices A and B. Three submissions were received in largely identical terms 
from some 5,300 individual members of the public. These submitters expressed 
opposition to the reform proposals, and to a mandatory data retention regime in 
particular. The Committee thanks these members of the public for contributing to 
the inquiry and making their concerns known. 
1.7 At all times it was the Committee’s preference for submission to be made public. 
Confidentiality was granted by the Committee where the information had a 
national security classification such as SECRET or where a submitter made a 
special request for such confidentiality to the Committee. 
1.8 Whilst it is the Committee’s preference to be open and transparent the use of 
classified evidence has meant this has not always been possible.  
1.9 The Committee is grateful to ASIO and ASIS for providing unclassified 
submissions. This was particularly helpful in the writing of this report. 
1.10 The Committee held six public hearings, three private classified hearings and a 
further private hearing. The witnesses who appeared at these hearings are 
outlined in Appendices C and D.  
1.11 In addition to its public and classified hearings, the Committee received private 
briefings from the Attorney-General on two occasions, and received a further 
private briefing from the Secretary and officials of the Attorney-General’s 
Department. 
1.12 As the Committee commenced its inquiry, the Government of the United 
Kingdom issued a draft Communications Data Bill which has similarities to 
potential reforms in the Australian Government’s proposals. The Bill was 
examined by the British Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and a Joint 
Select Committee of the UK Parliament. The Committee held a private meeting 
with the ISC where the reform proposals in each country were canvassed. The 
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Committee appreciated the observations and assistance provided by ISC 
members and their Secretariat. 
1.13 Finally, the Committee visited Telstra’s Global Operations Centre and received 
useful briefings from Telstra’s staff. 
1.14 Having commenced the inquiry at the beginning of July 2012, the Committee was 
asked to report if at all possible by the end of the calendar year. This afforded the 
Committee a highly compressed and unachievable time frame of less than six 
months to examine what is an extensive list of potential reforms, some of which 
are far reaching.  
1.15 The Committee thanks all submitters and witnesses, including the large number 
of members of the public who submitted, for their contributions to the 
Committee’s examination of this package of potential reforms of national 
security legislation.  
1.16 While the evidence submitted was heavily focussed on data retention, the 
Committee carefully examined each proposal within the Terms of Reference. In 
its recommendations the Committee has outlined a strategy for the further 
development of the potential reforms to national security legislation. Specifically, 
the Committee believes that detailed consideration of any draft legislative 
provisions will be necessary. Public consultation must be part of this 
consideration. As part of this consultation the Committee sees merit in expressly 
seeking the views of key stakeholders including the Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor, oversight bodies, privacy advocates, the 
telecommunications sector, law enforcement and national security agencies.  
Structure of the report 
1.17 This report focuses around the terms of reference, and thus comprises four 
chapters. The following chapters discuss: 
 Chapter Two – reform of the government’s ability to intercept 
telecommunications content and data via the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979; 
 Chapter Three – reform of telecommunications sector security and relevant 
legislation such as the Telecommunications Act 1997; and 
 Chapter Four – reform of the legislation governing the functions and activities 
of Australia’s intelligence community, including the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001. 
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 Chapter Five – data retention. 
1.18 The Terms of Reference group the proposed reforms into three broad categories: 
 Matters the Government wishes to progress; 
 Matters the Government is considering; and, 
 Matters on which the Government expressly seeks the views of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. 
1.19 Due to the complexity and number of issues raised in the Terms of Reference it 
has not always been possible or logical for the Committee to address its 
comments in accordance with the three broad groupings noted above. 
Chapter Two 
1.20 Chapter two looks at a series of proposed reforms to the telecommunications 
interception regime that are designed to better reflect the ‘contemporary 
communications environment’.1 
1.21 In particular, the AGD identified four aspects of the legislation as requiring 
reform: 
 Strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections in line with 
contemporary community expectations; 
 Reforming the lawful access regime for agencies; 
 Streamlining and reducing complexity; and 
 Modernising the cost sharing framework.2 
1.22 Chapter two deals with each of these areas in detail.  
Chapter Three 
1.23 Chapter three looks at emerging challenges to the security of telecommunications 
data: 
Risks to the availability, confidentiality and integrity of our national 
telecommunications infrastructure can come from hardware 
vulnerabilities, accidental misconfiguration, external hacking and even 
trusted insiders.3 
 
1  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 12. 
2  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 22. 
3  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 29. 
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1.24 The implications of these risks are significant, especially given that Australian 
businesses, individuals and public sector actors rely on telecommunication 
carriers and carriage service providers’ (C/CSPs) ability to store and transmit 
their data safely and securely, and to protect it from potential national security 
threats. The discussion paper notes that: 
Failure to effectively manage national security risks therefore has 
implications beyond individual C/CSPs; it is a negative externality 
affecting government, business and individual Australians.4 
1.25 The chapter looks at the proposed package of reforms to the Telecommunications 
Act 1997 and associated legislation to establish this regulatory framework. 
Chapter Four 
1.26 Chapter four deals with a number of practical difficulties with the legislation 
governing the operation of the Australian Intelligence Community which is 
comprised of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Defence Signals Directorate 
(DSD), and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), the 
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the Office of National Assessments 
(ONA).5 
1.27 In relation to these difficulties, the discussion paper canvasses a number of 
reforms to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) 
and the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act). According to the discussion paper, 
these reforms are necessary to: 
...maintain the intelligence gathering capabilities of the Australian 
intelligence agencies, ensuring they remain able to adeptly respond to 
emerging and enduring threats to security. Proposed reforms seek to 
continue the recent modernisation of security legislation to ensure the 
intelligence community can continue to meet the demands of government 
in the most effective manner.6 
 
4  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 29. An externality refers to a cost or benefit that accrues to actors which are not 
directly involved in a transaction. 
5  On 3 May 2013 the Government announced its intention to rename the DSD and DIGO as the 
Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO) 
respectively. <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-and-minister-for-
defence-joint-media-release-2013-defence-white-paper-renaming-the-defence-signals-directorate-and-
the-defence-imagery-and-geospatial-organisation/>, viewed on 6 May 2013. 
 
6  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 40. 
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1.28 Chapter 4 of the report looks into these matters and make recommendations 
where appropriate. 
Chapter Five 
1.29 The Government sought the Committee’s views on a mandatory data retention 
regime.7 The Committee did not have access to draft legislation. Furthermore, the 
inadequate description of data retention in the terms of reference and discussion 
paper also impaired both the public discussion and the Committee’s 
consideration of the data retention issue. 
1.30 By far the most controversial topic on which the Committee was asked to 
provide comment, data retention took up much of the Committee’s time. The 
number of submissions on this issue far exceeded those received on any other 
topic in the terms of reference.  
1.31 In correspondence to the Committee, the Attorney-General defined what could 
potentially be included in a data set for retention. The Attorney-General put 
forward the European Union data retention directive, which can be found at 
Appendix F, as an appropriate model. 
1.32 Many submitters to this inquiry expressed their concerns about content being 
retained under any mandatory data retention regime. However, by the 
conclusion of the evidence gathering phase of the inquiry, the Attorney-General 
and the AGD had categorically stated that it was not the Government’s intention 
to propose a regime that retains content, such as the substance of text messages 
and emails. However as Chapter Five reveals, there was conflicting evidence 
from expert witnesses as to whether this was technically possible. Indeed, one of 
the issues the Committee confronted was the uncertain definitional boundaries 
between data and content. For completeness, the definitional issue of what 
constitutes ‘data’ and ‘content’ is included in chapter five. 
1.33 The issue with which the Committee has grappled arises not primarily from a 
changed threat environment, but from the increasingly rapid development of 
technological capability which has in many cases outpaced the security services’ 
capacity to respond. 
1.34 There is no doubt that the enactment of a mandatory data retention regime 
would be of significant utility to the national security agencies in the 
performance of their intelligence, counter-terrorism and law enforcement 
functions. The Committee takes very seriously the security services’ concerns for 
public safety. 
 
7  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 40. 
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1.35 However, a mandatory data retention regime raises fundamental privacy issues, 
and is arguably a significant extension of the power of the state over the citizen. 
No such regime should be enacted unless those privacy and civil liberties 
concerns are sufficiently addressed 
1.36 Ultimately, the reconciliation of these two fundamental public values is a 
decision for Government to make. 
1.37 The Committee would have been in a better position to assess the merits of such 
a scheme, and the public better placed to comment, had draft legislation been 
provided to it.  
Appendices 
1.38 In addition to the appendices mentioned above, appendices with relevant 
information have been provided to assist the reader of the report. They are as 
follows: 
 Appendix E: Discussion paper, Equipping Australia against emerging and 
evolving threats. 
 Appendix F: Correspondence from the Attorney-General regarding data 
retention. 
 Appendix G: Correspondence from the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s 
Department further clarifying data retention.  
 Appendix H: Telecommunications data provided to law enforcement and 
national security agencies by Telstra. 
 
 2 
 
Telecommunications Interception 
2.1 In its discussion paper, the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) notes that the 
current Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act): 
...reflects the use of telecommunications and the structure of the 
telecommunications industry that existed in 1979 when the Act was made. 
Many of these assumptions no longer apply, creating significant 
challenges for agencies in using and maintaining their investigative 
capabilities under the Act.1 
2.2 Therefore, the Australian Government has proposed a series of reforms to the 
telecommunications interception regime that are designed better reflect the 
‘contemporary communications environment’.2 
2.3 In particular, the AGD identified four aspects of the legislation as requiring 
reform: 
 Strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections in line with 
contemporary community expectations; 
 Reforming the lawful access regime for agencies; 
 Streamlining and reducing complexity; and 
 Modernising the cost sharing framework.3 
2.4 This chapter will examine each of those proposals.  Before doing so, the 
Committee notes the evidence from interception agencies and the AGD that these 
 
1  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 12. 
2  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 12. 
3  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 22. 
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proposals should be considered in the context of a holistic revision of the TIA 
Act: 
The magnitude of current and anticipated change to the 
telecommunications landscape means it is now timely to consider 
whether the privacy needs of Australians and the investigative needs of 
law enforcement and national security agencies are best served through 
continuous ad-hoc change or whether the time is right to put in place a 
new interception framework that squarely focuses on the contemporary 
communications environment. The Department considers that holistic 
reform would establish a new foundation for the interception regime that 
enables users and participants, as well as the broader Australian 
community to understand their powers, rights and obligations.4 
2.5 The Committee’s view on whether a new interception regime is necessary will be 
provided following the consideration of the individual proposals for reform of 
the TIA Act. 
Strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections 
2.6 The AGD discussion paper expresses a desire to examine the ‘safeguards and 
privacy protections under the lawful access to communications regime’ in the 
TIA Act.  In particular, the discussion paper seeks to examine: 
 The legislation’s privacy protection objective; 
 The proportionality tests for issuing warrants; 
 Mandatory record-keeping standards; and 
 Oversight arrangements by Commonwealth and State Ombudsmen.5 
The legislation’s privacy protection objective  
2.7 As the discussion paper notes, the interception of telecommunications is ‘a 
powerful and cost effective tool’ for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
However, the discussion paper also notes that the ability to intercept 
telecommunications data and content must be balanced with the protection of 
privacy: 
The primary objective of the current legislation governing access to 
communications is to protect the privacy of users of telecommunications 
 
4  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, pp. 2-3 
5  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, pp. 7-8. 
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services in Australia by prohibiting covert access to communications 
except as authorised in the circumstances set out in the TIA Act.6 
2.8 The discussion paper proposes that the safeguards and privacy protections of the 
interception regime be strengthened ‘in line with contemporary community 
expectations’. 
2.9 Many of the submissions and much of the testimony provided to the Committee 
focused upon the privacy impact of proposals for reform of the TIA Act, with 
submitters and witnesses noting that one of the primary objectives of the 
telecommunications interception regime is to protect the privacy of people 
against the intrusion of interception. 
2.10 The proposal for a privacy objective drew broad support, from privacy 
advocates, private submitters, law enforcement and investigative agencies alike.  
The Western Australian Police stated: 
It is recognised that the privacy protection objective is a fundamental 
principle which underlies the TIA Act. It is important to protect the 
privacy of users of telecommunications services by prohibiting covert 
access to communications except as authorised by the TIA Act. 
… 
The introduction of a privacy focus objective clause into the TIA Act is 
appropriate, and would ensure that privacy protection is a 
consideration in the interpretation and application of the law.7 
2.11 The Law Council of Australia expressed strong support for the introduction of a 
privacy focused objects clause, and made several suggestions of possible 
provisions on which it could be modelled: 
Such a clause could be modelled on Article 17 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provides that: 
 ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks 
on his honour and reputation.  Everyone has the right to the protection 
of the law against such interference or attacks.’ 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also 
provides a possible model for such an objects clause. It provides that: 
 ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.  There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
 
6  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 12. 
7  Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 6. 
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of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.’8 
2.12 The NSW Council for Civil Liberties indicated that a privacy objective would 
provide an interpretive aid to issuing authorities when considering warrant 
applications: 
A privacy objective should be introduced into the legislation, as the 
Government proposes. It should be made clear that the privacy objective 
limits the operations of government agencies as well as those of other 
persons. This will assist judicial authorities to be tougher in their scrutiny 
of warrant applications. 9 
2.13 The AGD discussion paper refers to strengthening privacy protections in line 
with contemporary community expectations, but provides no detail on what 
those expectations are.  On that point, Privacy Victoria submitted: 
…it is important that we consider what ‘contemporary community 
expectations’ regarding privacy actually are. For example, in 2007 the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner commissioned a survey into 
community attitudes to privacy.  This survey was undertaken at the cusp 
of the social media boom. In the survey, 86% of respondents felt that it 
was a serious breach of privacy where a government department 
monitors an individual’s activities on the internet, recording information 
on sites visited without the individual’s knowledge. Similarly, 50% were 
more concerned than two years previous (2005) about providing 
information over the internet. I consider that these numbers would be 
greater today, given the mass of information collected by electronic 
means.10 
2.14 The Information Commissioner suggested that the Privacy Act 1988 reflects 
community privacy expectations: 
The OAIC considers that the Privacy Act 1988 (C’th) (Privacy Act), as the 
privacy oversight instrument the public is most familiar with, reflects 
existing community expectations. Accordingly, incorporating the core 
principles and values that underpin the Privacy Act into the other privacy 
accountability frameworks will help ensure that they remain consistent 
with community values and expectations.11 
 
8  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, pp. 21-2. 
9  NSW Council for Civil Liberties, Submission No. 175, p. 15. 
10  Privacy Victoria, Submission No. 109, p. 3. 
11  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No. 183, pp. 1-2. 
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2.15 While supportive of a privacy objective, the Western Australian Corruption and 
Crime Commission noted the need to balance privacy with investigative needs: 
The Commission supports the primary objective of the TIA Act which 
seeks to protect the privacy of individuals who use the Australian 
telecommunications system. The TIA Act does this by making it an 
offence to intercept communications passing over the telecommunications 
system. However this needs to be balanced against Australia's law 
enforcement and national security interests.12 
2.16 Similarly, Privacy Victoria assisted the Committee by noting the need to balance 
other considerations: 
Privacy is not an absolute right. A balance must be struck between 
privacy and other rights, including the public interest in protecting the 
safety and security of Australians.  This balancing act is a central tenet to 
privacy legislation around the world, and at times privacy must give way 
to other public and private interests.13 
2.17 The Committee recognises the dual objectives of the TIA Act: to protect the 
privacy of communications by prohibiting unlawful interception, while enabling 
limited interception access for the investigation of serious crime and threats to 
national security.  Express recognition of these objectives within the legislation 
would provide clarity of the purposes of the legislation and some interpretive 
guidance.   
 
 
12  Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission, Submission No. 156, p. 4. 
13  Privacy Victoria, Submission No. 109, p. 1. 
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Recommendation 1 
 The Committee recommends the inclusion of an objectives clause 
within the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 
which: 
 expresses the dual objectives of the legislation –  
⇒ to protect the privacy of communications;  
⇒ to enable interception and access to communications in order 
to investigate serious crime and threats to national security; 
and 
 accords with the privacy principles contained in the Privacy 
Act 1988. 
The proportionality tests for issuing warrants 
2.18 The AGD submission outlined the factors which must be considered by an 
issuing authority prior to issuing telecommunications interception warrants: 
The independent authority may issue the warrant if satisfied from the 
facts outlined in the affidavit that: 
 there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is using or 
is likely to use the service; 
 that information obtained under interception would be likely to assist 
the investigation of a serious offence in which the person is involved; 
 and having regard to: 
⇒ the privacy of any persons likely to be interfered with by 
interception; 
⇒ the gravity of the conduct being investigated; and 
⇒ the extent to which other methods of investigating the offence have 
been exhausted or would prejudice the investigation.14 
2.19 Submitters expressed support for the existence of the proportionality tests within 
the TIA Act, but expressed frustration about the absence of detailed proposals on 
which to comment.  For example, Mr Bernard Keane stated: 
  
 
14  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, Attachment A p. 1. 
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The paper is unclear about exactly what ‘strengthening’ is intended 
beyond a review and consideration of ‘a privacy focused objects clause’.  
Strengthening privacy laws and reviewing checks and balances is of 
course unobjectionable; but AGD has failed to even clearly describe its 
thinking on this important issue.15 
2.20 The Law Council of Australia noted that one way to strengthen the privacy 
protections within the TIA Act is to ensure consistent consideration of the impact 
of privacy before any power under the TIA Act is exercised: 
…the requirement to consider the extent to which the exercise of a power 
will interfere with personal privacy currently applies to the issuing of 
certain TIA Act warrants, but not all. 
For this reason, the Law Council supports the inclusion of a single, 
consistent privacy test in all warrant applications and in all authorisations 
to intercept, access or disclose telecommunications or telecommunications 
data.16 
2.21 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) expressed support for strengthening the 
proportionality test for telecommunications interception warrants, noting that 
the current formulation has ‘becoming increasingly out of balance to the changes 
in the way people communicate, the technology available to communicate and 
the use of that technology to commit crime’.17  As a result, the AFP: 
…sees benefit in strengthening the existing proportionality test to include 
consideration of the overall community good served by the investigation 
for which the interception is sought.18 
2.22 The Western Australia Police submitted that ‘the current provisions of the TIA 
Act provide sufficient scope for the proportionality test to be properly applied’19 
and did not seek change to the proportionality test. 
2.23 The Committee notes the useful discussion of proportionality tests provided by 
the Human Rights Law Centre in its submission:20 
 
15  Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, p. 3.  See also Mr Robert Batten, Submission No. 50, p. 3; Mr Ian 
Quick, Submission No. 95, p. 4. 
16  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 23. 
17  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, p. 8. 
18  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, p. 8. 
19  Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 6. See also: Western Australian Corruption and Crime 
Commission, Submission No. 156, pp. 4-5. 
20  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission No. 140, pp. 2-3. 
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Put broadly, general provisions setting out a proportionality analysis 
require that any limitation of rights be reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
2.24 The Committee considers the TIA Act must continue to require the consideration 
of proportionality in authorising the use of telecommunications interception as 
an intrusive investigative technique.  Given the evidence cited above the 
Committee believes it is appropriate that a review of the TIA Act’s 
proportionality tests be carried out. Any review of the proportionality tests must 
consider a range of matters to be included in the test, including the gravity of the 
conduct being investigated, the privacy intrusion of proposed investigative 
activity, the public interest served by the proposed investigative activity, and 
whether other less privacy intrusive investigative techniques would be effective. 
2.25 The Committee further considers there would be merit when reviewing the 
proportionality tests to examine the application of those tests across the range of 
powers in the TIA Act (interception, access to stored communications, and access 
to telecommunications data). 
 
Recommendation 2 
 The Committee recommends the Attorney-General’s Department 
undertake an examination of the proportionality tests within the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act). Factors 
to be considered in the proportionality tests include the: 
 privacy impacts of proposed investigative activity; 
 public interest served by the proposed investigative activity, 
including the gravity of the conduct being investigated; and 
 availability and effectiveness of less privacy intrusive 
investigative techniques. 
The Committee further recommends that the examination of the 
proportionality tests also consider the appropriateness of applying a 
consistent proportionality test across the interception, stored 
communications and access to telecommunications data powers in the 
TIA Act. 
Mandatory record-keeping standards 
2.26 The AGD discussion paper outlines the current TIA Act record-keeping 
requirements: 
Record keeping and accountability obligations require law enforcement 
agencies  to keep records relating to documents associated with the 
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warrants issued and particulars relating to warrant applications (such as 
whether an application was granted or refused) and each time lawfully 
intercepted information is used, disclosed, communicated, entered into 
evidence or destroyed. Agency heads must also report to the Attorney-
General on the use and communication of intercepted information within 
three months of a warrant ceasing to be in effect.  The Attorney-General’s 
Department must prepare an annual statistical report about the use of 
powers under the TIA Act, which the Attorney-General tables in 
Parliament.21 
2.27 The AGD discussion paper goes on to argue ‘the current regime is focused on 
administrative content rather than recording the information needed to ensure 
that a particular agency’s use of intrusive powers is proportional to the outcomes 
sought’.22  The AGD therefore recommends: 
Consideration should be given to introducing new reporting 
requirements that are less process oriented and more attuned to 
providing the information needed to evaluate whether intrusion to 
privacy under the regime is proportionate to public outcomes.23 
2.28 Two submissions suggested that a streamlined reporting regime could lead to 
significant weakening of oversight.  For example, Mr Bernard Keane stated: 
An alternative view is that ‘inflexible’ and ‘one size fits all’ provisions 
ensure that agencies cannot try to avoid reporting obligations and report 
in a manner that will enable meaningful comparisons over time and with 
other agencies. For relatively minor regulatory requirements, a ‘co‐
regulatory approach’ such as that proposed by AGD might be 
appropriate, but given the serious nature of the issues on which law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies are being asked to report, it is 
wholly inappropriate to leave it up to agencies themselves to determine 
exactly how and what they report within a general remit. This would 
represent a significant weakening of accountability in an area where there 
is already too little scrutiny.24 
2.29 The Committee received evidence from law enforcement agencies regarding the 
application of the existing record-keeping requirements.  For example, the AFP 
stated: 
 
21  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 26. 
22  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 26. 
23  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 26. 
24  Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, p. 3.  See also Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission No. 
121, pp. 12-13 
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The AFP believes the current legislated scheme needs review. It may have 
reached the point where it is too focussed on administrative requirements, 
rather than providing the basis for Parliament and the Ombudsman to 
ensure agencies are using the powers in the Act in a way that is consistent 
with the principles underlying the Act. There would be value in 
redrafting the legislation to include simplified, comprehensible and 
meaningful accountabilities and annual reporting obligations to enhance 
community understanding of the regime and its safeguards.25 
2.30 In support of this observation, the AFP cited the example of the requirement to 
provide a certified copy of each warrant despite the obvious efficiencies 
provided by email or facsimile communications.26 
2.31 Similarly, the Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission submitted: 
The Commission fully supports a robust regime of mandatory record-
keeping standards for agencies exercising powers under the TIA Act. The 
Commission acknowledges that effective oversight of agencies' use of 
these powers requires appropriate record-keeping standards sufficient to 
show compliance with the legislation. However it is the view of the 
Commission that many of the requirements of the current Act create 
unnecessary duplication of records and the creation of further records 
which no longer serve the original purpose of ensuring compliance with 
the Act and the creation of a robust compliance regime.27 
2.32 The Law Council of Australia expressed support for streamlining the record-
keeping requirements of the TIA Act to ensure they provided effective 
accountability: 
The Law Council strongly supports efforts to ensure that the reporting 
requirements and oversight mechanisms contained in the TIA Act are 
‘…attuned to providing the information needed to evaluate whether 
intrusion to privacy under the regime is proportionate to public 
outcomes’, as suggested by the Discussion Paper. This may involve 
review and reform of the different procedural and administrative 
requirements currently contained in the TIA Act relating to reporting, and 
to the role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman and his or her State and 
Territory counterparts. It may also involve consideration of additional or 
alternative mechanisms to enhance accountability under the TIA Act.28 
 
25  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, p. 9. 
26  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, p. 9. 
27  Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission, Submission No. 156, p. 5.  See also Western 
Australia Police, Submission No. 203, pp. 6-7. 
28  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 48. 
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2.33 The Law Council of Australia cautioned against ‘removing requirements for 
agencies to collect and record certain information about the exercise of their 
powers under the Act’ citing the example of the register of warrants maintained 
by the Secretary of the AGD.29 
2.34 The Committee strongly supports the need for record-keeping requirements as a 
means of ensuring meaningful oversight and accountability.  The TIA Act 
enables law enforcement and security agencies to exercise intrusive powers.  It is 
vital to the ongoing ability of those agencies to use those powers to be able to 
demonstrate adherence to the accountability requirements of the TIA Act.  
During the inquiry, the Committee received assurance from the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman’s office and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of 
the high level of accountability discharged by the interception agencies.30 
2.35 The Committee acknowledges, however, that record-keeping is not an end in 
itself, and must be designed to provide substantive rather than administrative 
accountability.  The Committee is satisfied that there is scope for achieving 
efficiencies by reviewing the existing reporting requirements without 
undermining accountability.  Further, the Committee considers there is scope to 
enhance accountability by removing otiose reporting requirements. 
 
Recommendation 3 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 with 
a view to revising the reporting requirements to ensure that the 
information provided assists in the evaluation of whether the privacy 
intrusion was proportionate to the public outcome sought.  
 
Oversight arrangements by the Commonwealth and State Ombudsmen 
2.36 The AGD discussion paper outlines the present oversight arrangements for law 
enforcement agencies: 
Oversight of law enforcement agencies’ use of powers is split between the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and equivalent State bodies in relation to 
interception activities.  The Commonwealth Ombudsman inspects the 
records of both Commonwealth and State agencies in relation to stored 
communications.  This split in responsibility contrasts with the 
 
29  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 48. 
30  See for example, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 8. 
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Surveillance Devices Act 2004, where the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
inspects all agencies.31   
2.37 The AGD goes on to note that the prescriptive form of the TIA Act oversight 
provisions ‘impede the Ombudsman’s ability to report on possible 
contraventions and compliance issues by prescribing detailed and time limited 
procedures that need to be checked for administrative compliance, rather than 
giving the Ombudsman scope to determine better ways of assisting agencies to 
meet their requirements.’32 
2.38 The Committee received submissions from law enforcement agencies expressing 
support for the review of the oversight arrangements to clarify the roles played 
by different oversight bodies.  For example, the Western Australia Police stated: 
The TIA Act currently creates a system based on dual oversight by both 
Commonwealth and State Ombudsman. The role of the oversight body, 
and the scope of inspection, could be better defined within the TIA Act. 
For WA Police, stored communications are inspected by the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, annually. Inspections of all other TI 
Warrants, and the corresponding revocations, destruction of, and 
associated record keeping, is conducted by the State Ombudsman, on a 
regular basis. 
On occasion, the Commonwealth Ombudsman has made comment on the 
content of an affidavit in support of an application for a stored 
communications warrant, and has questioned the appropriateness of the 
application. WA Police is of the opinion that the determination of the 
application, and the appropriateness or otherwise of the information 
contained in the affidavit is a matter for the issuing authority, not the 
oversight body. It is noted that the issuing authority has the power to 
receive information in both written and oral form. 
An examination of the existing oversight arrangements, the clarity of the 
role, and the practicality of a single oversight body is supported by WA 
Police.33 
2.39 Similarly, Telstra noted a desire for consistency of oversight arrangements: 
Telstra agrees that there must be consistent and practical arrangements 
put in place to enable oversight by both Commonwealth and State 
Ombudsmen aimed at strengthening the safeguards and privacy 
 
31  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 26. 
32  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, 
Discussion Paper, July 2012, p. 26. 
33  Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 7. 
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protections under the TIA Act and the Telco Act to ensure the security 
and privacy of customer communications.34 
2.40 The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner noted risks inherent in 
the fragmentation of oversight arrangements: 
…the OAIC notes that the fragmentation of existing oversight 
arrangements can make it difficult for the public to discern which 
oversight body is responsible for overseeing the access and interception 
activities of a particular law enforcement agency. The OAIC is mindful 
that the nature of the activities undertaken by law enforcement agencies 
may mean that, in certain circumstances, it is not appropriate for these 
activities to be made public. In these circumstances, it is particularly 
important that effective oversight arrangements exist to ensure that these 
agencies are not exceeding their lawful authority and to give the public 
confidence that their personal information is being handled in accordance 
with contemporary community expectations. The OAIC suggests that 
providing the public with clear information about which oversight bodies 
are responsible for overseeing the access and interception activities of 
specific law enforcement agencies would provide a more appropriate 
level of transparency.35 
2.41 The Law Council of Australia noted its support for consideration of a model 
similar to the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) whereby the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman would be the sole oversight body for law enforcement agencies 
under the TIA Act: 
The Law Council supports consideration of this model for potential 
application to the TIA Act warrant regime, which currently imposes 
inspection and reporting obligations on State bodies in respect of State 
agencies’ interception activities under the TIA Act. However, if a reform 
of this nature is to be pursued it must be developed in consultation with 
State and Territory Ministers and should not detract from the other 
reporting requirements outlined in the TIA Act…36 
2.42 The Committee believes that reviewing the TIA Act oversight regime to ensure 
the application of consistent standards of accountability and a single perspective 
on best practice is warranted. On the evidence before it, the Committee was not 
persuaded that the Surveillance Devices Act model is appropriate. The 
Committee is also aware of significant jurisdictional issues inherent in 
progressing this matter.. 
 
 
34  Telstra, Submission No. 189, p. 6. 
35  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No. 183, p. 12. 
36  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 50. 
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Recommendation 4 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
undertake a review of the oversight arrangements to consider the 
appropriate organisation or agency to ensure effective accountability 
under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.   
Further, the review should consider the scope of the role to be 
undertaken by the relevant oversight mechanism. 
The Committee also recommends the Attorney-General’s Department 
consult with State and Territory ministers prior to progressing any 
proposed reforms to ensure jurisdictional considerations are addressed. 
  
Reforming the lawful access regime for agencies 
2.43 The second aspect of the legislation in need of reform identified by the AGD 
discussion paper is the current lawful access regime.  The AGD identifies several 
areas for specific examination. First, it seeks to reform the lawful access to 
communications regime contained in the TIA Act by ‘reducing the number of 
agencies eligible to access communications information’. Second, it seeks to 
standardise warrant tests and thresholds. Third, it seeks to expand ‘the basis of 
interception activities’.37  
Reducing the number of agencies eligible to access communications 
information 
2.44 The AGD discussion paper states that a reduction in the number of agencies able 
to access communications information is contemplated ‘on the basis that only 
agencies that have a demonstrated need to access that type of information should 
be eligible to do so.’38 
2.45 A range of submissions cited with approval the proposal to reduce the number of 
agencies able to access communications information, but noted the difficulty in 
identifying which agencies should have these powers removed.  Ms Stella Gray 
commented: 
 
37  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, pp. 8, 9. 
38  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 24. 
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Reducing the number of government agencies which have access to 
individuals’ private communications, reduces the ability to abuse the TIA.  
However, there is insufficient detail here on which agencies are being 
considered for reduction in such powers.39 
2.46 Similarly, Liberty Victoria submitted: 
Liberty Victoria agrees that lawful access by agencies to 
telecommunications data ought to be restricted to protect the privacy 
rights of individuals. Liberty Victoria agrees that reducing the number of 
agencies able to access sensitive data is, in principle, important and 
necessary. Liberty Victoria would, however, like to understand further 
how the Government proposes to determine which agencies are able to 
access this data, to ensure that there are real and substantive security 
benefits proportionate to the greater privacy risks that arise when 
information is more widely disseminated. 
The Discussion Paper’s suggestion that agencies must have a 
‘demonstrated need’ to access information, while a good suggestion 
(indeed, a suggestion that one would have hoped already applied to 
agencies’ access to personal information), is too general to offer a detailed 
response. For example, it does not indicate how ‘need’ would be 
demonstrated as opposed to ‘operational convenience’..40 
2.47 The Attorney-General’s Department outlined to the Committee which agencies 
have access to telecommunications information: 
Currently, access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of 
the TIA Act, which permits an ‘enforcement agency’ to authorise a C/CSP 
to disclose telecommunications data where it is reasonably necessary for 
the enforcement of the criminal law, a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, 
or the protection of the public revenue. There are separate provisions 
enabling access for national security purposes. 
An enforcement agency is broadly defined as all interception agencies as 
well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a 
pecuniary penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the 
public revenue. In practice, the range of agencies that are enforcement 
agencies and which authorise the disclosure of telecommunications data 
is very broad and includes Shire Councils, Government Departments and 
Agencies such as Centrelink and bodies as the Royal Society for the 
 
39  Ms Stella Gray, Submission No. 152, p. 7. 
40  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 6.  See also Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, pp. 3-4; 
Senator Scott Ludlum, Submission No. 146, p. 3; Mr Ian Quick, Submission No. 95, p. 5. 
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) (which plays a role in 
investigating assaults and other criminal acts against animals).41 
2.48 The Committee noted that in 2010-11 there were 251,631 requests for access to 
telecommunications data from a variety of agencies including police forces, anti-
corruption bodies, Commonwealth and State and territory departments, local 
shire councils, animal protection authorities, roads authorities, revenue offices, 
and child support agencies.42 
2.49 Ms Irene Graham submitted that the range of agencies able to access stored 
communications and communications data should be reduced: 
The range of agencies should certainly be reduced, and probably most 
especially by deleting all, or most, of the civil and pecuniary penalty 
agencies that acquired power to obtain access to stored communications 
when the ‘stored communications’ warrants were introduced in 2006 
(although such agencies were not and still are not authorised to obtain 
interception warrants). 
… 
There absolutely does need to be a competent review conducted into 
which of such agencies have a clearly demonstrated need to access stored 
communications and/or telecommunications ‘data’ in specific 
circumstances, together with consideration of the type of offences and the 
penalties that apply to any offences in relation to which such agencies 
claim ‘a need’.43 
2.50 Telstra submitted the TIA Act could be amended to differentiate between types 
of telecommunications data, with limited agencies being permitted to access sets 
of data considered to be more sensitive: 
Telstra believes there is some merit in adopting a two-tiered 
communications data access regime to address potential risks of allowing 
access to customer data for the investigation of lesser offences. Under this 
type of regime, data readily available through C/CSP customer 
information systems could be provided under the current threshold test 
and would potentially remain accessible to a larger number of 
enforcement agencies and LENSAs [Law Enforcement and National 
Security Agencies]. 
Under this construct, access to more intrusive communications data, e.g. 
URLs, IP addresses or ‘created’ tailored data sets proposed under the data 
 
41  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, p. 9. 
42  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Annual Report 2010-11, pp. 62-5. 
43  Ms Irene Graham, Submission No. 135, p. 5. 
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retention regime, would only be provided to a limited number of LENSAs 
and would require higher approval thresholds to be satisfied.44 
2.51 An alternative approach was submitted by the Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance in their joint 
submission: 
The Associations believe that rather than looking to define the number of 
agencies that are eligible to access communications information (that 
being content and transactional data), a preferred approach should be to 
reserve access to communications information solely for purposes of 
addressing instances of serious crime or threats to national security. The 
nature of the crime/threat in each instance would then determine the type 
of information required, and the agency/agencies who are eligible to 
obtain access. If this approach is taken it will be important to be clear 
about what constitutes ‘serious crime’.45 
2.52 The Committee was not able within the confines of this inquiry to examine the 
justification for each enforcement agency to be able to continue to access 
telecommunications data.  It was clear from the evidence however that the 
present definition of enforcement agency, being broad and inexhaustive, leaves 
the potential for many agencies to request access to telecommunications data 
without independent scrutiny other than from the telecommunications providers 
who receive those requests.  This is not an acceptable burden to place on 
telecommunications providers, nor is the Committee convinced that this is an 
effective accountability mechanism. 
2.53 The Committee considers the appropriate mechanism to justify access to 
telecommunications data is the threshold at which access is granted.  The 
threshold acts to establish the level of gravity of the conduct which must be 
under investigation before the privacy intrusion of accessing telecommunications 
data can be justified. 
2.54 The Committee is satisfied that access to telecommunications data for serious 
crime and threats to security is justified.  Access for agencies not enforcing the 
criminal law or investigating security threats should be subject to further review. 
 
 
44  Telstra, Submission No. 189, p. 6. 
45  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, 
p. 7. 
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Recommendation 5 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
review the threshold for access to telecommunications data.  This review 
should focus on reducing the number of agencies able to access 
telecommunications data by using gravity of conduct which may be 
investigated utilising telecommunications data as the threshold on 
which access is allowed. 
Standardise warrant tests and thresholds 
2.55 In its submission to the Committee, the AGD addressed possible changes to the 
tests for telecommunications interception warrants, specifically the threshold at 
which interception warrants are available: 
Warrants relating to accessing real-time content are traditionally limited 
to investigating an offence that carries a penalty of at least seven years 
imprisonment: a ‘serious offence’ as defined in section 5D of the TIA Act. 
Section 5D is an exhaustive list which includes offences by reference to 
other Commonwealth legislation (such as an offence against Part 10.7 of 
the Criminal Code Act 1995) or of a certain type (such as murder) or 
involving certain conduct (such as trafficking in prescribed substances) all 
of which generally require at least seven years imprisonment. 
… 
The Department considers that these requirements should not change: 
access to real-time content should continue to be subject to an 
independently issued warrant for the investigation of a serious offence. 
… 
The Department is concerned that the growing complexity of section 5D 
of the TIA Act is inefficient in terms of police resources needed to clarify 
the application of the provision in specific circumstances and, more 
importantly, potentially privacy invasive in its lack of clarity about how 
and … 
The Department considers that the interception regime would offer 
greater privacy protection if the distinction between stored and live 
warrants was removed and if a standard threshold for both content and 
stored communications warrants was introduced.46 
2.56 The issue of a standard threshold for TIA Act warrants attracted significant 
evidence for the Committee’s consideration.  Many submitters acknowledged the 
potential administrative efficiencies to be gained from standardisation, but 
 
46    Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, p. 5. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION 27 
 
objected to the potential for warrant thresholds to be lowered.  For example, 
Liberty Victoria submitted: 
Standardisation of interception warrant tests must not compromise 
human rights – Liberty Victoria recognises that there may be operational 
benefits in standardising various warrant tests. However, we are 
concerned to ensure that any standardisation process does not 
compromise human rights in the name of operational efficiencies. In 
particular, we oppose any reduction of the general threshold for 
interception so that it applies to offences with maximum penalties of less 
than 7 years’ imprisonment.47 
2.57 The Committee also received extensive evidence from law enforcement agencies 
regarding the complexity of the present threshold for telecommunications 
interception warrants.  For example, Victoria Police submitted: 
The definition of serious offence pursuant to section 5D of the TIA Act is 
long, complex and outdated and it excludes offences which should be so 
classified. There are offences Victoria Police routinely investigates that are 
serious in nature, but are not specified in the definition or only become 
serious offences if they meet certain additional conditions such as being 
part of a series of offences, involve substantial planning and organisation 
and sophisticated methods and techniques. 
Offences that are serious in nature but are not captured in this section 
include blackmail and perverting the course of justice, where an 
investigative method such as telecommunications interception would 
assist in the investigation of offenders charged with serious crimes 
attempting to arrange false alibis or have witnesses change their 
statement and/or provide false evidence.48 
2.58 Similarly the Western Australia Police submitted: 
At present, under the TIA Act, it is not possible to obtain an interception 
warrant with respect to offences which carry a penalty of less than 7 years 
imprisonment but which may be preparatory to more serious offending. 
For example, precursor or preparatory crimes could include selling 
unregistered firearms, pervert the course of justice or stealing a motor 
vehicle. The ability to intercept communications in relation to precursor 
offences may assist in the prevention of more serious offending. 
WA Police would welcome an examination of the current definition of 
serious offence and serious contravention contained in the TIA Act 
 
47  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 2.  See also Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, p. 4; 
Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission No. 121, p. 13; Pirate Party Australia, Submission No. 134, p. 
12; and Ms Stella Gray, Submission No. 152, p. 8. 
48  Victoria Police, Submission No. 200, p. 7. 
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(section 5D and section 5E). The current definition is complex and 
unwieldy, and requires simplification.49 
2.59 The appropriate threshold for access to the content of communications is a 
complex issue.  As noted by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, stored communications warrants are available for pecuniary 
penalty offences in addition to the threshold set by a period of imprisonment: 
In the main, telephone interception is limited to investigation of serious 
offences under criminal law where the conduct is punishable by seven 
years’ imprisonment or more. In contrast, stored communications 
warrants can be issued by a judge for serious contraventions of civil or 
criminal law involving a fine or pecuniary penalty equivalent to at least 
$19,800 (individuals) or $99,000 (businesses), as well as for serious 
criminal offences capable of interception.50 
2.60 Rather than lowering the existing threshold, the Law Council of Australia 
advocated lifting the relevant thresholds: 
The Law Council is of the view that it is appropriate for the offence 
threshold for stored communication warrants to be reviewed and raised 
to apply only to criminal offences. Consideration should also be given to 
raising this threshold to ‘serious offences’, as defined in section 5D of the 
TIA Act, in recognition of the private nature of stored communication 
information and to better align the stored communication warrant process 
with that required for telecommunication interception warrants.51 
2.61 As stated by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, ‘proposals to 
standardise security warrant tests and thresholds must take into account the 
nature of each of these warrants and the level of intrusiveness.’52 
2.62 The Committee notes that there are differing penalty thresholds within the TIA 
Act, and between the TIA Act and other electronic surveillance powers (such as 
the Surveillance Devices Act 2004).  The appropriate threshold for access to 
telecommunications and access to stored communications (whether they be 
combined under a single test) requires a careful consideration of the: 
 proportionality of the investigative need and the privacy intrusion; 
 gravity of the conduct to be investigated by these investigative means; 
 scope of the offences included and excluded by a particular threshold; 
 
49  Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 8. 
50  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission No. 192, p. 5. 
51  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 30. 
52  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 9. 
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 impact on law enforcement agencies investigative capabilities, including those 
accessing stored communications when investigating pecuniary penalty 
offences; and 
 privacy impact. 
2.63 The Committee is not able, upon the evidence before it, to reach a final position 
about the appropriate threshold for access to telecommunications and stored 
communication.  Rather, the Committee is attracted to the proposal from the AFP 
for a further review to consider this issue: 
The appropriateness of these separate warrant tests and offence 
thresholds should be reviewed taking into consideration the 
contemporary use of communications in society generally and by persons 
of interest in the commission of crime, and the nature of the technology 
underpinning telecommunications and internet communication services. 
A key example of this is the increasing use of stored communication as a 
means of covert communication.  
From a law enforcement perspective such a review needs to take into 
account the basis of the gravity of the conduct; the increasingly 
ubiquitous nature of telecommunications content and stored 
communications as evidence of the commission of an increasing number 
of offences that cause significant harm to the community, and the 
transitory nature of that content. It may be that the differentiation 
currently imposed between the two forms of content is no longer 
appropriate and that a reviewed and unified threshold would be more 
appropriate to meet both community expectations and law enforcements 
needs.53 
 
2.64 The Committee notes that telecommunications interception warrants may be 
issued for the investigation of offences with a maximum penalty of at least seven 
years imprisonment but stored communications warrants may be issued for the 
investigation of offences with a significantly lower threshold of at least three 
years imprisonment as a maximum penalty. There is arguably very little 
difference in the privacy impact carried out if communications are accessed live 
via interception or after the communication takes place when accessed with a 
stored communications warrant. The Committee is of the view that covert access 
to communications should not distinguish between access methods, and that 
therefore the penalty threshold should be standardised. 
 
53  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, pp. 9-10. 
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Recommendation 6 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the standardisation of thresholds for accessing the content of 
communications.  The standardisation should consider the: 
 privacy impact of the threshold; 
 proportionality of the investigative need and the privacy 
intrusion; 
 gravity of the conduct to be investigated by these investigative 
means; 
 scope of the offences included and excluded by a particular 
threshold; and 
 impact on law enforcement agencies’ investigative capabilities, 
including those accessing stored communications when 
investigating pecuniary penalty offences. 
 
Expanding the basis of interception activities 
2.65 The AGD discussion paper describes the challenge to the ongoing effectiveness 
of telecommunications interception as follows: 
Telecommunications interception and access to communications data are 
unique and fundamental tools that cannot be replaced by other 
investigative techniques.  They are cost effective, timely, low risk and 
extremely successful tools in obtaining intelligence and evidence.  
Substantial and rapid changes in communications technology and the 
business environment are rapidly eroding agencies’ ability to intercept.  
Adapting the regime governing the lawful access to communications is a 
fundamental first step in arresting the serious decline in agencies’ 
capabilities.54 
2.66 The Committee notes the effectiveness of telecommunications interception as an 
investigative technique.  The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
Annual Report for 2010-11 notes that intercepted information contributed to 2441 
arrests, 3168 prosecutions, and 2034 convictions for the 2010-11 financial year.55 
2.67 The Committee took evidence on the decline in agencies’ interception capability, 
referred to as ‘going dark’: 
 
54  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 23. 
55  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Annual Report 2010-11, pp. 42, 44-5. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION 31 
 
In terms of this concept of going dark, it is certainly something that is 
being increasingly discussed amongst the law enforcement fraternity and 
it is a recognition primarily of these new technologies that we are unable 
to intercept for a range of reasons. That is one of the areas that I would 
respectfully suggest that the committee needs to consider in terms of the 
ongoing viability of telecommunications interception generally.56 
2.68 The AFP submitted that the telecommunications environment has shifted 
considerably since 1979 resulting in significant challenges to interception: 
That industry environment no longer exists. Several service or application 
providers may be involved in any one communication event. Individuals 
often use multiple devices and applications to communicate and free 
accounts can be established quickly and with no clear connection to a real 
life identity. Further, the current approach presupposes that the 
communications are between people using devices, not machine based 
communications as may be used through botnets or other internet based 
crimes where communications content is an important source of evidence. 
Into the future, given the move from circuit based to IP based 
telecommunication services, identifying communications between 
persons will become increasing challenging. 
In light of this it is no longer viable to continue to base interception solely 
on the traditional network identifiers prescribed in the TIA Act. For this 
reason the AFP considers additional bases for interception such as the 
concept of communications of interest that relate to the offence under 
investigation would be of benefit. This concept could include the source 
of a communication, the destination of a communication, and the type of 
communication.57  
2.69 The Committee heard evidence that a proposal for ‘attribute based interception’ 
would assist in countering the decline of capability caused by technological and 
counter-security measures.  The Western Australia Corruption and Crime 
Commission explained the proposal: 
Being able to identify particular communications within the service, for 
example, may allow agencies to exclude or include particular 
communications through relevant identifiers. For example, if an internet 
based interception were to be conducted on a user's account the agency 
may only be interested in particular communications such as those linked 
to an email address or internet chat protocol. By expanding the basis for 
interception activity, agencies may be able to exclude other 
 
56  Detective Inspector Gavan Seagrave, Transcript, 5 September 2012, pp. 29-30. 
57  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, pp. 12-13. 
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communications thereby better targeting the communications of interest 
and providing greater privacy protection by excluding other content.58 
2.70 A range of submissions noted the potential privacy protection which could be 
achieved by introducing a warrant which better targeted communications on the 
basis of specific attributes.  Those submissions noted however the need to ensure 
appropriate oversight and accountability of the proposed warrant type: 
The Law Council recognises the challenges existing and emerging 
telecommunications technologies pose for agencies attempting to 
accurately identify the communications they intend to intercept or access. 
For this reason, the Law Council generally supports efforts to develop a 
warrant regime that focuses on better targeting the characteristics of a 
communication and enables it to be isolated from communications that 
are not of interest. However, the Law Council is keen to ensure that any 
proposed ‘simplification of the warrant process’ does not occur at the 
expense of specific provisions designed to ensure that each particular 
device or service to be intercepted or communication to be accessed is 
clearly identified and shown to be justifiable and necessary, and that it 
occurs in a manner that has the least intrusive impact on individual rights 
and privacy.59 
2.71 Liberty Victoria similarly expressed in principle support subject to appropriate 
oversight and accountability arrangements: 
Liberty Victoria is not at this stage opposed to further consideration being 
given to expanding interception obligations from the network/service 
layer to the application layer. Interception at the network/service layer 
often involves casting the net of information to be intercepted too broadly, 
with a greater risk of capturing irrelevant and innocent communications. 
However, any expansion must be accompanied by the adoption of 
appropriate safeguards and accountability mechanisms.60 
2.72 Other submissions expressed concern at the potential impact on privacy which 
may result from expanding the basis of interception: 
When viewed in the context of a proportional response to the current 
threat landscape I do not feel that the expansion of interception activities 
as outlined in the ToR and discussion paper are proportional to the 
massive invasion of privacy entailed. The cost to our privacy is too high in 
relation to a threat that if anything is subsiding and to which it appears 
 
58  WA Corruption and Crime Commission, Submission No. 156, p. 10. 
59  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 31 
60  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 3. 
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the security agencies of our nation have enough tools to combat 
effectively anyway.61 
2.73 The AGD submission described the present considerations an issuing authority 
must address prior to issuing a telecommunications interception warrant: 
The independent authority may issue the warrant if satisfied from the 
facts outlined in the affidavit that: 
 there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is using or 
is likely to use the service 
 that information obtained under interception would be likely to assist 
the investigation of a serious offence in which the person is involved 
 and having regard to: 
⇒ the privacy of any persons likely to be interfered with by 
interception 
⇒ the gravity of the conduct being investigated, and 
⇒ the extent to which other methods of investigating the offence have 
been exhausted or would prejudice the investigation.62 
2.74 The Committee received evidence from the Commonwealth Ombudsman and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.  No issue of substantive non-
compliance by the interception agencies was raised before the Committee.  The 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security did raise, however, a range of 
issues for consideration should this proposal be adopted: 
A key issue to be considered in this proposal is whether the warrants 
would be limited to interception based on the ‘characteristics’ described 
in the initial warrant (similar to a service warrant) or whether ASIO 
would itself be able to vary the warrant to add or remove ‘characteristics’ 
(similar to a named person warrant). If the proposal is for the latter then 
there needs to be certainty as to the parameters within which 
‘characteristics’ can be added. 
… 
A further issue is the technological capacity to actually undertake this 
type of ‘characteristic’-based interception – including whether the carriers 
should be responsible for collecting, processing and delivering the 
communications of interest or whether the agencies should be permitted 
to collect and retain large amounts of information in order to find the 
communications of interest. It is outside my area of focus to comment on 
the technology, cost or burden sharing aspects of the proposal. However I 
would expect to see any regime include appropriate measures to ensure 
 
61  Mr Daniel Judge, Submission No. 157, p. 9.  See also J Trevaskis, Submission No. 62, p. 8; Mr Mark 
Newton, Submission No. 87, p. 9, and James (no further details), Submission No. 7. 
62  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, Attachment A p. 1 
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that the content of communications which were not the specific target of 
the warrant were not retained longer than necessary for ‘sorting’ and to 
ensure that such information is kept secure. 
One of the important accountability and oversight requirements of the 
current regime is the requirement that ASIO provide a report to the 
Attorney-General after the expiration or revocation of each warrant. The 
report must include details of the telecommunications service to or from 
each intercepted communication was made as well as the extent to which 
the warrant has assisted ASIO in carrying out its functions. This measure 
would be particularly important in maintaining oversight and 
accountability of any discretion to add new characteristics for 
interception.63 
2.75 The Committee agrees with the need to ensure that telecommunications 
interception powers remain subject to appropriate accountability and oversight, 
including a robust system for obtaining telecommunications interception 
warrants from independent issuing authorities who have considered the privacy, 
proportionality and investigative necessity of proposed interception activities. 
2.76 The Committee notes the potential for attribute based interception to assist in 
arresting the decline of interception capability, while also offering additional 
privacy protections by better targeting communications which are of particular 
relevance to the serious crime or national security threat which is being 
investigated. 
2.77 Possible attributes which may be used in these warrants include: 
 Time of a communication; 
 Location of a communication; and 
 an identifier or address that uniquely identifies a service or account. 
 
 
63  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, pp. 11-12. 
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Recommendation 7 
 The Committee recommends that interception be conducted on the basis 
of specific attributes of communications. 
The Committee further recommends that the Government model 
‘attribute based interception’ on the existing named person interception 
warrants, which includes: 
 the ability for the issuing authority to set parameters around 
the variation of attributes for interception; 
 the ability for interception agencies to vary the attributes for 
interception; and 
 reporting on the attributes added for interception by an 
authorised officer within an interception agency. 
In addition to Parliamentary oversight, the Committee recommends that 
attribute based interception be subject to the following safeguards and 
accountability measures: 
 attribute based interception is only authorised when an issuing 
authority or approved officer is satisfied the facts and grounds indicate 
that interception is proportionate to the offence or national security 
threat being investigated; 
 oversight of attribute based interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of attribute based 
interception. 
 
Streamlining and reducing complexity 
2.78 The AGD discussion paper also identified the need to reduce complexity in the 
lawful access regime as a driver of potential reform. As such, it sought an 
examination of: 
 Ways to simplify the provisions that allow the various agencies to share 
information and cooperate; 
 The removal of legislative duplication; and 
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 The creation of a single warrant with multiple telecommunications 
interception powers.64 
Simplifying the information sharing provisions that allow agencies to 
cooperate 
2.79 The TIA Act is drafted in prescriptive terms, based on the premise that 
interception is prohibited unless authorised by one of the limited exceptions.  
The prescriptive nature of the regime continues in the provisions which regulate 
the use and communication of intercepted information.  The AGD Discussion 
paper explains: 
Information obtained under the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 is subject to more rigorous legislative protections than 
other forms of information in an agency’s possession.  The provisions are 
detailed and complex in relation to record keeping, retention and 
destruction and can present a barrier to effective information sharing both 
within an agency and between agencies.  This was not an issue when the 
Act was enacted and applied only to ASIO and the AFP, but with more 
agencies now defined as interception agencies and the national and 
transnational nature of many contemporary security and law enforcement 
investigations, effective co-operation within and between agencies is 
critical.   
Simplifying the current information sharing provisions would support co-
operative arrangements between agencies and consideration could be 
given to the ways in which information sharing amongst agencies could 
be facilitated.65 
2.80 The NSW Police argued that the prescriptive approach inhibits interagency 
cooperation and impedes agencies’ abilities to cooperate effectively: 
Further, the access to and the subsequent use of information is framed 
throughout the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 as one 
agency undertaking one investigation which will lead to a prosecution. I 
think that the act needs to be reformed to reflect new operational realities, 
including the different functions of agencies within the act and the fact 
that effective information sharing is a key component of successful 
investigations. The current information-sharing and dissemination 
scheme contained in the act is complex, confusing and cumbersome. The 
current provisions were not designed with joint agency operations in 
 
64  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, pp. 8-9. 
65  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 25. 
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mind and are considered to be overly restrictive, with the default position 
being to prohibit communication of information that has been obtained 
lawfully. 
Whilst acknowledging privacy concerns—and we do acknowledge 
privacy concerns and the intrusive nature of telephone interception—a 
simplified, more permissive information-sharing communication model 
really does need to be adopted. If agencies are going to be encouraged 
and properly equipped to perform their functions and to cooperate 
effectively, then we need to be allowed to disseminate, communicate or 
share information where there is a legitimate reason to do so. Naturally, 
appropriate oversight and safeguards need to be and must be 
incorporated in such a scheme. But, overall, it is the agencies that readily 
use this legislation that I think are best placed to assist in its reform and 
the New South Wales Police Force is in an excellent position to provide 
further input from an operational perspective.66 
2.81 The NSW Police supported the argument for reform with the following examples 
of current operational impediments: 
As an example, if we were tapping a telephone and, as a result of some 
information which came across that phone, we had concerns that 
someone was carrying a firearm on the street but we were not in a 
position to take any action, we cannot post that intelligence on a warning 
system for our officers. We would like to be able to put out a warning 
saying, ‘If you pull this vehicle over with that person driving, be careful—
intelligence suggests that they are armed.’ 
Another example might be where we have an interception operation 
running and, as a result of that, we come across some information about a 
child abuse situation. In that setting, we are not at liberty even to advise a 
child protection authority that there is a telephone interception running. 
That is because we are not able to use that lawfully intercepted 
information. That is difficult. We encounter that every day.67 
2.82 Victoria Police submitted the current TIA Act regime is too restrictive, and 
inhibits community protection: 
While it is important that there are strict controls over the sharing of 
information, Victoria Police investigators have on occasion found the 
legislation to be too restrictive. There have been instances where lawfully 
intercepted information would be of high importance to other 
organisations providing a function in the service of the community, but 
 
66  Commissioner Andrew Scipione, Transcript, 26 September 2012, pp. 17-18.  See also Western Australia 
Police, Submission No. 156, p. 6. 
67  Commissioner Andrew Scipione, Transcript, 26 September 2012, p. 25. 
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Victoria Police is legislatively prevented from providing it. For example, if 
an interception identifies that a child is at risk of harm from its parents, 
this information cannot be communicated to child protection agencies. 
Similarly, where investigators identify the inappropriate dealings of a 
prison officer, this information cannot be passed on to prison authorities.68 
2.83 A number of submissions noted in-principle support for streamlined information 
sharing provisions, citing the need for effective collaboration between law 
enforcement and national security agencies.  That support, however, was subject 
to concerns that simplified information sharing provisions should not intrude 
upon privacy to any extent greater than is necessary for the purpose of the 
investigation.  The Liberty Victoria submission is illustrative in this regard: 
Liberty Victoria acknowledges that there is an increasing need for 
agencies defined as ‘interception agencies’ – including those responsible 
for national and transnational security and law enforcement 
investigations – to share information with one another. The nature of 
transnational security concerns means that agencies other than ASIO and 
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) are involved in investigations which 
impact the security of Australia, as well as Australian citizens within 
Australia and abroad. 
However, as noted above in relation to standardisation of the tests and 
thresholds relating to warrants, detailed information-sharing provisions 
may reflect a desire to appropriately balance the right to privacy against 
security considerations. Careful consideration will therefore need to be 
given about whether the complexity of information-sharing provisions is 
justified. In Liberty Victoria’s view, any broadening of scope to allow 
additional information-sharing between agencies should be taken 
seriously and with the upmost concern for privacy. Again, while Liberty 
Victoria recognises the need to facilitate information-sharing between 
agencies in some cases, there is insufficient detail in the Discussion Paper 
for stakeholders to comment in detail.69 
2.84 Similarly, Ms Stella Gray expressed concern that streamlined information sharing 
did not become unregulated information centralisation: 
It is fair and reasonable to assume that if an agency obtains evidence of a 
crime that is outside their jurisdiction to pursue, they should be able share 
that evidence with the relevant agency. However, they should only share 
the evidence relevant to the crime in question. If agencies were allowed to 
share the entirety of communications intercepted under the original 
warrant, this would be a clear case of overreach, and has severe 
 
68  Victoria Police, Submission No. 200, p. 11.  See also Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 9. 
69  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, pp. 8-9. 
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implications for citizens’ privacy. It is crucial that all information gathered 
from warrants remains stored separately as a privacy safeguard. If this 
aspect of information sharing is not treated with precision, there will be a 
temptation to create a central database accessible by all agencies, which is 
a security and privacy risk in itself.70 
2.85 Mr Bernard Keane submitted that the case for simplified information sharing had 
not been made: 
The argument that information should be more easily shared between 
agencies is a glib one, and the only justification advanced in the paper is 
that ‘effective co‐operation within and between agencies is critical.’ This 
of course is assertion rather than argument; no effort is made by AGD to 
explain what failings are currently occurring because of the legislative 
restraints on his intercepted data can be shared. 
… 
AGD has offered no justification for violating the long‐standing 
philosophy that intercepted information should only be used for the 
purposes for which it was collected, rather than becoming a common 
treasure trove to be dipped into by all law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies at will.71 
2.86 The Pirate Party Australia expressed support for enhanced reporting, but did not 
support a reduction in accountability: 
We support security agencies providing more relevant information about 
the proportionality of any use of their invasive powers, while opposing 
any streamlining that reduces the ability of investigative bodies to 
uncover corruption or abuse of power.72 
2.87 The AFP submission included several case studies to illustrate that the current 
prescriptive information sharing provisions impede operational collaboration.  
The AFP stated: 
The complex and evolving nature of transnational crime means that no 
one agency can effectively conduct complex investigations. Collaboration 
is an essential element in achieving operational goals. The TIA Act as it 
currently stands impedes the effective exchange of lawfully obtained 
communications information and reduces the efficiency of operational 
partnerships. Simplified, principle based use and disclosure rules would 
be more consistent with the modern approach to cooperation between 
 
70  Ms Stella Gray, Submission No. 152, p. 7. 
71  Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, p. 4. 
72  Pirate Party Australia, Submission No. 134, p. 13. 
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agencies and assist in assuring information obtained under lawful 
interception is maximised appropriately to serve the public good.73 
2.88 The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner acknowledged the 
necessity of information sharing to effective investigative collaboration, but 
noted the need to ensure clarity of obligations and standards regarding the 
protection of the privacy of personal information due to fragmented information 
handling obligations: 
[t]he OAIC considers that this fragmentation makes it particularly 
important that each of the applicable regulatory frameworks setting out 
information sharing arrangements between law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies clearly and consistently specifies the nature, scope 
and limits of the information sharing activities. This includes specifying 
what protections are afforded to any personal information collected, used 
or disclosed under the information sharing arrangement.74 
2.89 Mr Newton noted general support for information sharing simplification, but not 
if it resulted in a net reduction in privacy protections: 
In particular, I would not support a sharing regime which enabled an 
agency which had obtained evidence for a certain purpose to divulge it to 
a second agency for a different purpose, if that second agency would 
otherwise be required to obtain their own warrant.75 
2.90 The Law Council of Australia submitted it is appropriate that information 
obtained under the TIA Act is subject to more rigorous legislative protections 
than other forms of information in a law enforcement agency’s possession: 
Sharing this type of information must necessarily be more restricted than 
sharing other information in order to recognise its particularly sensitive 
nature and the intrusive impact on a person’s rights and privacy. It could 
include, for example, details of a person’s most private conversations or 
the precise location of a person, and may include information in relation 
to non-suspects or other innocent third parties. Provisions relating to the 
sharing of this type of information must also reflect limits on the types of 
officers who are able to have primary access to this information.76 
2.91 Rather than simplification to enable greater interagency information sharing, the 
Law Council suggested reforms should look at ‘strengthening and clarifying the 
existing provisions, recognising that different restrictions on communication, use 
and disclosure may be appropriate in light of the nature of the information 
 
73  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, p. 10. See also: Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service, Submission No. 168, p. 3. 
74  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No. 183, pp. 10-11. 
75  Mr Mark Newton, Submission No. 87, p. 7. 
76  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 46. 
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obtained, and depending on what types of agencies are able to have primary 
access to such information.’77 
2.92 The Committee supports the need to ensure that any amendments to the 
information sharing provisions provide appropriate privacy protections.  The 
Committee understands, however, one of the potential benefits of proposed 
information sharing reforms is to enable investigative agencies to provide 
intercepted information to an agency that is responsible for investigating 
particular criminal activity. 
2.93 The Committee supports the view that information sharing provisions should 
continue to impose appropriate restrictions upon the use and disclosure of 
telecommunications interception information, having regard to its privacy 
intrusive nature.  The Committee also supports the need for law enforcement 
and security agencies to be able to share information to ensure that serious 
crimes and threats to national security can be investigated in a timely and 
thorough manner.   
2.94 The Committee is concerned about the proliferation of institutions that gather 
and share information, and the absence of consistent guidelines and sufficient 
oversight. 
 
Recommendation 8 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
review the information sharing provisions of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 to ensure: 
 protection of the security and privacy of intercepted 
information; and 
 sharing of information where necessary to facilitate 
investigation of serious crime or threats to national security. 
 
Removing legislative duplication 
2.95 The discussion paper notes that legislative complexity has been created by 
frequent amendments to the TIA Act: 
The pace of change in the last decade has meant the Act has required 
frequent amendment resulting in duplication and complexity that makes 
 
77  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 47. 
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the Act difficult to navigate and which creates the risk that the law will 
not be applied as Parliament intended.78 
2.96 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked on notice to provide examples of 
legislative duplication.  The Department noted that it considers that the multiple 
types of warrants are no longer appropriate for the modern communications 
landscape:  
Key areas of duplication relate to the different types of warrants, 
including the distinction made between intercepted and stored 
communications.79  
2.97 The Department observed that the duplicated nature of warrants leads to other 
forms of unnecessary legislative duplication: 
The oversight, record keeping and reporting provisions which flow from 
these warrant provisions are also duplicative. For example, in relation to 
oversight responsibilities, there is dual oversight of State and Territory 
agencies by both the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the relevant State 
or Territory oversight agency. 
In relation to record keeping and reporting, there are three separate 
annual report requirements for telecommunications interception 
warrants, stored communication warrants and access to 
telecommunications data. In the case of interception warrants there are 
separate annual report requirements for Commonwealth agencies and 
State prescribed authorities, there are also two separate reporting 
requirements for State agencies. The three requirements differ making it 
difficult to undertake a meaningful analysis and comparison of the 
different mechanisms. 80 
2.98 The Department presented the overall view that:   
…streamlining and modernising lawful access to telecommunications 
provisions through the creation of a one warrant regime that regulates 
access to the content of a communication, together with the flow on 
effects to the oversight, record keeping and reporting requirements, will 
remove significant duplication and complexity from the TIA Act and 
create consistency in the accountability framework.81   
2.99 The Committee is of the view that removing legislative duplication would help 
to make the interception regime easier for the general public, legal practitioners, 
law enforcement and the justice system to understand and apply.  
 
78  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 17 
79  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 18. 
80  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 18. 
81  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 18. 
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Recommendation 9 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 be amended to remove legislative duplication. 
 
A single warrant with multiple telecommunications interception powers 
2.100 The AGD submission states: 
The Department considers that the interception regime would offer 
greater privacy protection if the distinction between stored and live 
warrants was removed and if a standard threshold for both content and 
stored communications warrants was introduced. Reliance on the higher 
seven year penalty threshold has not proved successful in limiting the 
application of interception powers. On the other hand the three year 
stored communications threshold underestimates the value of non-voice 
communications in the contemporary communications environment. A 
threshold in between these two would recognise the growing importance 
of non-voice communications and enable interception to be used as a tool 
in investigating a number of serious crimes that currently fall outside the 
TIA Act. 
A single warrant, and clarification of the concept of serious offence, 
would greatly enhance the capacity of the interception regime to ensure 
that interception is only available in defined circumstances.82 
2.101 Victoria Police supported the proposal for a single warrant, noting in its 
submission: 
It is no longer practicable for warrants to be obtained solely on traditional 
network identifiers such as telephone numbers or International Mobile 
Equipment Identifier (IMEI) numbers. A single warrant in which 
particular identifier(s) could be stipulated (such as a username, webmail 
address, internet account) would enable the targeting of communications 
of a suspect without the need for multiple warrants over time on the same 
target.83 
2.102 Similarly, the Western Australia Police expressed support for the efficiency and 
flexibility a single warrant regime would represent: 
 
82  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, p. 5. 
83  Victoria Police, Submission No. 200, p. 13. 
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The creation of a single warrant with multiple TI powers would provide 
the flexibility to cater for future technological change by having a focus on 
communications made by an individual rather than the specific 
technology or equipment used. 
WA Police is of the view that the use of a single broad based warrant 
would simplify an otherwise overly complicated regime. At present, the 
TIA Act provides for 6 different warrants (service warrant, b-party 
interception warrant, named person warrant, device based interception 
warrant, section 48 entry onto premises warrant, stored communications 
warrant), each of which have specific applicability. The application of the 
current warrant regime has the potential to cause confusion as police 
officers are often unsure about which warrant best suits the needs of a 
particular investigation.84 
2.103 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications 
Alliance joint submission noted reservation with the proposal for a single 
warrant due to the potential for it to shift obligations and due diligence checks 
onto telecommunications providers: 
A telecommunications service provider must be able to clearly determine 
from the warrant which services should be intercepted in order to 
properly implement a warrant. For these same reasons the responsibility 
to identify relevant services should rest with the intercepting agency and 
not the service provider. Industry also expects that there will be a 
continuing need for independent oversight of warrant applications prior 
to them being served on a carrier or carriage service provider. It would 
not be possible for the oversight process to fully assess the impact of each 
warrant if the carrier or service provider is subsequently required to make 
the decisions about what particular services are to be intercepted.85 
2.104 Similarly, iiNet noted the need for warrants to avoid shifting questions of 
judgement to telecommunications providers: 
The Discussion Paper does not specify what the particular ‘TI powers’ 
will be (i.e. whether a consolidation of existing powers is intended or the 
addition of new powers). iiNet believes that it is important that it be 
recognised that C/CSPs are not State agents, and a clear demarcation 
should be maintained between CSPs providing access and C/CSPs doing 
more than providing access. Furthermore, C/CSPs should not be required 
to make any judgement calls as regards what particular information is 
 
84  Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 11. 
85  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, 
p. 10.  
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required for a C/CSP to comply with a warrant. Therefore, warrants 
should contain clear and specific terms.86 
2.105 Interception agencies explained to the Committee, however, that the proposal for 
a single telecommunications interception warrant would significantly increase 
administrative efficiency without diminishing accountability: 
The current TIA Act requires various types of warrants to access 
communications lawfully. Additional types of warrants have been created 
over the years in response to changes in methodologies and technologies. 
The resultant system is complex requiring detail to be interpreted by 
agencies, issuing authorities, oversight bodies, and courts. The 
Commission supports the concept of a single simplified warrant. The 
relevant thresholds and privacy intrusions are essentially the same where 
communications are accessed via service device be they stored 
communications or intercepted in transit. 87 
2.106 A number of submissions expressed cautious support for the proposed single 
warrant, noting the potential for efficiencies within the warrant process, but 
noted concern at the potential for the proposal to diminish thresholds.  The Pirate 
Party submission is an example of this position: 
If this single warrant retains a threshold test for serious crimes (with a 
penalty of 7 years or greater imprisonment) then there should be no 
obstacle in implementing it. If, however, the threshold is lower than that 
then there would be grave concerns in allowing it.88 
2.107 The Tasmanian Association of Community Legal Centres expressed concern the 
proposal would lead interception agencies to using available powers, rather than 
the most appropriate power: 
In our view the current legislative requirement that law enforcement 
agencies apply for either a ‘telecommunications service’ warrant 
(authorising the interception of only one service, such as a single 
telephone number) or a ‘named person’ warrant (authorising the 
interception of any telecommunication services or devices that are likely 
to be used by the person named in the warrant) reduces the risk that law 
enforcement agencies will use all the powers available to them rather than 
being used for a specific purpose as currently provided in the powers of 
the two warrants.89 
2.108 The issue of the thresholds and how to deliver the appropriate accountability 
was usefully addressed by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security: 
 
86  iiNet, Submission No. 108, p. 10. 
87  Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission, Submission 156, p. 8. 
88  Pirate Party, Submission No. 134, p. 15. 
89  Tasmanian Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission No. 184, pp. 2-3. 
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Having multiple sets of warrant applications for a single investigation is 
administratively inconvenient for ASIO and does not necessarily provide 
the Attorney-General with a clear view of the totality of proposed 
activities. Any proposal to streamline this and give the Attorney-General 
a better picture of the situation is worthy of consideration but issues of 
proportionality and levels of authorisation will need careful 
consideration. 
… 
One interpretation of the proposal in the discussion paper could be that 
the Attorney-General is to be asked only to agree broadly to ‘interception’ 
against a particular individual, group or premises for a specified period 
and to then allow the Director-General of Security or a delegated ASIO 
officer to decide what form that interception should take during the 
warrant period (including whether B-Party interception is appropriate). I 
note that a ‘named person warrant’ currently allows the Director-General 
of Security to add or remove services from interception coverage during 
the life of the warrant to enable interception of communications made by 
or to the specified individual. Any proposal to effectively further transfer 
the level of decision making from Ministerial level to within an agency 
needs to ensure that appropriate reviews take place within the agency, 
make allowance for independent scrutiny and consider external reporting 
requirements.90 
2.109 Similarly, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre for Public Law noted the need to ensure 
that a regime for a single telecommunications interception warrant should 
continue to ensure proportionality is considered by the issuing authority: 
The most recent report of the Attorney-General’s Department into the 
operation of the TIA Act states that a named person warrant has a ‘high 
impact on privacy’. It should only be used ‘when necessary and other 
alternative methods are not available’. Therefore, in the majority of cases, 
law enforcement agencies obtain a telecommunications service warrant 
rather than a named person warrant. This is the correct approach. Any 
intrusions into the right to privacy should be the minimum required to 
achieve the public purpose. We are concerned that merging of named 
person warrants and telecommunications service warrants into a single 
category of warrant would result in law enforcement agencies using all 
the powers that are available to them (regardless of whether these powers 
are strictly necessary to investigate the criminal activity).91 
 
90  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, pp. 9, 10. 
91  Gilbert + Tobin Centre for Public Law, Submission No. 36, p. 9. 
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2.110 The Law Council of Australia also noted reservations about the proposal’s 
potential to diminish accountability, particularly in the absence of detail within 
the Attorney-General’s Department Discussion Paper.  The Law Council 
helpfully indicated some of the considerations which could be addressed if the 
reform were to be supported: 
However, if a proposal of this nature were pursued, the Law Council 
would suggest that the issuing authority must be satisfied of the 
following minimum requirements: 
 that any person whose telecommunications are to be intercepted is 
specifically identified as a legitimate target of suspicion from a security 
or law enforcement perspective; 
 that each and every telecommunications service or telecommunications 
device to be intercepted is, in fact, used or likely to be used by the 
relevant person of interest; and 
 each and every telecommunications service or telecommunications 
device to be intercepted can be uniquely identified such that relevant 
telecommunications made using that service or device can be isolated 
and intercepted with precision. 
In addition, the issuing officer should also have regard to: 
 the likely benefit to the investigation which would result from the 
intercepted information substantially outweighing the extent to which 
the interception is likely to interfere with the privacy of any person or 
persons; 
 the gravity of the conduct constituting the offence or offences being 
investigated; 
 how much the information referred to would be likely to assist in 
connection with the investigation by the agency of the offence or 
offences; and 
 to what extent methods of investigating the offence or offences that do 
not involve intercepting communications have been used by, or are 
available to, the agency92. 
2.111 The Committee acknowledges the need to ensure that intrusive investigative 
techniques are exercised only in necessary and justified circumstances, and that 
the intrusion is proportionate to the conduct being investigated.  A balance must 
be struck between appropriate checks and balances, and the operational 
flexibility required to deliver effective law enforcement and protection against 
national security threats. 
2.112 The Committee is of the view that revising the present multiple 
telecommunications interception warrants into a single warrant regime can 
deliver administrative efficiencies to interception agencies without removing 
 
92  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 53. 
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appropriate accountability and safeguards.   
 
Recommendation 10 
 The Committee recommends that the telecommunications interception 
warrant provisions in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 be revised to develop a single interception warrant regime.   
The Committee recommends the single warrant regime include the 
following features: 
 a single threshold for law enforcement agencies to access 
communications based on serious criminal offences; 
 removal of the concept of stored communications to provide 
uniform protection to the content of communications; and 
 maintenance of the existing ability to apply for telephone 
applications for warrants, emergency warrants and ability to 
enter premises. 
The Committee further recommends that the single warrant regime be 
subject to the following safeguards and accountability measures: 
 interception is only authorised when an issuing authority is 
satisfied the facts and grounds indicate that interception is 
proportionate to the offence or national security threat being 
investigated; 
 rigorous oversight of interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of interception; and 
 Parliamentary oversight of the use of interception. 
 
Modernising the cost sharing framework 
2.113 The final area for potential legislative reform identified by the AGD discussion 
paper relates to modernising the cost-sharing framework.  The discussion paper 
provided by the AGD proposes that cost sharing frameworks be modernised by 
aligning ‘industry interception assistance with industry regulatory policy’ and by 
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clarifying the role of the Australian Communications and Media Authority’s role 
in regulation and enforcement.93 
Align industry interception assistance with industry regulatory policy 
2.114 The terms of reference to this inquiry state the Government wishes to progress 
the modernisation of the cost-sharing framework to align industry interception 
assistance with industry regulatory policy.  The industry assistance obligations 
are contained in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA 
Act) and in the Telecommunication Act 1997.  The discussion paper explains: 
In reforming cost sharing, consideration must also be given to the current 
make‐up of the telecommunications industry. The current requirements 
are predicated on the existence of one or few industry players and assume 
that all are resourced on a similar basis and have a similar customer base. 
This does not reflect industry practice which better suits a tiered model 
that supports comprehensive interception and delivery capability on the 
part of larger providers, a minimum interception and delivery capability 
on the part of medium providers and only reasonably necessary 
assistance for interception on the part of smaller providers. 
A tiered model would also recognise that smaller providers generally 
have fewer customers and therefore have less potential to be required to 
execute an interception warrant and less capacity to store and retain 
information about communications and customers.94 
2.115 The Department explained that the current cost responsibility principles for the 
maintenance of effective were established following the 1994 review into the 
Long term Cost-effectiveness of Telecommunications Interception by Mr Pat Barrett.95  
The Department also gave an example of a more flexible approach to applying 
obligations to the contemporary telecommunications environment: 
The requirement for all industry participants to have the same 
interception capability can also be an expensive and unnecessary burden 
that can act as a barrier to entry to the telecommunications market for 
new industry players.  Therefore, requiring all service providers to have 
the same interception capability regardless of size (as in the current 
system) could have the effect of restricting competition rather than 
promoting it and stifling innovation (noting that the promotion of the 
 
93  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 13. 
94  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 28.  
95  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 19. 
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supply of diverse and innovative carriage services and content services is 
one of the objects of the Telecommunications Act).96 
2.116 The Department concluded: 
The current industry and legislative cost allocation framework is working 
well, but efficiencies may be able to be made in regards to standardisation 
of technical and administrative requirements in meeting these obligations.  
Opportunities for reducing red tape and achieving regulatory offsets may 
also be identified.97 
2.117 The Committee appreciates that the telecommunications environment has 
evolved rapidly and is significantly different in size, composition and 
international presence to the industry that existed when the TIA Act was first 
passed.   
2.118 Therefore, the Committee agrees that there is merit in reconsidering application 
of the cost-sharing provisions of the telecommunications interception regime to 
provide a more flexible approach.    
 
Recommendation 11 
 The Committee recommends that the Government review the 
application of the interception-related industry assistance obligations 
contained in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
and Telecommunications Act 1997. 
Clarify ACMA’s regulatory and enforcement role 
2.119 The Australian Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA) has the 
following functions and responsibilities: 
The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) is a 
government agency responsible for the regulation of broadcasting, the 
internet, radiocommunications and telecommunications. 
The ACMA's responsibilities include:  
 promoting self-regulation and competition in the communications 
industry, while protecting consumers and other users  
 fostering an environment in which electronic media respect 
community standards and respond to audience and user needs  
 managing access to the radiofrequency spectrum  
 
96  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 19. 
97  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 19. 
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 representing Australia 's communications interests internationally.98 
2.120 The AGD discussion paper suggested that the enforcement mechanisms available 
to the ACMA in relation to telecommunications interception regulation should 
be expanded: 
Consideration should also be given to clarifying the role of the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) in regulating industry 
obligations under the interception regime.  The ACMA has rarely used its 
powers to enforce compliance with the TIA Act because the only effective 
power available to it under the Act is court action.  Court action is usually 
inappropriate or excessive in the circumstances and unhelpful from an 
agency perspective because it may publicly disclose that a particular 
C/CSP is not complying with its TIA Act obligations.  The ACMA’s role 
could be reinforced by expanding the range of regulatory options 
available and clarifying the standards with which industry must 
comply.99 
2.121 Telstra expressed support for clarifying the ACMA’s enforcement role, also 
noting the need to ensure appropriate consideration is given to education and 
dispute resolution roles: 
Telstra believes there needs to be clarification as to what role ACMA will 
have in future in monitoring compliance by C/CSPs with the Telco Act 
and TIA Act in respect to national security and law enforcement. 
The Discussion Paper does not suggest what types of additional powers 
may be contemplated. Telstra would recommend that whatever agency is 
given this enforcement role its primary focus should be on undertaking 
an active role in education and dispute resolution, with any penalty 
enforcement role being secondary.100 
2.122 Mr Ian Quick expressed opposition to the proposal due to the potential loss of 
transparency: 
A significant advantage of the current ACMA’s power – going to court– is 
that it is public and open to scrutiny. If, as the discussion paper suggests – 
‘The ACMA’s role could be reinforced by expanding the range of 
regulatory options available and clarifying the standards with which 
industry must comply.’ 
it would be possible – though the paper does not say what the ‘options’ 
are – that the ACMA could quietly push a C/CSP into doing something it 
 
98  Australian Communications and Media Authority website, <www.acma.gov.au>, viewed 7 June 2013. 
99  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 28. 
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did not want to do. While this may be alleviated by clear standards, any 
option it has should be open to public scrutiny.101 
2.123 The Committee did not receive a submission from the ACMA but notes the 
suggestion from Mr Bernard Keane to review the 2005 report Reform of the 
broadcasting regulator’s enforcement powers prepared for ACMA by Professor Ian 
Ramsay.  As Mr Keane noted: 
Reform of the broadcasting regulator’s enforcement powers is a valuable 
analysis of regulatory theory that should provide the basis for an effective 
regulator’s suite of tools for achieving effective industry regulation. … In 
particular, it addressed the issue of a lack of ‘mid‐tier’ powers, which is a 
similar issue to that raised by AGD in the paper in relation to powers to 
enforce compliance with the TIA Act. On this issue, a power to accept 
enforceable undertakings, and a power to issue infringement notices, 
would appear to be two mid‐tier powers worth considering to enable 
ACMA to enforce compliance without resorting to litigation.102 
2.124 The Committee notes that an effective enforcement and compliance regime 
requires a range of sanctions and tools which are tailored to a range of potential 
conduct.   
 
Recommendation 12 
 The Committee recommends the Government consider expanding the 
regulatory enforcement options available to the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority to include a range of 
enforcement mechanisms in order to provide tools proportionate to the 
conduct being regulated. 
Requirements for industry interception obligations 
2.125 The AGD discussion paper outlines the current situation regarding the 
expression of industry interception obligations: 
The TIA Act places an obligation on each C/CSP to have the capability to 
intercept communications and requires carriers and nominated carriage 
service providers to submit an annual interception capability plan 
outlining their strategy for complying with their obligation to intercept 
and to deliver communications to interception agencies.  The obligation 
extends to maintaining the capability to intercept communications that 
 
101  Mr Ian Quick, Submission No. 95, p. 7. 
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are carried by a service that they provide and to deliver those 
communications to the requesting agency consistent with a warrant.   
However, as networks have become more complicated and the types of 
services available have expanded, often beyond the C/CSPs’ own 
networks, challenges have evolved in applying a general obligation.  
Consideration should be given towards introducing measures that 
implement more specific technical requirements to cater for a diverse and 
sophisticated telecommunications environment.   This includes 
developing requirements around administrative needs such as the 
timeliness of cost sharing to agencies and the security measures to be 
applied to the handling of sensitive information relating to interception 
operations.  103 
2.126 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications 
Alliance supported a ‘high level set of requirements for industry interception 
obligations to be clear, straightforward and reasonable.’104   
2.127 iiNet submitted that it was unclear what was proposed, but that some 
clarification is necessary: 
This proposed reform appears to iiNet to be capable of being very broad. 
It is not expressly discussed in any detail in the Discussion Paper. 
Without detail of what this reform would involve, it is difficult for iiNet 
to provide any meaningful comment, except to say that there should be 
thorough consultation with industry on these detailed requirements. iiNet 
believes that consideration of any such reform should include giving 
consideration to clarifying the scope of section 313 of the Telco Act. The 
scope of the obligation to ‘give such help as is reasonably necessary’ is 
vague and uncertain.105 
2.128 The Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission expressed support for 
the potential benefits to be derived from clearly articulated obligations: 
The current regulatory regime for industry interception obligations is 
administratively burdensome for both industry participants and the 
regulatory agency. The current requirement of industry to prepare and 
submit interception capability plans which are then assessed annually 
should be reviewed. 
The implementation of detailed requirements for industry interception 
obligations may assist in clarifying requirements and account for technical 
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complexities. The Commission endorses the inclusion of administrative 
requirements as part of industry interception requirements. In many 
cases, difficulties or delays in interception are due to administrative, as 
opposed to, technical limitations.106 
2.129 The Committee notes that while, in general, a cooperative relationship exists 
between telecommunication companies and law enforcement and national 
security agencies, a uniform level of cooperation does not exist across all sectors 
of the industry. The Committee sees benefit in providing detailed guidance on 
the obligations imposed on the telecommunications industry to ensure 
telecommunications providers and interception agencies alike understand the 
extent of those obligations. 
 
Recommendation 13 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 be amended to include provisions which clearly 
express the scope of the obligations which require telecommunications 
providers to provide assistance to law enforcement and national security 
agencies regarding telecommunications interception and access to 
telecommunications data. 
 
Clarify that the interception regime includes ancillary service providers 
2.130 Although expressed as ‘extending’ the interception regime to ancillary service 
providers such as Facebook, Google and Twitter, the purpose of this term of 
reference is in fact to clarify that — as the Committee understands to be the case 
— the existing obligations do apply to ancillary service providers. It is not an 
extension of existing obligations. 
2.131 Although he does not refer to ancillary service providers by name, 
Commissioner Scipione of the NSW Police Service described the challenges to 
national security services and the law enforcement community posed by 
technological change: 
A further significant challenge for law enforcement agencies investigating 
national security and serious criminal matters is the increasing use of 
sophisticated technologies by criminals. Frankly, organised criminals are now 
able to operate outside the reach of ordinary telecommunications interception 
and law enforcement agencies that are dealing with criminals who have 
access to unprecedented advancements in technology. Legislation that not 
 
106  Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission, Submission No. 156, p. 8. 
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only fails to adequately recognise this but significantly fails to future proof 
itself against rapidly emerging technologies is what we are dealing with 
here.107 
2.132 The rationale for clarifying the regulatory obligations of ancillary service 
providers under the TIA Act was stated by the Western Australia Police: 
When communication systems were conducted over telephone 
networks only, as was the case when the TIA Act was written, there 
was no question as to who was responsible for supplying the 
interception points. It is no longer simply the case of going to just one 
telecommunications provider to intercept a persons’ communications. 
It is now quite feasible for someone to be subscribed to one provider 
for their telephone traffic and another provider for their Internet. 
Further, other providers might provide a Voice Over IP (VOIP) 
telephone service which then utilises a network, or multiple networks 
of multiple providers to get from point a to point b.  
Intercepting an individual’s communications is no longer a simple 
exercise of only going to the major identified service providers. 
Regardless of the provider, it should be possible to intercept related 
Internet traffic for the purposes of investigating serious criminal 
activities.108 
2.133 Victoria Police also submitted that the fact that the existing regime applied to 
ancillary service providers should be made clear beyond doubt: 
Monitoring of intercepted communications by Victoria Police routinely 
demonstrates that services such as these are being used by suspects in 
furtherance of their criminal activities. Without a mandatory regulatory 
obligation placed on the providers of these services used in Australia, 
criminals can continue to communicate without the risk of being exposed 
to interception. There needs to be legislative parity with the obligations 
applicable to Australian service providers.109 
2.134 The Committee notes that the TIA Act facilitates interception and access to 
telecommunications data by law enforcement and national security agencies.  
The TIA Act facilitates this by relying upon the cooperation and assistance 
provided by telecommunications providers.  The TIA Act does not distinguish 
between telecommunications providers, but provides a universal 
telecommunications interception obligation on all providers of 
telecommunications services.   
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2.135 Although the terms of reference requests the Committee to consider whether the 
existing TIA Act should ‘extend’ to ancillary service providers the Committee 
believes that the TIA Act does, under its existing provisions, include ancillary 
service providers. The use of the term ‘extend’ is inapt. The Committee received 
no evidence on behalf of ancillary service providers which disputed that the TIA 
Act applied to them. It is not an extension of existing obligations.  
Recommendation 14 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access Act) 1979 and the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended 
to make it clear beyond doubt that the existing obligations of the 
telecommunications interception regime apply to all providers 
(including ancillary service providers) of telecommunications services 
accessed within Australia. As with the existing cost sharing 
arrangements, this should be done on a no-profit and no-loss basis for 
ancillary service providers. 
 
Industry participation model 
2.136 The AGD discussion paper suggests the Committee should consider the merits of 
a tiered regime for industry assistance to intercept communications and facilitate 
access to telecommunications data: 
In reforming cost sharing, consideration must also be given to the current 
make-up of the telecommunications industry.  The current requirements 
are predicated on the existence of one or few industry players and assume 
that all are resourced on a similar basis and have a similar customer base.  
This does not reflect industry practice which better suits a tiered model 
that supports comprehensive interception and delivery capability on the 
part of larger providers, a minimum interception and delivery capability 
on the part of medium providers and only reasonably necessary 
assistance for interception on the part of smaller providers.   
A tiered model would also recognise that smaller providers generally 
have fewer customers and therefore have less potential to be required to 
execute an interception warrant and less capacity to store and retain 
information about communications and customers.  Requirements on 
industry to retain current information and to assist agencies to decrypt 
information would greatly enhance agencies’ abilities to detect and 
disrupt criminal and other behaviours that threaten national wellbeing 
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but should be implemented in a way that does not compromise business 
viability.110 
2.137 Ms Stella Gray queried the efficacy of a tiered regime for industry assistance: 
A tiered interception-compliance model may simply encourage people to 
flock to smaller CSPs to evade surveillance, thereby negating the structure 
of this model.111 
2.138 iiNet expressed in-principle support for a tiered industry assistance model, 
noting that it reflected industry practice: 
iiNet agrees with the comments in the Discussion Paper that a tiered 
model would more accurately reflect industry practice. However, iiNet 
believes that it is appropriate to distinguish between: 
 the legal obligation to provide interception capability; and 
 the manner in which that obligation is complied with by a particular 
C/CSP. 
iiNet believes that the obligation to provide interception capability should 
apply uniformly to all C/CSPs. However, iiNet believes that there should 
be flexibility as regards the manner in which a particular C/CSP complies 
with the obligation to provide interception capability, and the size and 
resources of the C/CSP should be a relevant consideration in the 
assessment of that C/CSP’s interception capability plan.112 
2.139 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications 
Alliance also expressed in-principle support for a tiered industry assistance 
model: 
Industry favours a tiered participation model, where investment in 
interception capabilities is based on Agency need and risk, as opposed to 
the current blanket obligation which requires the deployment of 
interception capabilities that in some cases are unlikely to be used.113 
… 
The current blanket approach of the TIA Act potentially gives rise to 
replication of interception capabilities at the carrier, wholesale service 
provider, retail Broadband service provider and application service layer. 
A more efficient regulatory framework should be sought, where 
replication of interception capabilities is not required.114 
 
110  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 28. 
111  Ms Stella Gray, Submission No. 152, p. 6. 
112  iiNet, Submission No. 108, p. 11 
113  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, 
p. 11. 
114  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, 
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2.140 In contrast, Telstra expressed significant reservations about the proposal for a 
tiered industry assistance model: 
Telstra believes these proposals run the risk of creating an uneven playing 
field, where the compliance burden would rest disproportionately with 
larger C/CSPs and the effectiveness of the overall regime is undermined 
by allowing criminals or terrorists to avoid interception arrangements by 
acquiring services from smaller C/CSPs. 
In relation to the interception cost sharing framework, the Discussion 
Paper indicates that a new tiered model may be introduced where larger 
C/CSPs are expected to have a comprehensive interception capability 
(presumably at a greater cost) while smaller C/CSPs may only be 
required to have a minimum level capability (presumably at a lower cost). 
While the Discussion Paper states that one of its aims is to maintain 
‘competitive neutrality’ in the industry, it is hard to see how tiered 
compliance obligations are consistent with this aim. As such, Telstra does 
not support this proposal.115 
2.141 In testimony before the Committee, Telstra expanded upon these concerns: 
Essentially what we are saying is that it should be a uniform application 
of obligations. Given the nature of their targets, law enforcement and 
national security schemes are only as strong as their weakest link. On an 
uneven playing field criminals and terrorists will inevitably locate their 
operations where security obligations are the lowest, leaving larger 
telecommunication operators to incur the costs of greater obligations for 
no offset in law enforcement or national security gain.116 
2.142 Mr Mark Newton also opposed the proposal, submitting that a tiered model 
already applied by informal means: 
This proposal is unnecessary, on the grounds that we have it by fiat 
already. Current industry interception obligations are consultative, and 
the Attorney-General’s Department doesn’t bother to consult with 
providers that this proposal would envisage as ‘tier 3.’ I believe 
considering this proposal is a waste of time, and I don’t support it.117 
2.143 The Committee understands the proposal to be that all telecommunications 
providers would remain subject to an obligation to provide assistance to law 
enforcement and security agencies, but the manner in which telecommunications 
interception obligations would be discharged would vary according to the risk 
profile of the telecommunications provider.  As such, the Committee is assured 
                                                                                                                                                               
p. 12. 
115  Telstra, Submission No. 189, p. 9.  
116  Mr James Shaw, Transcript, 27 September 2012, p. 2. 
117  Mr Mark Newton, Submission No. 87, p. 9. 
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that lower tier telecommunications providers will still maintain interception 
capability. 
2.144 The committee does not favour a tiered approach. However it acknowledges that 
there may be situations related to practicability and affordability where 
exceptions for particular industry players are justifiable. However it is for those 
who seek exemption from the uniform obligation to demonstrate why they 
should be excused.  
 
Recommendation 15 
 The Committee recommends that the Government should develop the 
implementation model on the basis of a uniformity of obligations while 
acknowledging that the creation of exemptions on the basis of 
practicability and affordability may be justifiable in particular cases. 
However, in all such cases the burden should lie on the industry 
participants to demonstrate why they should receive these exemptions.  
 
An offence for failure to assist in the decryption of communications 
2.145 The AGD submission explains the rationale and scope of the decryption 
assistance proposal: 
Encryption is becoming widespread in information and communications 
technology. Criminals and terrorists are increasingly using encryption to 
avoid detection, investigation and prosecution causing difficulties for 
agencies to access clear, intelligible communications in their operations. 
Encryption can be difficult to manage. It may not always be the case that a 
person who uses or creates encryption is able to provide assistance with 
decryption. Often an applications provider, organisation or individual 
provides encryption services, rather than a carrier. Criminal organisations 
and terrorists can obtain these services or even create and use their own 
encryption solutions. 
Section 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 (the Crimes Act) sets out provisions 
concerning decryption regarding information obtained under search 
warrants; however this does not extend to communications intercepted 
pursuant to a warrant under the TIA Act. 
In summary, section 3LA of the Crimes Act allows a police officer to 
apply to a magistrate for a warrant to require a person to provide in 
accessible form (i.e. in decrypted form) data held on a computer or data 
storage device, where the computer or data storage device had been 
seized under a warrant. A warrant may be applied to the person under 
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investigation, an owner of the device, an employee of the owner, a 
relevant contractor, a person who has used the device, or a systems 
administrator. There is a penalty of up to two years imprisonment for 
failing to comply with an order. 
A consistent approach to that contained in the Crimes Act would ensure 
that information lawfully accessed for national security or law 
enforcement purposes under the TIA Act was intelligible.118 
2.146 The Committee received many submissions about the absence of clarity as to 
whom the proposed offences would apply to, and what type of decryption 
assistance is envisaged. 
End users, wholesale service providers, broadband retail service 
providers and content providers could all potentially play a role in the 
encryption of communications. Where the provider is based offshore then 
the matter of jurisdiction also needs to be considered. 
Any decryption requirement should also specify that the obligation is to 
make available, if it is available, the means for decryption, as opposed to 
the actual content/communications that is to be decrypted. 
There must not be a presumption that a person or organisation is capable 
of decrypting communications. The imposition of sanctions or penalties 
must be based on proof that the person or organisation is capable of 
assisting with the decryption of communications and there is evidence 
they have refused to do so.119 
2.147 The AFP confirmed in testimony to the Committee that the decryption assistance 
sought by law enforcement agencies is limited to encryption applied by 
telecommunications providers: 
From our perspective, encryption is a terrific advancement for the 
Australian community. Because it helps protect people from those who 
would do them harm in scams and those sorts of things it is a very good 
thing. What we would be seeking as far as the uptake to the act goes is 
that, where we have a warrant to intercept particular information going to 
a particular service, that the service provider provide those encryption 
keys to us to allow us to undertake that interception under warrant—as I 
have said—rather than anything else. This is not about people's home 
encryption. This is about talking to service providers about their 
 
118  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, pp. 6-7. 
119  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, 
p. 12.  See also Mr James Sinnamon, Submission No. 100, p. 1; Privacy Victoria, Submission No. 109, p. 6; 
Mr Arved von Brasch, Submission No. 126, p. 3. 
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providing those encryption keys under warrant for us to then intercept a 
particular device which has been duly authorised.120 
2.148 The AFP provided a case study in support of the proposal: 
During an investigation into an online paedophile network, it was noted 
that targets deployed a multiplicity of encryption techniques. They sent 
messages using an encryption overlay; images were encrypted and 
‘hidden’ within other images which were then sent via closed peer to peer 
networks which also used encryption. Advanced Encryption Standards 
applications were used on virtual machines (computers within 
computers). The combined effect meant persons of interest were able to 
browse the internet without leaving detectable forensic footprints for 
investigators. 
Additional members of this network identified and pursued in a related 
operation took the anti-forensic techniques further and used full disk 
encryption along with hidden volumes that were disguised using a 
technique that allowed for plausible deniability of the content, effectively 
circumventing both interception and search warrant legislation. Persons 
of interest identified in the investigation included a computer antivirus 
developer, and a computer networking trainer; their technical expertise 
was such that they were able to develop and customise their own 
encryption protocols rather than relying on off the shelf products.121 
2.149 The Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission expressed support for the 
proposal noting the current investigative challenge which encryption presents: 
The increased use of sophisticated encryption presents challenges to the 
CMC. Internet service providers (ISPs) as well as application service 
providers (ASPs) are increasingly providing end to end encryption. The 
fact that ASPs can be located anywhere in the world can make it 
extremely difficult to seek assistance in the decryption of content that may 
be vital in an investigation. TIA Act reform that envisages law 
enforcement agencies being able to request decryption assistance where 
possible from ISP’s, Carriers and ASPs, would potentially allow for 
greater access to critical evidence.122 
2.150 A range of submissions raised the prospect that an offence for failing to provide 
decryption assistance would undermine confidentiality requirements.  The 
Electronic Frontiers Australia submission was indicative: 
 
120  Commissioner Tony Negus, Transcript, 26 September 2012, p. 28. 
121  Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 163, pp. 14-15. 
122  Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission, Submission No. 147, p. 7.  See also Western Australia 
Corruption and Crime Commission, Submission No. 156, p. 10; Victoria Police, Submission No. 200, p. 
15, Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 13. 
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EFA is concerned about the possible creation of an offence for failing to 
assist in the decryption of communications for the following reasons: 
 it undermines the right of individuals to not cooperate with an 
investigation 
 it poses a threat to the independence of journalists and their sources, 
particularly in circumstances involving whistle-blowing activity 
related to cases of official corruption 
 it could undermine the principles of doctor-patient and lawyer-client 
confidentiality and other trusted relationships 
 there are foreseeable and entirely legitimate circumstances in which 
decryption of data is not possible, such as where a password has been 
forgotten and is unrecoverable.123 
 
2.151 The Human Rights Law Centre submitted that decryption assistance could 
impose an obligation on suspects to provide a ‘level of assistance to investigators 
[that] runs counter to the right to remain silent.’124  
2.152 Mr Ian Quick objected to the proposal on a number of practical and theoretical 
grounds: 
On the practical front, what would an agency do if someone said 
 ‘I can’t remember the password’ 
 ‘I’ve deleted whatever the password was that was used for that period, 
so cannot assist.’ 
 ‘I didn’t know it was encrypted, so have no idea what you are talking 
about.’ 
 ‘It’s not encrypted, it’s just random junk (for whatever reason..)’ 
 ‘The password I gave you doesn’t work? The file/message must be 
corrupted, 
 I can’t help you.’ 
In addition, many communication protocols regularly used on the 
internet have session keys used for encryption, which are not recoverable 
by the end user. 
What would the agency do? All the responses above might be legitimate, I 
have certainly experienced every one of them! How would you 
distinguish between someone who was truthfully saying it and someone 
who was lying? Surely it would be against the presumption of innocence 
to fine/jail people who failed to assist unless it could be proven that they 
could assist – and how could this be done? How would it be legislated?125 
 
123  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission No. 121, p. 15 
124  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission No. 140, p. 11. See also, Mr Breheny, Transcript, 5 September 
2012, p. 45; Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, p. 12. 
125  Mr Ian Quick, Submission No. 95, p. 13. 
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2.153 The Law Council of Australia gave in principle support for assisting agencies 
access communications once authorised, but queried whether an offence was the 
appropriate mechanism: 
However, the Law Council also appreciates the need to ensure that 
officers who have been authorised to access communications can do so in 
an effective, meaningful way. 
To this end, the Law Council does not oppose mechanisms to assist 
agencies to reconstruct or decrypt the content of communications to 
which access has been authorised. 
It notes for example, that the Telecommunications Act already obliges 
carriers and carrier service providers to provide such help to agencies as 
is ‘reasonably necessary’ for enforcing the criminal law and laws 
imposing pecuniary penalties, protecting public revenue and 
safeguarding national security. 
However, it is not clear on the basis of the information provided in the 
Discussion Paper that the introduction of a criminal offence, presumably 
aimed at participants in the telecommunications industry such as carriers 
and carriage service providers, would be an effective or appropriate 
response, particularly when other non-punitive efforts may to be 
available to enhance cooperation between the agencies and the 
telecommunication industry. 
Before introducing criminal liability for failing to assist in the decryption 
of communications, the Law Council suggests that the PJCIS requests that 
information be provided by the Attorney-General’s Department that 
explains whether the proposed offence adheres to the principles 
contained in the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement 
Notices and Enforcement Powers.126 
2.154 The Committee notes that, like the proposal for data retention, much of the 
discussion of the proposal for decryption assistance was confused by the lack of 
clarity on what is being proposed. 
2.155 The Committee understands the proposal is for an offence to apply where a 
telecommunications provider does not provide assistance to decrypt 
communications where those communications have been encrypted by that 
telecommunications provider. This will of course only arise in circumstances 
where the relevant national security agency has established grounds where it is 
necessary to intercept and decrypt the communication.  That being the 
understanding, many of the concerns raised by submitters about individuals 
being subject to the offence, or being forced to provide passwords, do not apply. 
 
126  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 36. 
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2.156 The Committee notes encryption can impede access to telecommunications 
interception where access to the content of communications has been lawfully 
authorised. 
2.157 The Committee acknowledges, however, that there remains a lack of specificity 
regarding the scope of the offence and the circumstances in which it may apply.  
In this context, the Committee appreciates the guidance provided by the Law 
Council of Australia in referring to the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, 
Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers. 
 
Recommendation 16 
 The Committee recommends that, should the Government decide to 
develop an offence for failure to assist in decrypting communications, 
the offence be developed in consultation with the telecommunications 
industry, the Department of Broadband Communications and the 
Digital Economy, and the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority.  It is important that any such offence be expressed with 
sufficient specificity so that telecommunications providers are left with 
a clear understanding of their obligations. 
 
Institute industry response timelines 
2.158 The Western Australia Police expressed support for the imposition of industry 
timelines for assistance sought from telecommunications providers: 
It is important that telecommunication carriers are capable of dealing with 
urgent requests for communications data. This is particularly relevant 
when dealing with stored communications data. It is the practice of some 
carriers to purge such data after a short period of time. To ensure that 
evidence is not lost, carriers must have the capability of immediately 
responding to requests from law enforcement agencies to preserve the 
data, or alternatively they must have a reasonable ability to store data to 
until the completion of a police investigation.127 
2.159 Optus expressed concern if the timeliness proposal was raised as more than a 
minimum standard: 
Optus does not support mandated response times for warrants, unless it 
is calibrated as a backstop for extremely poor responsiveness. If the 
objective is to achieve an overall improvement in timeliness, then the 
 
127  Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 13. See also: Western Australia Corruption and Crime 
Commission, Submission No. 156, pp. 10-11. 
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focus should be on end-to-end process opportunities, taking into account 
both the agency activities and the carrier activities. The adoption of more 
effective and complete B2B electronic transaction processes for warrants 
by both agencies and carriers could drive substantial improvements in 
timeliness.128  
2.160 In relation to requirements for timeliness however, the Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance considered the 
current regime enables the law enforcement and national security agencies to 
negotiate service levels for the supply of reasonably necessary assistance.129 
2.161 Similarly, iiNet did not support the proposal, noting an absence of justification: 
iiNet submits that imposing specific industry timeframes is unnecessary. 
iiNet notes that there is no suggestion in the Discussion Paper that 
industry tardiness is in any way a cause of any of problems for law 
enforcement agencies.130 
2.162 Telstra indicated a significant resource implication from the proposal: 
Telstra submits that for Government to mandate ‘response timelines’ 
would also require Government to spend significant funds to support the 
introduction of a fully automated request management system (as 
discussed in 8a) for use by LENSAs and C/CSPs otherwise the LENSAs 
would not obtain the benefits intended from this proposal.131 
2.163 The Committee notes the need to ensure that telecommunications providers are 
able to provide timely assistance to law enforcement and national security 
investigations.  The evidence presented to the Committee, however, was sparse 
on the question of whether or not such assistance is presently provided in a 
timely manner. 
2.164 The Committee acknowledges, however, that clearly expressed obligations 
would enable telecommunications providers to better assist the investigative 
agencies. 
 
 
128  Optus, Submission No. 206, p. 2. 
129  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association – Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, 
p. 13. 
130  iiNet, Submission No. 108, p. 12. 
131  Telstra, Submission No. 189, p. 10. 
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Recommendation 17 
 The Committee recommends that, if the Government decides to develop 
timelines for telecommunications industry assistance for law 
enforcement and national security agencies, the timelines should be 
developed in consultation with the investigative agencies, the 
telecommunications industry, the Department of Broadband 
Communications and the Digital Economy, and the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority. 
The Committee further recommends that, if the Government decides to 
develop mandatory timelines, the cost to the telecommunications 
industry must be considered. 
 
Revision of the interception regime 
2.165 Submissions and testimony provided to the Committee, particularly from 
interception agencies, indicate a desire for a comprehensive revision of the TIA 
Act.  For example, the Western Australia Police submission states: 
WA Police supports the suggested reform of the TIA Act in its entirety, 
for ease of understanding and in order to remove duplication. Further, 
there is a need to update the content of the TIA Act to ensure that the 
provisions are practical and responsive.132 
2.166 In its submission, the AGD supports the proposal for comprehesive reform, 
stating: 
The magnitude of current and anticipated change to the 
telecommunications landscape means it is now timely to consider 
whether the privacy needs of Australians and the investigative needs of 
law enforcement and national security agencies are best served through 
continuous ad-hoc change or whether the time is right to put in place a 
new interception framework that squarely focuses on the contemporary 
communications environment. The Department considers that holistic 
reform would establish a new foundation for the interception regime that 
enables users and participants, as well as the broader Australian 
community to understand their powers, rights and obligations.133 
 
132  Western Australia Police, Submission No. 203, p. 9. 
133  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 218, pp. 2-3  
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2.167 The Committee received extensive evidence from interception agencies, privacy 
advocates and legal practitioners about the complexity of the TIA Act.  Indeed, 
the Committee’s consideration of the statutory framework supports the 
conclusion that it is so complex as to be opaque in a number of areas.  That this is 
the case in legislation which strives to protect the privacy of communications and 
enabling legitimate investigative activities is of concern. 
2.168 The Committee acknowledges, however, the risks associated with 
comprehensive revision of legislation and that a cautious approach is necessary.  
Privacy Victoria noted in-principle support for revision to achieve technological 
neutrality, but cautioned: 
However, when revising these laws, the goal should not be to lower 
protections contained within, but rather to standardise and enhance 
existing protections irrespective of the method of communication (that is, 
to make the laws technologically neutral).134 
2.169 The Committee did not have the advantage of receiving draft legislation to 
review.  That being the case, there is an inherent difficulty in recommending 
comprehensive revision of the TIA Act in the absence of draft proposals.   
2.170 The Committee acknowledges, however, that the TIA Act is complex. It could be 
improved significantly by providing clear direction on the protections afforded 
to telecommunications users, and the scope of the powers provided to agencies 
able to undertake telecommunications interception and access to stored 
communications and telecommunications data.   
2.171 Implementing the recommendations of this report necessitates a significant 
revision of the interception regime.  The Committee therefore supports 
comprehensive revision of the TIA Act. 
 
 
134  Privacy Victoria, Submission No. 109, p. 2 
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Recommendation 18 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) be comprehensively revised with the 
objective of designing an interception regime which is underpinned by 
the following: 
 clear protection for the privacy of communications; 
 provisions which are technology neutral; 
 maintenance of investigative capabilities, supported by 
provisions for appropriate use of intercepted information for 
lawful purposes;  
 clearly articulated and enforceable industry obligations; and 
 robust oversight and accountability which supports 
administrative efficiency. 
The Committee further recommends that the revision of the TIA Act be 
undertaken in consultation with interested stakeholders, including 
privacy advocates and practitioners, oversight bodies, 
telecommunications providers, law enforcement and security agencies. 
The Committee also recommends that a revised TIA Act should be 
released as an exposure draft for public consultation. In addition, the 
Government should expressly seek the views of key agencies, including 
the: 
 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor; 
 Australian Information Commissioner; 
 ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that 
the draft legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
 
 3 
 
Telecommunications security 
3.1 The Terms of Reference to this inquiry state that the Government expressly seeks 
the views of the Committee on amending the Telecommunications Act 1997 to 
address security and resilience risks posed to the telecommunications sector.  
This would be achieved by: 
 instituting obligations on the Australian telecommunications industry 
to protect their networks from unauthorised interference; 
 instituting obligations to provide Government with information on 
significant business and procurement decisions and network designs;  
 creating targeted powers for Government to mitigate and remediate 
security risks with the costs to be borne by providers; and  
 creating appropriate enforcement powers and pecuniary penalties. 
3.2 The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) discussion paper notes that, with the 
pace of technological change, serious challenges to the security of 
telecommunications data have emerged: 
Risks to the availability, confidentiality and integrity of our national 
telecommunications infrastructure can come from hardware 
vulnerabilities, accidental misconfiguration, external hacking and even 
trusted insiders.1 
3.3 The implications of this risk are significant, especially given that Australian 
businesses, individuals and public sector actors rely on telecommunication 
carriers and carriage service providers’ (C/CSPs) ability to store and transmit 
their data safely and securely, and to protect it from potential national security 
threats.  The discussion paper notes that: 
 
1  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 29. 
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Failure to effectively manage national security risks therefore has 
implications beyond individual C/CSPs; it is a negative externality 
affecting government, business and individual Australians.2 
3.4 The discussion paper further explains the significance of the telecommunications 
industry to national security: 
While advances in technology and communications have resulted in 
unquestionable benefits to society and the economy, they have also 
introduced significant vulnerabilities, including the ability to disrupt, 
destroy, degrade or alter the functioning of our critical 
telecommunications infrastructure and the information held on it. A clear 
understanding of the current telecommunications environment is 
essential to identifying network vulnerabilities and managing them 
effectively. This includes the composition and operation of the 
telecommunications industry, national security risks, and the current 
regulatory environment.3 
3.5 The discussion paper cites the Director-General of ASIO’s speech at the Security 
in Government Conference on 7 July 2011 outlining how poor security of 
telecommunications information poses a threat to national security: 
States, as well as disaffected individuals or groups, are able to use 
computer networks to view or siphon sensitive, private, or classified 
information for the purpose of, political, diplomatic or commercial 
advantage. 
Individual records or files stored or transmitted on telecommunications 
networks may not be classified or particularly sensitive in and of 
themselves but, in aggregate, they can give foreign states and other 
malicious actors a range of intelligence insights not otherwise readily 
available. This threat extends to information vital to the effective 
day‐to‐day operation of critical national industries and infrastructure, 
including intellectual property and commercial intelligence.4 
3.6 Furthermore, these threats come from a variety of sources: 
…other nation states, acting in their own national interest; criminal 
syndicates, especially – but not exclusively – well-resourced organised 
 
2  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 29. An externality refers to a cost or benefit that accrues to actors which are not 
directly involved in a transaction. 
3  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 30. 
4  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, 
Discussion Paper, July 2012, p. 32. 
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crime networks, which in some cases operate transnationally, 
compounding the difficulty of detecting and disrupting their activities; 
business corporations seeking commercial advantage over competitors; 
political or other issue-specific motivated groups; cyber-vandals; and a 
catch-all of other malicious and non-malicious ‘hacktivists’.5 
3.7 These threats originate in many different countries. According to a recent study 
by McAfee: 
36 percent of all attacks originated from the United States, 33 percent from 
China and 12 percent from Russia. Of the remainder, Germany, the UK 
and France accounted for no more than six percent.6 
3.8 The McAfee study also discussed the types of threats, finding that of the 
telecommunications infrastructure companies surveyed: 
89 percent … had experienced infection by a virus or malware; 60 percent 
had experienced ‘theft of service’ attacks; 54 percent experienced ‘stealthy 
infiltration’ that targeted theft of data or the takeover of critical 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition control systems; approximately 
20 percent experienced extortion through the targeting and infiltration of 
control systems; and 29 percent had experienced large scale distributed 
denial of service attacks, often several times a month, of which two thirds 
had impacted on operations.7 
3.9 To counter those threats, the discussion paper proposes the development and 
implementation of a ‘risk based regulatory framework to better manage’ these 
national security challenges to telecommunications security.8 
3.10 The discussion paper proposes a package of reforms to the Telecommunications 
Act 1997 and associated legislation to establish this regulatory framework: 
 An industry-wide obligation on all C/CSPs to protect their 
infrastructure and the information held on it or passing across it from 
unauthorised interference to support the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of Australia’s national telecommunications infrastructure; 
 A requirement for C/CSPs to provide Government, when requested, 
with information to assist in the assessment of national security risks to 
telecommunications infrastructure; and 
 
5  Ian Dudgeon, ‘Cyber-Security: the importance of partnerships’, Regional Security Outlook 2013, Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacfic, p. 9. 
6  Ian Dudgeon, ‘Cyber-Security: the importance of partnerships’, Regional Security Outlook 2013, Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacfic, p. 10. 
7  Ian Dudgeon, ‘Cyber-Security: the importance of partnerships’, Regional Security Outlook 2013, Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacfic, p. 10. 
8  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 29. 
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 Powers of direction and a penalty regime to encourage compliance.9 
3.11 The discussion paper states that the desired outcomes of the proposed 
framework are that: 
 government and industry have a productive partnership for managing 
national security risks to Australia’s telecommunications 
infrastructure, 
 security risks relating to Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure 
are identified early, allowing normal business operations to proceed 
where there are no security concerns and facilitating expedient 
resolution of security concerns, 
 security outcomes are achieved that give government, business and the 
public confidence in their use of telecommunications infrastructure for 
both routine and sensitive activities,  
 the protection of information, including customer information and 
information about customers, contained on or transmitted across 
telecommunications networks is better assured, and 
 compliance costs for industry are minimised.10 
Issues raised in evidence 
Is there a need for an industry wide obligation to protect 
telecommunications? 
3.12 Mr Mark Newton disputed the discussion paper’s contention that there is a need 
for Government intervention in the telecommunications industry for the purpose 
of national security advising that ‘it isn’t the role of carriers and carriage service 
providers (C/CSPs) to make business decisions in the intelligence community’s 
best interests’, rather:   
It’s the intelligence community’s job to stay sufficiently informed and 
organisationally nimble that they can accommodate C/CSPs’ business 
decisions without feeling a need to interfere in them.11 
3.13 In a similar vein, Mr Daniel Black contended that telecommunications security 
was the Government’s responsibility:  
 
9  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 34. 
10  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, pp. 29-30. 
11  Mr Mark Newton, Submission No. 87, p. 10. 
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Private industry values the privacy of its business and procurement 
decisions as much as the government values its “information about the 
national security environment”.   Instituting obligations in legislation is a 
crude mechanism and shows the government to industry relationship is 
broken that these meaningful private dialogues are not taking place to the 
level required.12 
3.14 Macquarie Telecom disagreed that there is a need for Government intervention 
on the issue of security because it saw that providing security was already in the 
interests of service providers: 
You could imagine that we would have a significant interest in ensuring 
that that information is kept secure and that it is retained and dealt with 
at a high level of security.  In that sense we wanted to bring it to the 
attention of the committee that the market is responding to the need for 
cyber security.  We are not saying that means that the entire Australian 
network and national security is in perfect hands, but we want to bring it 
to the attention of the committee that there are market responses going on 
that ought to be taken into account when thinking about what the broader 
regulatory arrangements should be that affect all players.13 
3.15 Macquarie Telecom contended that industry-led self-regulation would be a more 
proportionate alternative regulatory intervention.  Self-regulation could involve 
a voluntary obligation to protect telecommunications infrastructure, networks 
and systems.  Macquarie Telecom further argued that an unenforceable industry 
code, informed by government guidelines, would be preferable for obtaining 
voluntary compliance.14 
3.16 In contrast, the Commonwealth Privacy Commissioner (within the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner), Mr Timothy Pilgrim, agreed with the 
discussion paper’s objective of requiring telecommunications industry 
participants to protect information: 
 The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner welcomes the fact 
that one of the desired outcomes of the framework is that the security of 
individuals’ personal information contained on or transmitted across 
telecommunication networks is better assured.  
The OAIC supports the policy intention behind the proposal to introduce 
a regulatory framework that will address security and resilience risks 
posed to Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure. 
 
12  Mr Daniel Black, Submission No. 97, p. 7. 
13  Mr Matthew John Healy, National Executive, Industry and Policy, Macquarie Telecom, Transcript, 5 
September 2012, pp. 11 -12.  
14  Macquarie Telecom, Submission No. 115, pp. 2-3. 
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…  
The OAIC welcomes the fact that one of the desired outcomes of the 
framework is that the security of individuals’ personal information 
contained on or transmitted across telecommunication networks is 
better assured.15  
3.17 In contrast to Macquarie Telecom, another telecommunications industry 
participant, Optus, favoured obligations being equally placed on all industry 
participants and expressed ‘cautious support’ for a legislated framework:  
For a number of years Optus has engaged informally with national 
security agencies on matters relating to the security and resilience of its 
networks and business operations, including offshore operations.  Having 
regard to the positive aspects of this experience, Optus has formed the 
view that it is desirable to move to a more structured scheme, to ensure 
that the benefits and responsibilities are proportionately shared across the 
industry (for competitive and equity reasons). Optus provides “cautious 
support” for the implementation of a scheme.16 
3.18 Optus’ cautious support was contingent on how the Government might design 
such a framework: 
I want to emphasise that our caution arises more from the challenge of 
correctly calibrating the practical design of such a scheme (and the down-
side risks of incorrectly calibrated arrangements), than fundamental 
concern about the principle.17  
How should a telecommunications security model be structured? 
3.19 The AGD discussion paper proposes a compliance framework, based on 
requiring industry participants to be able to demonstrate ‘competent 
supervision’ and ‘effective control’ over their networks.  
3.20 Competent supervision refers to the ability of a service provider to maintain 
technically proficient oversight of the operations of their network, and the 
location of data; awareness of, and authority over, parties with access to network 
infrastructure; and a reasonable ability to detect security breaches or 
compromises.18 
 
15  Mr Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission No. 183, p. 16. 
16  Optus, Submission No. 206, p. 3. 
17  Optus, Submission No. 206, p .3. 
18  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 35. 
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3.21 Effective control refers to the ability of a C/CSP to maintain direct authority or 
contractual arrangements which ensure that its infrastructure and the 
information held on it is protected from unauthorised interference.19 
3.22 Optus agreed that this proposed framework could be effective: 
We support the idea that a scheme should be targeted to achieve and 
verify outcomes, rather than be prescriptive about particular business 
practices, network designs or purchasing decisions. This aligns with the 
proposed approach of a scheme requiring carriers to demonstrate: 
 Competent supervision; and 
 Effective control.20 
3.23 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications 
Alliance, representing the industry as a whole, preferred an outcomes-based 
approach to regulation: 
The Associations agree that the regulatory framework should focus on 
security outcomes rather than technical requirements and that industry 
should be able to demonstrate compliance rather than have prescriptive 
obligations imposed.  
Noting the importance of network security and resiliency in the digital 
age, the Associations on the whole welcomes the Government’s pragmatic 
security outcomes/objectives based approach as opposed to stipulating a 
requirement for Government approval of network architecture at a 
technical or engineering level.21 
3.24 Similarly, the Commonwealth Privacy Commissioner, within the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, agreed that a framework should be 
focussed on the end results, rather than a prescriptive government-led process:  
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner considers that 
such an outcomes-based regulatory framework would ensure that [service 
providers] have sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in 
telecommunications technology, whilst also ensuring that the 
Government remains responsible for ensuring that the overall protection 
of personal information is achieved.22  
 
19  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 36. 
20  Optus, Submission No. 206, p. 3. 
21  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 
114, p. 17; see also: Huawei Technologies (Australia) Pty Limited, Submission No. 149, p. 11. 
22  Mr Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission No. 183, p. 16. 
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3.25 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications 
Alliance further argued that direct government control of the business decision-
making process would be excessive:  
A regulatory regime that mandates external controls over procurement 
and network design practices and requires extensive notification practices 
would certainly amount to an overly prescriptive level of intervention.  
The Associations believe that such a regulatory framework would restrict 
the ability of network and infrastructure providers to cost-effectively 
implement platforms that are innovative, progressive and provide 
supplier differentiation. Controls over procurement would also 
unnecessarily increase timeframes for network rollouts, which would 
contradict the Government’s advocacy for increased broadband 
deployment.23 
Information sharing and compliance auditing 
3.26 The AGD discussion paper states that Government would provide guidance to 
assist industry to understand and meet its obligations, and to inform 
Carriers/Carriage Service Providers (C/CSPs) how they can maintain competent 
supervision and effective control over their networks.  In order to monitor 
compliance with the obligations under a framework, C/CSPs would be required 
to demonstrate compliance to Government. This could be done by compliance 
assessments and audits, based on a risk assessment to inform the level of 
engagement required.24 
3.27 In relation to the inherent risk of private sector entities being obliged to provide 
information to Government Mr Mark Newton observed that: 
Businesses also need to be mindful of the fact that any information they 
provide to the Government can potentially be released (e.g., under 
Freedom of Information, subpoena, or leak), so it’s wise to be reluctant 
about sharing.25 
3.28 The Committee observes that industry is required to provide similar network 
and service information to the Attorney-General’s Department under the 
interception capability obligations contained in the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979.  That information is given statutory protection 
 
23  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 
114, p. 17. 
24  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 36. 
25  Mr Mark Newton, Submission no. 87, p. 10. 
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from disclosure to any other person without the written permission of the C/CSP 
concerned.26  
3.29 Macquarie Telecom, in accepting that protecting the security of Australia’s 
telecommunications network infrastructure is in Australia’s national interest, 
noted that it was incumbent on Government to communicate with industry: 
At the same time, C/CSPs and other players in the broader 
communications sector are highly motivated to ensure the security of 
their own network infrastructure, systems and data. With a clear 
alignment between the interests of industry players and the Government 
on the need for network infrastructure security, Macquarie believes a 
better outcome could be achieved with increased communication at a 
trusted level between industry and Government.27 
3.30 The complementary roles that industry and government can play was 
highlighted by Vodafone Hutchison Australia: 
 The Government’s security agencies are best placed to outline what are 
actual and emerging security risks and provide clear guidance to the 
industry about effective protections and controls to mitigate these 
risks. 
 The telecommunications industry is best placed to determine what are 
the most appropriate operational and technical controls for their 
businesses.28 
3.31 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications 
Alliance argued that industry participants need to know in advance of making 
their decisions what position and advice Government may have: 
The Associations have proposed that requirements regarding networks 
and infrastructure need to be clearly defined so that industry can invest 
and deploy infrastructure with confidence and, without concern that 
government will raise objections once such networks are deployed.29 
3.32 Telstra highlighted uncertainty in how risk assessments might work in practice: 
What is not clear is whether these “risk assessments” would be subject to 
legislated timeframes so as to avoid delaying procurement or network 
design activities. It is also unclear if C/CSPs will have to implement the 
 
26  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, section 202. 
27  Macquarie Telecom, Submission No. 115, p. 2. 
28  Vodafone Hutchison Australia, Submission No. 113, p.2; see also:  Optus, Submission no. 206, p. 3, Cisco 
Systems Australia Pty Limited, Submission No. 112, p. 2; and Huawei Technologies (Australia) Pty 
Limited, Submission No. 149, p. 12. 
29  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 
114, p. 18; see also: Telstra, Submission no. 189, p. 12. 
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suggested outcomes of the “risk assessments” and if there are any 
penalties for not doing so.30 
Remediation powers and a penalty regime 
3.33 The AGD discussion paper proposes that the risk management framework for 
determining that Carriers and Carriage Service Providers (C/CSPs) will practice 
competent supervision and effective control of their systems will need to be 
underpinned by penalties and the ability of government to make directions to 
service providers: 
Where potential issues of concern are identified, the preferred approach 
would be to engage with the relevant C/CSPs to establish whether 
national security concerns can be co‐operatively addressed. Where this is 
not possible, one way to proportionately address various levels and forms 
of non‐compliance could be to provide a graduated suite of enforcement 
measures (including the power of direction). The availability of 
enforcement measures would provide industry with greater incentive to 
engage co‐operatively with Government.  
Under such an approach, in cases where engagement with C/CSPs 
proves to be ineffective, or a blatant disregard of security information 
jeopardises the Government’s confidence in the security and integrity of 
Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure, powers of direction could 
provide a proportionate means to achieve compliance. 31 
3.34 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications 
Alliance in their joint submission were not convinced that it is yet necessary to 
create an interventionist or punitive compliance regime:   
With regard to the proposal for an amendment to the Act to allow for the 
creation of appropriate enforcement powers and associated pecuniary 
penalties, the Associations’ position is that development of a financial 
penalties framework is premature, and not conducive to the development 
of an appropriate level of trust, and a common vision on security and 
resiliency, between Government and service providers.32 
3.35 Telstra argued that government already possesses the means to dissuade service 
providers from engaging in poor security practices: 
 
30  Telstra, Submission No. 189, pp. 12-13. 
31  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 37. 
32  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 
114, p. 19. 
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Telstra believes the most sensible way to provide these incentives would 
be through the Government’s own procurement practices – i.e. 
Government to specify in requests for proposal/tender their security, 
resilience and integrity requirements for IT and communications services 
supplied to Government by C/CSPs.33 
3.36 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications 
Alliance also argued that if the framework in the discussion paper was to be 
established as proposed, the framework should include avenues to appeal 
government decisions: 
The Associations propose that it should include a facility for an 
appropriate and truly independent means of review or appeal to prevent 
arbitrary or unjust use of directions or penalties.34 
Other considerations 
Regulatory impacts  
3.37 The Committee received some limited evidence about the potential regulatory 
impacts that the telecommunications security reform might have on industry. 
However, these points were not elaborated upon in submissions or in oral 
evidence to the Committee. The Australian Mobile Telecommunications 
Association and Communications Alliance in their joint submission stated: 
Concerns previously raised by the Associations on the proposal to make 
legislative and regulatory changes to enhance the security and resilience 
of telecommunications network infrastructure, are as follows: 
 the potential for the proposed regime to bring providers into conflict 
with existing corporate regulations, particularly those relating to the 
disclosure of information; 
 the compatibility of the proposed regime with existing corporate 
governance where a provider’s activities might be driven by decisions 
made outside of Australia. Many operators have global or regional 
supply arrangements which would in effect become invalid under the 
proposed regime. This would result in costs to operators in the amount 
of many millions of dollars as a result of having to break 
regional/global supply contracts; 
 impacts on competition in the market-place and risk that proposed 
requirements may create a barrier to entry for new, lower cost 
providers and could eliminate some of those already in the market, 
 
33  Telstra, Submission No. 189, p. 13.  
34  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 
114, p. 18. 
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resulting in decreased market competition on pricing and general 
consumer detriment; 
 the absence, to date, of any protection/indemnity to civil action for 
providers who have acted in good faith under the requirements of the 
proposed amendments; 
 the fact that the rapidly changing technology landscape, where 
potential vulnerabilities now exist at the physical, network and 
application layers, has not been sufficiently taken into account, 
specifically with regards to the concept of “critical infrastructure”; and 
 the need to engage further with industry on possible regulatory 
alternatives: such as a set of guidelines to provide guidance for 
providers in the areas of procurement and network design; a process 
for Government-industry engagement where a high risk event is 
identified and a framework for periodic reporting to Government 
agencies on the security measures being taken by providers.35 
 
Data breach notifications  
3.38 The Privacy Commissioner, within the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner (OAIC), raised the potential introduction of a compulsory data 
breach notification regime to supplement security arrangements: 
While notification of a data breach is currently not required by the 
Privacy Act, the OAIC suggests that it be considered as part of the 
proposed framework as an important mitigation strategy against privacy 
risks.  It may also assist in promoting transparency and trust for C/CSPs. 
The OAIC suggests that the implementation of an effective mechanism for 
ensuring that industry has taken reasonable steps to mitigate security 
risks is essential and will assist in achieving the necessary levels of 
transparency and accountability. In the event that there is a complaint to 
the OAIC, access to any compliance assessments and audits of the 
Government under the proposed regime would assist the OAIC in its 
investigation of the matter.36 
3.39 Similarly, the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and 
Communications Alliance, in their joint submission, contended that a cyber-
attack reporting regime would be preferable to the penalty and remediation 
regime proposed in the discussion paper:  
 
35  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 
114, pp. 18-19. 
36  Office of Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No. 183, p. 20. 
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An alternative, and preferable, approach would be to require a reporting 
regime relating to cyber-attacks on Australian networks with noticeable 
operational impact by service providers as opposed to a system which 
enforces penalties on those providers. Where service providers can 
demonstrate implementation of reasonable minimum network security 
measures then imposition of a penalty based instrument would seem to 
be punishing those service providers who have taken steps to ensure, 
within their control, that a certain level of precaution has been exercised 
at a network level.37 
3.40 Senetas, a private sector security consultant, was also of the view that the 
government make data breach notification mandatory for C/CSPs.38 
Free trade commitments 
3.41 Australia’s free trade commitments require any barriers to trade to be no more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil the legitimate objective of protecting 
national security.  Huawei Australia cautioned that a legislative framework that 
targets particular vendors or vendors from particular countries could also raise 
concerns about free trade commitments: 
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) members are essentially required not to discriminate 
against imported products on the basis of their country of origin.  If the 
Network Security Reforms result in discrimination against vendors on the 
basis of their country of origin, it is likely that this would place Australia 
in breach of its WTO obligations under the GATT.39 
 
37  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 
114, p. 19. 
38  Senetas, Submission No. 237, p. 1. 
39  Huawei Technologies (Australia) Pty Limited, Submission No. 149, p. 15. 
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Committee comment 
3.42 The Committee understands the rationale of the Telecommunications Sector 
Security Reform proposal and notes the warm, if cautious support, of most 
industry submitters.  
3.43 There are threats to Australia’s national security that can be effected through the 
telecommunications systems. The industry itself is best placed to deal with those 
threats, however, it cannot protect its systems and infrastructure of which it is 
ignorant or that it does not understand. As well, there is the problem of 
participants which ignore, or fail to take them sufficiently seriously. The relevant 
threat information is held by government.  Where appropriate, there is therefore 
a need for Government to share threat information with industry in order for 
industry participants to make informed decisions about their procurements and 
outsourcing arrangements.   
3.44 Conversely, it would not be possible for government and industry to have 
effective or guided discussions without industry providing essential background 
information to government with which it can assess threats.  The greatest 
improvements to telecommunications sector security would come through 
dialogue – with both industry and Government exchanging useful, and sensitive, 
information. 
3.45 The Committee is of the view that it will be necessary to encourage service 
providers to engage with Government and to accept the advice given to them.  
Although there are currently indirect incentives for service providers to protect 
their customers’ information (such as public relations damage), commercial 
interests will not always align with the national interest.   
3.46 To account for those instances were advice is not acted upon and where national 
security is threatened, the Committee agrees that Government should create a 
scheme including the capacity for Government to direct service providers to take 
certain remediation actions. 
3.47 The Committee believes there cannot be an effective and equitable security 
regime without enforcement mechanisms. 
Interaction between data retention and telecommunications security  
3.48 The Privacy Commissioner drew the Committee’s attention to the need to 
consider telecommunications sector security reform for telecommunications data 
that is held under any potential data retention regime:  
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The OAIC notes that ensuring that Australian telecommunications 
networks are protected by an effective security framework is particularly 
important given the proposals relating to data retention.40 
3.49 The Committee agrees with the Privacy Commissioner that there is a clear need 
to secure information or data that is stored, given that there are already large 
volumes of telecommunications information held by telecommunications 
providers. 
3.50 The Committee is, therefore, of the view that an infrastructure and information 
security regime should be introduced whether or not Government chooses to 
introduce a data retention regime.  
Regulatory impacts  
3.51 As highlighted by the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and 
Communications Alliance, a Regulation Impact Statement should consider 
further issues that were not examined in detail in submissions or in evidence 
given at hearings to this inquiry.  Such issues should include: 
 the interaction of the proposed regime with other corporate regulations; 
 the compatibility of the proposed regime with existing corporate governance 
where a provider’s activities might be driven by decisions made outside of 
Australia;   
 consideration of an indemnity to civil action for service providers who have 
acted in good faith under the requirements of the proposed framework; and 
 impacts on competition in the market-place, including: 
⇒ the potential for  proposed requirements may create a barrier to entry for 
lower cost providers;  
⇒ the possible elimination of  existing lower cost providers from the market, 
resulting in decreased market competition on pricing; and 
⇒ any other relevant effects. 
 
 
40  Mr Timothy Pilgrim, Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission No. 183, p. 16. 
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Recommendation 19 
 The Committee recommends that the Government amend the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 to create a telecommunications security 
framework that will provide: 
 a telecommunications industry-wide obligation to protect 
infrastructure and the information held on it or passing across 
it from unauthorised interference; 
 a requirement for industry to provide the Government with 
information to assist in the assessment of national security 
risks to telecommunications infrastructure; and 
 powers of direction and a penalty regime to encourage 
compliance. 
The Committee further recommends that the Government, through a 
Regulation Impact Statement, address: 
 the interaction of the proposed regime with existing legal 
obligations imposed upon corporations; 
 the compatibility of the proposed regime with existing 
corporate governance where a provider’s activities might be 
driven by decisions made outside of Australia;   
 consideration of an indemnity to civil action for service 
providers who have acted in good faith under the requirements 
of the proposed framework; and 
 impacts on competition in the market-place, including: 
⇒  the potential for proposed requirements to create a barrier to 
entry for lower cost providers;  
⇒  the possible elimination of existing lower cost providers 
from the market, resulting in decreased market competition 
on pricing; and 
⇒ any other relevant effects. 
 
 
 
 4 
 
Australian Intelligence Community Legislation 
Reform  
4.1 The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) discussion paper notes that the 
security environment in which Australia’s intelligence agencies operate ‘is 
continually evolving and becoming increasingly diversified’. This evolution and 
diversification in turn requires these intelligence agencies to adapt, and as such 
the discussion paper argues that: 
...it is imperative that these agencies are appropriately equipped with the 
necessary statutory powers to uphold Australia’s vital national security 
interests.1 
4.2 The Attorney‐General’s Department and agencies within the Australian 
Intelligence Community have identified a number of practical difficulties with 
the legislation governing the operation of those agencies.  
4.3 As such, the discussion paper canvasses a number of reforms to the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) and the Intelligence Services 
Act 2001 (IS Act). According to the discussion paper, these reforms are necessary 
to: 
...maintain the intelligence gathering capabilities of the Australian 
intelligence agencies, ensuring they remain able to adeptly respond to 
emerging and enduring threats to security. Proposed reforms seek to 
continue the recent modernisation of security legislation to ensure the 
intelligence community can continue to meet the demands of government 
in the most effective manner.2 
 
1  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 40. 
2  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 40. 
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4.4 The proposed reforms fall into three broad categories: 
 Matters the Government wishes to progress: changes to ASIO’s warrant 
provisions; changes to ASIO Act employment provisions; and clarifying the 
authority of DIGO. 
 Matters the Government is considering: amending the ASIO Act to create an 
authorised intelligence operations scheme; further changes to ASIO’s warrant 
provisions; and clarifying the ability of ASIO to cooperate with private sector 
actors. 
 Matters on which the Government seeks the views of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security (the Committee): further changes to 
ASIO’s warrant provisions; ministerial authorisations  for Australia’s foreign 
intelligence agencies to produce intelligence on Australian citizens; and ASIS 
cooperation with overseas authorities on self-defence and weapons training. 
Proposals the Government wishes to progress 
ASIO Act – Computer access warrants 
4.5 The Terms of Reference for this inquiry incorporate three separate issues relating 
to computer access warrants.  One issue is a matter that the Government wishes 
to progress, a second is a matter that the Government is considering and the 
third is a matter that for which the Government expressly seeks the Committee’s 
views.  In this report, the three issues will be dealt with together because of their 
common subject matter. 
4.6 Section 25A of the ASIO Act currently allows the Director-General of Security to 
request the Attorney-General to issue a computer access warrant.  The Attorney-
General may issue the warrant if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that access to data held in a particular computer will substantially 
assist the collection of intelligence in respect of a security matter. 
4.7 Computer access warrants authorise ASIO to do things specified by the 
Attorney-General in relation to a particular computer, subject to any restrictions 
also specified by the Attorney-General. 
4.8 The ASIO Act currently allows the Attorney-General to specify the entering of 
premises, the use of computers, telecommunications facilities, other electronic 
devices and data storage devices for the purpose of obtaining data that is held on 
the target computer and, if necessary, adding, deleting or altering other data in 
the target computer if it is necessary to obtain the data. 
4.9 A warrant issued under section 25A empowers ASIO to copy any data that 
appears to be relevant to the collection of intelligence, as well as do anything that 
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is reasonably necessary to conceal that any action has been done under the 
warrant.  
4.10 However, ASIO is prohibited from adding, deleting or altering other data in the 
target computer or doing anything that interferes with, interrupts or obstructs 
the lawful use of the target computer by other persons. 
4.11 The Attorney-General’s Department discussion paper nominates three particular 
changes to section 25A that would enhance its effectiveness. 
References to ‘computer’ in section 25A 
4.12 The Terms of Reference state that the Government wishes to amend the ASIO 
Act to update the definition of computer in section 25A.  The discussion paper 
elaborates that the ASIO Act could be amended so that a computer access 
warrant may be issued in relation to a computer, computers on a particular 
premises, computers connected to a particular person or a computer network.3 
4.13 Computer access warrants under section 25A of the ASIO Act are limited to 
obtaining data stored on ‘a computer’.  A ‘computer’ is defined to mean ‘a 
computer, a computer system or part of a computer system’.  This means that if 
an individual has more than one computer which is not part of the same 
computer system, or data is stored on a computer network, it may be necessary 
for the Attorney-General to issue more than one warrant. 
4.14 The discussion paper asserts that ‘this is inefficient and does not increase the 
level of accountability around the issue of warrants’. The discussion paper 
further suggests that a possible solution to this issue could be to:  
…amend the ASIO Act so that a computer access warrant may be issued 
in relation to a computer, computers on a particular premises, computers 
connected to a particular person or a computer network.4 
4.15 Mr Ian Quick identified that there may be some over-reach or ambiguity in how 
far removed from the target intelligence a computer could be lawfully accessed: 
Could a single warrant cover all computers at BHP headquarters? All 
computers at a university?5  
4.16 Mr Quick added:  
A ‘computer network’ is even more worrying.  How is the network 
defined?  Everything the person could access anywhere on the internet?  
Everything on their ‘local’ (on the premises) network?  Where exactly 
 
3  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 39. 
4  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 39. 
5  Mr Ian Quick, Submission No. 95, p. 8. 
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would the warrant boundaries be, given that it could be argued that the 
bulk of computers on the planet are on the same ‘network?6 
4.17 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) noted that:      
Computing technology and usage patterns have changed and continue to 
change, however the proposed response may introduce further issues. For 
example, the term ‘computers connected to a computer network’ is 
potentially very broad in scope.  It is difficult to contemplate when it 
would be reasonable to access all computers connected to a network in the 
absence of further limitations.  Similarly ‘computers on a particular 
premises’ could inadvertently include computers that can have no 
connection whatsoever with the individual of interest.7 
4.18 Similarly, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law argued:  
ASIO should not be able to seek a warrant to access the computers on a 
particular network unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person in relation to whom intelligence is being sought had a connection 
with computers other than his own on the network.8 
4.19 The Australian Privacy Foundation argued that the ambiguity of the discussion 
paper meant that such changes ‘may be harmless or disastrous depending on 
exactly what is intended’.  The Australian Privacy Foundation further advised 
that: 
The Committee should reject outright the concept of agencies ever being 
permitted to perform an act that “adds, deletes or alters data or interferes 
with, interrupts, or obstructs the lawful use of the target computer by 
other persons”, on the grounds that such acts pollute evidence, and 
enable the “framing” of suspects.9 
Committee comment 
4.20 The Committee notes the concerns that have been raised as to the authority that 
may be given to ASIO under the proposed changes to the computer access 
warrants regime.  However, the Committee is of the view that giving full effect to 
the original intention of that warrant regime is necessary.   
4.21 In an environment of rapidly evolving technology, the capability of ASIO should 
not be degraded by the definition of computer in the ASIO Act being obsolete. 
Therefore, the Committee considers that the existing definition of computer in 
the ASIO Act, and in particular the term “computer system”, may not be 
sufficient to include a multiplicity of computers operating together as a network. 
 
6  Mr Ian Quick, Submission No. 95, p. 8. 
7  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 14. 
8  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission No. 36, p. 11. 
9  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission No. 162, p. 9.  
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In the Committee’s view, computer networks should be within the definition of 
“computer”. 
4.22 The Committee understands the desire of ASIO to enable warrants to extend to 
all computers located on a particular premises, or connected to a particular 
person; however it does not consider that the issue is appropriately addressed by 
amending the definition of “computer” but rather by amending the warrant 
provisions.    
 
Recommendation 20 
 The Committee recommends that the definition of computer in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended by 
adding to the existing definition the words “and includes multiple 
computers operating in a network”. 
The Committee further recommends that the warrant provisions of the 
ASIO Act be amended by stipulating that a warrant authorising access 
to a computer may extend to all computers at a nominated location and 
all computers directly associated with a nominated person in relation to 
a security matter of interest. 
 
 
Enabling the disruption of a target computer 
4.23 The Terms of Reference state that the Government is considering amending the 
ASIO Act to modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant provisions to enable the 
disruption of a target computer for the purposes of a computer access warrant. 
4.24 The discussion paper elaborates that subsection 25A(5) currently restricts ASIO 
from doing anything under a computer access warrant that adds, deletes or alters 
data or interferes with, interrupts, or obstructs the lawful use of the target 
computer by other persons.  This prohibition operates regardless of how minor 
or inconsequential the interference, interruption or obstruction may be. 
4.25 The discussion paper explains that the existing formulation of the prohibition 
leads to difficulties in executing computer access warrants: 
The increasingly complex nature of the global information technology 
environment and the use by some targets of sophisticated computer 
protection mechanisms can adversely impact ASIO’s ability to execute a 
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computer access warrant for the purpose of obtaining access to data 
relevant to security.10 
4.26 The discussion paper suggests that to address those difficulties section 25A could 
be amended so that the prohibition does not apply to activity proportionate to 
what is necessary to execute the warrant. 
4.27 The Law Council of Australia countered the discussion paper’s assertions by 
highlighting the original intent of the provision that prevents ASIO from 
disrupting the target computer when it executes its warrant: 
Having regard to this legislative history, the Law Council questions the 
basis of this proposed reform in relation to sub-section 25A(5).  This key 
provision was considered important to the community and the 
Parliament when it was introduced and the discussion paper does not 
justify its removal other than through the general statement about the 
global information technology environment and sophisticated computer 
protection mechanisms adversely impacting on ASIO’s ability to execute 
computer access warrants.11 
4.28 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) addressed concerns by 
clarifying the intent of the proposal: 
I understand that the proposal is to enable ASIO to do only what is 
necessary to covertly retrieve the information sought under the warrant.  
That is, the primary purpose of any disruption would be to avoid 
disclosing to the person or group under surveillance that ASIO was 
monitoring them. This seems to be a reasonable solution to current 
operational problems.12 
4.29 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked why ASIO should be allowed to 
disrupt a target computer if the law currently prevents such actions from being 
authorised.  The Department expanded upon the intent of the proposal: 
This prohibition operates regardless of how minor or inconsequential the 
interference, interruption or obstruction may be. As this requirement is 
expressed in absolute terms, it can prevent ASIO from being able to 
execute a warrant if doing so would have even a minor or inconsequential 
impact, such as a temporary slowing of the computer. It could also create 
uncertainty if it is not possible to determine whether doing something 
under a computer access warrant may interfere with, interrupt or obstruct 
the lawful use of the computer by other persons.13 
 
10  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 48. 
11  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 66. 
12  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 20. 
13  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 2. 
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4.30 In their joint submission, the peak industry bodies the Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance expressed 
concern that disruption of a target computer could inadvertently lead to damage 
to broader telecommunications networks: 
Disruption of a target computer, or network, should be facilitated by 
agency mechanisms. Industry would strongly oppose any proposal for 
disruption mechanisms being inserted into information communications 
networks, communications devices, and any other publicly available 
applications platforms.14 
4.31 Similarly, Telstra expressed its concern as to the involvement of 
telecommunications service providers: 
If such a change to legislation is contemplated, Telstra would expect that 
ASIO provide [service providers] with full indemnity in relation to 
proceedings brought by a third party in relation to this form of 
interception.15 
4.32 In relation to accessing information stored in cloud computing facilities, Mr 
Robert Batten, submitting in a private capacity, cautioned:  
Any reform that allows interruption to service needs to be worded to be 
cognisant of the potentially very broad implications of such interruption, 
and that warrants for physical computers are becoming less relevant in 
the face of rapid virtualisation.16  
Committee comment 
4.33 The Committee notes the Attorney-General’s Department’s submission that there 
is a need to address difficulties that can arise in executing ASIO’s computer 
access warrants. The Committee further notes that the ASIO Act should be 
amended so that the prohibition on disrupting computers does not apply to 
activities that would be necessary to execute the warrant. 
4.34 The Committee also encourages the Government to consider including 
provisions in the ASIO Act that would prevent damage or cause loss to 
telecommunications systems operated by third parties.  
4.35 The Committee agrees with the comments of the IGIS that this proposal should 
be framed carefully to minimise the impact on parties unrelated to the security 
matter: 
 
14  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission no. 114, 
p. 20. 
15  Telstra, Submission No. 189, p. 14; see also: Mr Evan Slatyer, Submission No. 131, p. 1. 
16  Mr Robert Batten, Submission No. 50, p. 10; see also Internet Society of Australia, Submission No. 145, p. 
3. 
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As this proposal could directly affect the activities of persons unrelated to 
security interests it would be essential to have to clearly justify the case as 
to why it is appropriate to affect any lawful use of the computer. The 
reasons would need to balance the potential consequences of this 
interference to the individual(s) with the threat to security.17 
4.36 The Committee also agrees with the IGIS that there should be appropriate review 
and oversight mechanisms with particular attention to the effect of any 
disruption on third parties. 
 
Recommendation 21 
 The Committee recommends that the Government give further 
consideration to amending the warrant provisions in the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to enable the disruption of a 
target computer for the purposes of executing a computer access warrant 
but only to the extent of a demonstrated necessity. The Committee 
further recommends that the Government pay particular regard to the 
concerns raised by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
 
Access via third party computers and communications 
4.37 The Terms of Reference state that the Government expressly seeks the views of 
the Committee on amending the ASIO Act to modernise and streamline ASIO’s 
warrant provisions by using third party computers and communications in 
transit to access a target computer under a computer access warrant. 
4.38 As with the proposals considered above, the discussion paper attributes the 
increasingly difficult situation ASIO faces in executing its computer access 
warrants to advancements in technology. This is particularly the case where a 
target is security conscious and ASIO must consider ‘innovative methods’ to 
access the target computer: 
In the same way that access to a third party premises may be necessary to 
execute a search warrant, it may be necessary to use a communication that 
is in transit or use a third party computer for the purpose of executing a 
computer access warrant.18 
4.39 The discussion paper proposes: 
 
17  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 20. 
18  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 50. 
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To overcome this problem, it may be appropriate to amend the ASIO Act 
to enable a third party computer or communication in transit to be used 
by ASIO to lawfully access a target computer. Noting that using a 
communication in transit or a third party computer may have privacy 
implications, appropriate safeguards and accountability mechanisms 
would need to be incorporated into such a scheme.19 
4.40 The description of the proposal and the lack of reference to what a legislative 
framework for third party access might entail drew criticism: 
There is no reference to proportionality tests applicable or the need to 
balance any national security benefit against the cost to individual 
privacy.20 
4.41 There was also criticism of the very nature of accessing the computers of people 
who are not directly national security targets: 
In my view, this proposal is completely unjustified. To access a third 
party’s computer which has no connection with the target is 
extraordinarily broad and intrusive. These are powers usually 
characteristic of a police state.  Adversely impacting the privacy of an 
individual (the third party) should only be permitted in the most extreme 
circumstances as a “last resort” when all other methods have been 
exhausted.  Furthermore, the power to alter (rather than “access”) a third 
party computer should not be permitted.  
Even with such safeguards and accountability mechanisms (which are not 
detailed in the discussion paper), I cannot support a measure that could 
severely diminish the privacy of individuals and could cause a chilling 
effect on the way that individuals communicate and use technology.21 
4.42 The Acting Commissioner of the Victorian Privacy Commission elaborated on his 
comment for the Committee at a hearing.  The Commissioner was asked whether 
this proposal would be acceptable if there were appropriate safeguards:   
It still severely diminishes the privacy of individuals.  Certainly, it would 
need the safeguards and accountability mechanisms and it would need to 
be strongly argued that it met those tests of legitimacy, necessity and 
proportionality. But there is not even an attempt, in my view, in the 
discussion paper to do that.22 
 
19  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 50. 
20  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 3; see also: Mr Daniel Judge, Submission No. 157, p. 13; Ms Stella 
Gray, Submission No. 152, pp. 11-12; see also: New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No. 133, p. 
8. 
21  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No. 109, p. 6. 
22  Dr Anthony Bendall, Acting Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Transcript, Melbourne, 5 September 2012. 
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4.43 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked why ASIO should be empowered 
to ‘hack’ the computers of people who are not threats to security.  The 
Department clarified that the proposal would not allow for surveillance of third 
party computers: 
The proposals would not involve hacking in the sense of authorising 
ASIO to examine the content of material.  AGD notes the concerns raised 
in submissions to the Committee, for example from the Office of the 
Victorian Privacy Commissioner, that the proposal would allow 
surveillance of virtually unlimited services. However, the purpose of a 
warrant authorising the use of a third party computer would still be to 
access the computer of security interest, and the warrant would not 
authorise ASIO to obtain intelligence material from the third party 
computer or the communication in transit.23 
4.44 The IGIS suggested an appropriate precedent within the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) that could be adapted in the ASIO Act 
to provide appropriate accountability safeguards, should the proposal be 
adopted:     
Any such change must ensure that the impact on the third party, 
including privacy implications as well as any impact on the security or 
lawful use of the third party computer are considered carefully in the 
approval process. 
Currently the TIA Act allows ASIO to obtain a warrant from the 
Attorney-General to intercept communications via a third party only 
where all other practicable methods have been exhausted or where it 
would not otherwise be possible to intercept the relevant 
communications.  This appears to be an appropriate safeguard.24 
4.45 The IGIS refers to interception warrants that are labelled ‘B-Party’ warrants. 
4.46 The Attorney-General’s Department offered further clarification of the 
safeguards that would limit the intrusiveness of access to third party computers 
and communications: 
There are a range of safeguards that already exist so that third party 
computers and communications in transit could only be used in limited 
circumstances.  It is envisaged that use of third party computers and 
communications in transit would need to be expressly authorised by the 
Attorney-General when issuing a warrant. The Attorney-General’s 
Guidelines contain requirements for ASIO to use as little intrusion into 
 
23  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 1. 
24  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 21. 
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privacy as possible and for the measures used to obtain intelligence to be 
proportionate to the gravity of the threat (section 10.4).25 
4.47 Mr Johann Trevaskis, submitting in a private capacity, noted additional practical 
questions that the Government should consider when it develops draft 
legislation for Parliament’s consideration:    
It also raises the issue of what happens if the third party detects what is 
going on. The third party is unlikely to be aware of the ASIO operation. 
The third party may deliberately or unintentionally reveal details of it, or 
interfere with it. The third party, thinking his system is under attack, may 
actively take countermeasures. Will the third party be indemnified for any 
of this?  If the third party becomes aware of what is going on is the third 
party obliged to consent to the intrusion?26 
Committee comment  
4.48 The Committee notes that there are circumstances in which it would be necessary 
for ASIO to access a third party computer or communication in transit for the 
ultimate purpose of lawfully accessing a target computer. 
4.49 The Committee notes that third party access has significant privacy implications 
and that therefore appropriate safeguards and accountability mechanisms, such 
as those included in the TIA Act for ‘B-Party’ interception warrants, would need 
to be incorporated into such a scheme.  
4.50 The interception of voice communications via third parties is already lawful 
under the TIA Act. This proposal would extend this capability under warrant to 
ASIO via the ASIO Act to allow it to access data through third parties. In essence, 
this is another case of updating the Acts to keep pace with technological 
developments. 
 
Recommendation 22 
 The Committee recommends that the Government  amend the warrant 
provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
to allow ASIO to access third party computers and communications in 
transit to access a target computer under a computer access warrant, 
subject to appropriate safeguards and accountability mechanisms, and 
consistent with existing provisions under the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979.  
 
 
25  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 1. 
26  Mr Johann Trevaskis, Submission No.62, p. 11. 
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ASIO Act warrant proposals 
4.51 The Terms of Reference and discussion paper describe three related proposals 
that have the potential to affect the operation of all warrant types contained in 
the ASIO Act. Broadly, these proposals relate to the duration, variation and 
renewal of ASIO warrants.  
4.52 Under the ASIO Act, the Director-General of Security applies to the Attorney-
General for warrants.  If satisfied that all the criteria have been met and that a 
case has been made that special powers should be used in a particular matter, the 
Attorney-General may issue a warrant at their discretion. 
4.53 It is important to note that those powers exercised under warrant are of an 
inherently intrusive nature.  They include search, listening device, tracking 
device and computer access warrants. In the case of surveillance and computer 
access warrants, they are executed covertly and the persons affected might never 
know that they were under surveillance. 
4.54 Some general observations and criticisms that cover all three related proposals 
were made: 
Liberty Victoria is concerned that the proposals to extend the duration 
and allow the renewal of warrants potentially undermine judicial scrutiny 
of warrants. The lack of evidence to support the need for reforms and the 
lack of reference to accountability measures is problematic given the 
highly invasive nature of search warrants.27 
4.55 The IGIS outlined the principles that ought to underpin the ASIO Act warrants 
regime: 
Proposals to increase the scope of existing powers or their duration need 
to ensure that safeguards exist such that the extended scope or longer 
timeframes do not become the norm, and that the warrants are not 
unduly broad and are executed reasonably and in accordance with the 
specifics of the legislation as well as the overarching privacy and 
proportionality objectives.28 
Variation of warrants 
4.56 The first proposal, which the Government states it wishes to progress, would 
allow the variation of all types of ASIO Act warrants. 
4.57 The discussion paper explains that: 
Currently, the ASIO Act does not specifically provide for a warrant to be 
varied if the circumstances justify such a variation. A new warrant is 
required in every instance where there is a significant change in 
 
27  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 3. 
28  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 3. 
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circumstances. A variation provision may be appropriate to ensure 
sufficient operational flexibility while maintaining appropriate 
accountability.29 
4.58 NSW Young Lawyers argued that the existing requirement that a new warrant 
should be applied for when there is a change in circumstances should be retained 
as that is an important accountability mechanism: 
In order to maintain accountability and ensure that an existing warrant 
did not endure inappropriately following a significant change in 
circumstances, any variation of a warrant as proposed would call for a 
level of accountability whereby the entire basis of the warrant would be 
reviewed in light of present, past and altered circumstances.  This level of 
accountability is achieved under the existing provisions.30  
4.59 The Law Council of Australia criticised the short description of the proposal in 
the discussion paper as lacking detail vital for consideration: 
For example, would there be different requirements for seeking a 
variation of a search warrant under section 25 compared with a variation 
of warrant to use a listening device under section 26? Would there be 
different limits on the period in respect of which an existing warrant 
could be renewed, depending on the nature of the power to be 
exercised? 31  
4.60 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked which warrants are intended to 
be varied and in what ways might those warrants be varied.  The Department 
clarified: 
It is envisaged that a general power to vary warrants could apply to all 
warrants under Division 2 Part III of the ASIO Act (this proposal does not 
cover questioning and detention warrants). A variation might be sought if 
there is a relatively minor change in circumstances. For example, if ASIO 
had a computer access warrant relating to a particular computer and also 
entry to the premises in which that computer is located. If the person 
moved house unexpectedly, before entry to the premises to access the 
computer occurred, the ability to request a variation to amend the address 
could be appropriate, as the core grounds (to access data on the target 
computer) would not have changed.32  
 
29  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 41. 
30  New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No. 133, p. 7; see also: Law Council of Australia, 
Submission No. 96, p. 67. 
31  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 67; see also: New South Wales Young Lawyers, 
Submission No. 133, p. 6. 
32  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 5. 
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4.61 The Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner criticised what might be a 
potential expansion of the activities authorised by the warrant, without recourse 
to the issuing authority:  
In my view, the level of variation required needs to be carefully 
considered and should be extremely limited. Courts are (rightly) vested 
with authority to grant warrants; allowing “operational flexibility” to 
vary a warrant could potentially allow extension of a warrant beyond 
what was authorised by a court.33 
4.62 The Attorney-General’s Department was also asked which officer might be 
vested with the authority to vary the terms of a warrant.  The Department 
responded that it would be the Attorney-General, the original issuer of the 
warrant: 
Given that the Attorney-General issues warrants and their terms and 
conditions, it would seem appropriate that the Attorney-General should 
have the responsibility for approving the variation of warrants.34 
Committee comment 
4.63 The Committee notes the Attorney-General’s Department contention that 
allowing the variation of active ASIO Act warrants is appropriate in order to 
ensure sufficient operational flexibility for ASIO.  
4.64 The Committee is satisfied that the appropriate accountability would be 
maintained if any such variation was authorised by the Attorney-General.   
 
Recommendation 23 
 The Committee recommends the Government amend the warrant 
provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
to promote consistency by allowing the Attorney-General to vary all 
types of ASIO Act warrants. 
 
Duration of search warrants 
4.65 The second proposal that the Government wishes to progress relates to the 
duration of ASIO Act search warrants. The discussion paper elaborated that the 
maximum duration of search warrants could be increased from 90 days to six 
 
33  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No. 109, p. 4; see also:  Ms Stella Gray, 
Submission No. 152, p. 9. 
34  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 5. 
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months, making those warrants consistent with the duration of all other warrants 
issued under that Act. 
4.66 The discussion paper’s rationale for extending the duration of search warrants to 
six months is that: 
… [it] would provide operational benefits as the exact timing of the search 
may depend on a range of unknown and fluid operational factors.  
Indeed, there have been instances where ASIO was unable to execute a 
search warrant within the 90 day limit for reasons beyond its control, and 
a new warrant would be required.35 
4.67 The proposal to increase the duration of ASIO Act warrants was subject to many 
of the same criticisms that the variation of ASIO warrants proposal received, 
namely that current arrangements serve to protect the interests of affected 
parties.  The Castan Centre for Human Rights Law observed that:  
A modest additional administrative burden is a small price to pay in 
return for avoiding any implication, for example, that certain persons are, 
by default, subject to covert intelligence surveillance.36 
4.68 Contrary to the discussion paper’s rationale, Mr Daniel Nazer asserted that the 
efficacy of search warrants may be better served by shorter deadlines for 
executing searches:  
As days, weeks, or even months go by, it becomes increasingly likely that 
a search warrant is based on stale information. Indeed, with a deadline as 
long as 180 days, it is possible that an investigation might evolve to the 
point of exonerating a target. Thus, limited warrant durations promote 
privacy by ensuring that searches are conducted based on fresh, accurate 
information.37   
4.69 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked why the current 90 day 
timeframe for the execution of search warrants is inadequate.  The Department 
explained: 
ASIO operations require careful planning, and may require a high degree 
of flexibility as to when warrants are executed, in order to ensure access 
to the intelligence information and ensure protection of ASIO officers and 
methodology.  Searches may be undertaken covertly, which may 
significantly limit opportunities to execute the warrant. A warrant 
enabling a search to take place within a six month period would provide 
 
35  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p41, p. 42. 
36  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission No. 142, p. 4. 
37  Mr Daniel Nazer, Submission No. 110, p. 7. 
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operational benefits as the exact timing of the search may depend on a 
range of unknown and fluid operational factors.38 
4.70 The IGIS shed further light on the possible rationale of extending the duration of 
these warrants: 
I am aware of one general category of warrants where there is sometimes 
difficulty executing the warrant within 90 days. To ensure the legislative 
response is proportionate it may be preferable to allow this particular 
category of search warrants to be extended rather than all search 
warrants.39 
4.71 Though it was not publicly discussed what types of searches may be difficult for 
ASIO to execute within 90 days, the IGIS offered an alternative solution to a 
blanket extension of all ASIO search periods:  
If that period is extended to six months then this should clearly be set as 
the maximum possible duration – not the default standard for all 
warrants.  If this provision was enacted I would monitor search warrant 
requests closely to see whether the duration of each warrant request was 
considered on an individual basis to ensure it was valid for an 
appropriate time, which would usually be less than six months.40 
4.72 The IGIS finally observed that there was overlap with another proposal included 
in the terms of reference, the ‘named person warrant’ for ASIO warrants.  That 
concept is to create an additional form of warrant that would enable all forms of 
special powers to be available under the ASIO Act against a particular person.  
That proposal was referred to the Committee as one that the Government is 
considering and is discussed separately below.   
4.73 The IGIS observed that: 
…it may be that the policy reason behind the change from 90 days to 6 
months is directed at administrative ease and consistency for such 
warrants. However my view is that administrative ease and consistency 
are, in themselves, not compelling reasons to increase warrant powers or 
extend their duration.41 
4.74 The Attorney-General’s Department responded to the IGIS’s concern: 
As with all ASIO warrant powers, six months would be a maximum 
duration. It would be open to ASIO to apply for a period shorter than six 
months where appropriate, or for the Attorney-General to grant a warrant 
 
38  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 3. 
39  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 15. 
40  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 15. 
41  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 15. 
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with a shorter duration if an adequate supporting case for the maximum 
duration is not presented. 
While it is possible for ASIO to reapply for a new warrant if it has not 
been possible to conduct the search within the 90 day period, if the search 
has not been conducted and the grounds remain unchanged, arguably 
seeking a fresh warrant does not significantly add accountability. The 
warrant, whether in force for 90 days or six months, still only authorises 
one search of the premises. There is also a requirement under section 30 of 
the ASIO Act for the Director-General to notify the Attorney-General and 
take steps to ensure that any action under the warrant is discontinued if 
the Director-General ceases to be satisfied that the grounds for it exist.42 
Committee comment  
4.75 The Committee did not receive sufficient evidence to justify the proposal that the 
maximum duration of search warrants be increased from 90 days to six months. 
 
Recommendation 24 
Subject to the recommendation on renewal of warrants, the Committee 
recommends that the maximum duration of Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 search warrants not be increased. 
  
 
Renewal of warrants 
4.76 The third proposal that the Government wishes to progress relates to the renewal 
of ASIO Act warrants.  The discussion paper notes that when a warrant expires, 
which is up to 6 months for most ASIO warrants, and there remains an ongoing 
need to use special powers, a new warrant must be sought from the Attorney-
General by the Director-General of Security.  The current provisions in the ASIO 
Act do not enable a warrant to be extended.   
4.77 The discussion paper notes that certain threats to security can endure for many 
years and that the threats creating the need for a significant proportion of 
warrants continue beyond the initial authorisation periods.  This means that:     
In such circumstances, ASIO must apply for a new warrant which 
necessitates restating the intelligence case and completely reassessing the 
legislative threshold in instances where there has not been a significant 
 
42  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 3. 
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change to either, and where the assessment of the intelligence case 
remains unchanged. A renewal process would provide appropriate 
oversight and accountability without requiring excessive administrative 
resources.43 
4.78 Liberty Victoria questioned the desirability of removing the need to obtain a new 
warrant:  
The renewal of a warrant is not a minor matter. It extends the power of 
ASIO officers to interfere in the personal privacy of suspects through the 
interception of communications, searches of private premises, installation 
of listening devices, inspection of postal articles and use of tracking 
devices. All renewals need to be based on clear evidence of the 
intelligence case and reference to the legislative threshold. Such basic 
standards should not be regarded as “excessive” administrative 
requirements.44 
4.79 Though not expressly endorsing the introduction of a renewal process in lieu of 
requiring fresh warrants when existing investigations carry on past the expiry of 
original warrants, the IGIS did offer comfort to the Committee that ASIO would 
not lower the standards expected of it when assessing which matters are 
investigated with intrusive powers: 
My experience is that ASIO actively monitors changes in circumstances 
and is generally prompt in ensuring that action under a warrant is 
discontinued when the grounds for a warrant have ceased to exist.  My 
understanding is that there is no intention in ASIO to reduce the scrutiny 
given to the intelligence case on renewal or re-issue of warrants or the 
ongoing monitoring of the grounds for the warrant – these essential 
internal assurance processes may limit the “streamlining” benefits the 
proposed amendment could deliver.45 
4.80 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law reminded the Committee that 
consideration of the concept of renewing warrants should also be considered in 
the context of the ‘named person warrant’ proposal:    
We would, however, note that the criteria, especially for renewal, should 
not be significantly less than those for issuing a warrant in the first place.  
This is particularly important given the proposal to merge warrant 
powers into a single category of warrant. Otherwise, renewal may become 
 
43  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 42. 
44  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 10; see also: Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission 
No. 142, p. 4; Mr M Newton, Submission No. 87, p. 11. 
45  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 15. 
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a means of rolling all of the warrant powers over every six months 
without meaningful consideration of whether the need still exists.46 
4.81 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked what was envisaged for a 
renewal process for ASIO warrants and how that may differ from applying for 
fresh warrants.  The Department replied: 
It is envisaged that a renewal process would differ by enabling ASIO to 
present a renewal application to the Attorney-General that focuses on 
why it is necessary to continue the warrant and certifies that the facts and 
grounds specified in the original application have not changed.  A 
simplified renewal process would provide significant administrative 
efficiencies for ASIO and the Attorney-General, without reducing 
oversight and accountability, as the Attorney-General would still need to 
be satisfied that the application meets the relevant threshold.47 
4.82 Noting community concerns raised in submissions, the Attorney-General’s 
Department also advised: 
…that the criteria for renewal should not be significantly less than those 
for issuing a warrant in the first place.  The Attorney-General could still 
have responsibility for renewing warrants, and the IGIS would also 
continue to have oversight of all warrant documentation. On that basis, 
the Attorney-General would only grant a renewal if satisfied that the 
legislative requirements continue to be met. In doing so, the decision to 
renew warrants would be focused on any change in circumstances from 
when the original warrant was issued and the appropriateness of 
continuing the warrant for a further period.48 
Committee comment 
4.83 The Committee is of the view that there is merit in making the process of 
obtaining authority to continue the use of intrusive powers more efficient.  This 
could be done with a form of renewal, rather than requiring ASIO to start its 
application afresh.   
4.84 However, the standards and thresholds for obtaining a warrant should not be 
lowered for the renewal of the very same warrant. The Attorney-General ought 
to remain satisfied, by applying the same standards, that there is a threat that 
requires intrusive investigation, as they were when the original warrant or 
warrants were issued. 
 
 
46  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission No. 36, pp. 13-14.  
47  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 4. 
48  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 4. 
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Recommendation 25 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to allow the Attorney-General to 
renew warrants. 
 
ASIO Act employment provisions 
4.85 The Terms of Reference to this inquiry state that the Government wishes to 
progress the modernisation of the ASIO Act employment provisions.  ASIO 
officers are employed under the ASIO Act rather than the Public Service Act 1999.  
The discussion paper notes that the provisions relating to the employment of 
ASIO officers do not align with the Australian Public Service framework as the 
ASIO Act provisions have not been updated since they were originally enacted 
30 years ago. 
4.86 These proposals are: 
 To delete the requirement for an ASIO employee to hold an “office” within 
ASIO; 
 Replacing various descriptors denoting employment within ASIO, with a 
single descriptor, ‘employee’, throughout the ASIO Act; 
 Repealing section 87 of the ASIO Act, which relates to employees who were 
employed immediately before the ASIO Act’s commencement in 1979, of 
whom there are no longer any employed; and 
 Secondment provisions.  
4.87 The Committee received no evidence in relation to the first three proposals, 
however, they appear on their face to be of an innocuous administrative 
character.  
Proposed secondment arrangements  
4.88 The Terms of Reference to this inquiry state that the Government wishes to 
progress amendments to the ASIO Act to ‘provide for additional scope for 
further secondment arrangements’.  The discussion paper elaborates that this 
proposal is to legislate secondment arrangements for ASIO officers into other 
agencies and for officers from other agencies into ASIO: 
In order to access specialist skills and as part of arrangements whereby 
ASIO works closely with other agencies, ASIO often places staff of other 
agencies to work within ASIO, or agrees to its staff members working in 
other agencies.  Legal complexities can arise in making such 
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arrangements because of the specified scope of the functions and powers 
of ASIO and the other organisation involved.49 
4.89 The discussion paper suggests that ASIO’s ability to engage with other agencies 
would be enhanced, and administrative difficulties could be overcome if the 
ASIO Act expressly enabled the secondment of staff to and from ASIO.  It is also 
proposed that, during the secondment, a seconded staff member carries out only 
the functions of the host organisation in accordance with any procedures or 
restrictions that apply under legislation to the host organisation.50  For instance, 
this would mean that an ASIO officer seconded to the AFP would act according 
to the laws and rules that apply to the AFP, rather than ASIO. 
4.90 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security submitting on the secondment 
proposal noted that there is potential for poorly constructed secondment 
arrangements to create opportunities for circumventing existing statutory 
limitations: 
If the secondment proposal is adopted I would be looking to ensure that 
the changes are applied in such a way that it is clear to individual officers 
which agency they are undertaking an activity for and that ‘secondments’ 
are a true change in working arrangements for a reasonable period.  In 
my view it would not be proper for such a mechanism to be used to 
circumvent limits placed on employees in other legislation. For example it 
would not be proper for an ASIS staff member to be ‘seconded’ to ASIO 
for a day or two to enable them to perform an activity that they would 
otherwise not be permitted to undertake.  My understanding is that this is 
not a practice the agencies intend to adopt.51 
4.91 The discussion paper acknowledges that there is no intention for future 
secondment arrangements to be used to circumvent statutory limitations on the 
acts that officers from particular agencies may carry out.  The current 
requirements that allow Intelligence Services Act agencies to co-operate with 
ASIO would operate independently of any new secondment provisions.52  
Committee comment 
4.92 The Committee is satisfied with the creation of new secondment provisions in 
the ASIO Act, provided that those arrangements cannot be used for the purpose 
 
49  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 43. 
50  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 43. 
51  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 16. 
52  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 41. 
106 INQUIRY INTO POTENTIAL REFORMS OF AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION 
 
of officers of agencies circumventing existing safeguards and limitations that 
apply to their employment and conduct.  
 
Recommendation 26 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to modernise the Act’s provisions 
regarding secondment arrangements. 
  
Intelligence Services Act – Clarifying the authority of the Defence Imagery 
and Geospatial Organisation  
4.93 The Government wishes to clarify the authority of the Defence Imagery and 
Geospatial Organisation (DIGO).  The discussion paper explains that minor 
amendments to subsection 6B(e) of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act) 
would ensure that DIGO has clear authority to undertake its geospatial and 
imagery functions.   
4.94 Under the IS Act, DIGO has a number of geospatial and imagery related 
intelligence functions, as well as civilian functions that relate to supporting 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments as well as other bodies.  The 
discussion paper explains that minor legislative clarifications are required to 
ensure that DIGO has clear legislative support to undertake its geospatial and 
imagery related functions.   
4.95 DIGO's work under its civil assistance function may involve collecting imagery 
and other data in relation to locations inside and outside Australia.  That work is 
not done for the purpose of providing information about a particular person or 
entity.  This means that is not an intelligence-gathering function but DIGO may 
still utilise the same sources or capabilities that it uses for intelligence collection 
to perform its statutory civil assistance function. 
4.96 The discussion paper proposes amendments to the Intelligence Services Act to 
avoid any doubt that DIGO is enabled to provide Commonwealth and State 
authorities, and other approved bodies, assistance in relation to the production 
and use of both non intelligence and intelligence imagery and geospatial 
products.53 
4.97 The discussion paper also proposes that the IS Act be amended to include an 
express power for DIGO to provide specialised imagery and geospatial 
technologies assistance to Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities and 
 
53  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 45. 
AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LEGISLATION REFORM  107 
 
certain non‐government bodies.  This would include the use and application of 
specialised imagery and geospatial technologies, including geospatial web‐based 
services.54   
4.98 Because DIGO is an organisation that uses intelligence-gathering capabilities for 
both intelligence and non-intelligence functions, as well as using those 
capabilities to image locations within Australia and overseas, some submitters 
urged caution in amending the legal framework in which DIGO operates.   
4.99 For example, Ms Stella Gray highlighted for the Committee that: 
This would enable ASIS, DSD and DIGO to collect intelligence on 
Australian citizens whenever the agencies are cooperating with ASIO in 
the performance of its functions.  This proposal does not include any 
provision to prevent the abuse of power by these agencies whilst working 
in concert.  This proposal cannot be supported with the current level of 
accountability it demands of these agencies.55 
4.100 The discussion paper explains that the safeguards that prevent possible abuses of 
power will remain in place: 
The proposed amendments do not change the original intended operation 
of section 6B of the IS Act.  The existing safeguards in the IS Act would 
remain unaffected and in place. The suggested changes involve minor 
clarifications to provide more certainty and practical utility. By making 
the legislation clearer, it would be easier for the Inspector‐General of 
Intelligence and Security to effectively review whether DIGO is operating 
within its powers, and ensure accountability is maintained.56 
4.101 The IGIS further elaborated on the protections that would prevent the risk of 
abuse of power by DIGO and the agencies and bodies that it may assist:  
If such assistance was also for the specific purpose of producing 
intelligence on an Australian person my expectation is that DIGO would 
continue to be required to obtain ministerial authorisation. I also expect 
DIGO to continue to apply the Privacy Rules made under s. 15 of the IS 
Act to any disclosure of intelligence about an Australian person, 
regardless of which function the intelligence was collected under.57 
 
54  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 45. 
55  Ms Stella Gray, Submission No. 152, p. 10.   
56  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 45. 
57  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 23. 
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Committee comment 
4.102 The Committee agrees that the IS Act should be amended to clarify DIGO’s 
authority to assist other agencies and bodies, provided that the existing oversight 
and accountability mechanisms would apply. 
 
Recommendation 27 
 The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to clarify the authority of the Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation to undertake its geospatial and imagery functions. 
 
Matters the Government is considering 
4.103 The second category of reform proposals are matters which the Terms of 
Reference state the Government is considering. These are proposals to amend the 
ASIO Act to: 
 Create an authorised intelligence operations scheme; 
 Create a named person warrant;  
 Align the ASIO Act surveillance device provisions with the Surveillance Devices 
Act 2004; 
 Allow the Director-General of ASIO to create authorisation lists for the 
execution of warrants; 
 Clarify ASIO’s ability to operate with the private sector; and 
 Refer breaches of the prohibition on identifying ASIO officers to law 
enforcement for investigation.  
  
Creation of an authorised intelligence operations scheme 
4.104 The Terms of Reference state that the Government is considering amending the 
ASIO Act to create an authorised intelligence operations scheme.  Such a scheme 
would provide ASIO officers and its human sources with protection from 
criminal and civil liability for certain conduct in the course of authorised 
intelligence operations. 
4.105 The discussion paper proposes the creation of an authorised intelligence 
operations scheme (or controlled operations scheme) for ASIO officers, based on 
that currently available to certain law enforcement officers under the Crimes Act 
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‘with appropriate modifications and safeguards that recognise the scheme would 
operate in the context of covert intelligence gathering investigations or 
operations’.58 
4.106 Existing controlled operations provisions in Commonwealth and State and 
Territory laws provide for the issue of authorities which provide immunity from 
prosecution and indemnity from civil liability for law enforcement officers and 
nominated civilian participants who engage in activities that would otherwise be 
unlawful.   
4.107 The Australian Federal Police (AFP)’s Annual Controlled Operations Report for 
2010-11 notes that controlled operations can be used to uncover serious illicit and 
organised criminal activity such as the smuggling of drugs, firearms and persons 
and to disband or disrupt organised criminal syndicates.59 
4.108 In relation to creating an analogous scheme for ASIO, the discussion paper 
explains that: 
An authorised intelligence operations scheme would significantly assist 
covert intelligence operations that require undercover ASIO officers or 
human sources to gain and maintain access to highly sensitive 
information concerning serious threats to Australia and its citizens.60 
4.109 The discussion paper also provides that: 
Should an authorised intelligence operations regime be pursued, it will be 
critical that it achieves an appropriate balance between operational 
flexibility and appropriate oversight and accountability. Key features that 
may contribute to such could include: 
 the Director‐General of Security to issue authorised intelligence 
operation certificates which would provide protection from criminal 
and civil liability for specified conduct for a specified period (such as 
12 months);  
 oversight and inspection by the IGIS, including notifying the IGIS once 
an authorised intelligence operation has been approved by the 
Director‐General;  
 specifying conduct which cannot be authorised (for example, 
intentionally inducing a person to commit a criminal offence that the 
person would not otherwise have intended to commit and conduct that 
is likely to cause the death of or serious injury to a person or involves 
the commission of a sexual offence against any person), and  
 
58  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 46. 
59  AFP, Controlled Operations annual Report 2010-2011, viewed 12 November 2012, 
<www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/publications/~/media/afp/html/controlled-operations-annual-
report-2010-2011.ashx>. 
60  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 46. 
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 independent review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of 
any such scheme, which could be conducted five years after the 
scheme’s commencement.61 
4.110 The potential creation of an authorised intelligence operations scheme raised a 
number of criticisms in submissions and at hearings.  
4.111 Dr Patrick Emerton of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law at Monash 
University drew an important distinction between ASIO and traditional law 
enforcement agencies such as police forces.  Dr Emerton contended that ASIO:  
...is not a law enforcement agency and is not accountable through the 
criminal trial process in the way that a law enforcement agency is, and it 
is therefore not governed by the very strict chapter 3 [of the Constitution] 
jurisprudence that governs the behaviour of law enforcement agencies 
under our constitutional law. It is in a very different constitutional 
position, a very different administrative position and a very different 
policy position, and it is essentially secret.62 
4.112 The IGIS questioned why ASIO’s existing relationships with law enforcement 
agencies could not be utilised to take advantage of the existing controlled 
operations regimes: 
I am aware that over a period of some years my office has received a 
small number of complaints from current and former ASIO human 
sources that demonstrate the complexity of the relationship.  The paper 
does not explain why ASIO could not request the AFP or ACC to use 
existing powers to perform these functions, including where necessary 
authorising ASIO officers or sources under the existing schemes.63 
4.113 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked if ASIO would be able to rely on 
the AFP to conduct controlled operations on its behalf.  The Department 
contended that it would not always be possible: 
While there might be some capacity to utilise this scheme in joint counter-
terrorism investigations, ASIO security intelligence operations extend 
across the range of national security matters within the ASIO Act. Some 
operations may cover matters not normally the subject of criminal 
investigations, such as foreign interference. Similarly, ASIO may be 
involved at a stage where there would not be sufficient grounds for law 
enforcement to investigate the possible commission of an offence.64   
 
61  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, pp. 46-47. 
62  Dr Patrick Emerton, Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Transcript, Melbourne, 5 September 2012,  
p. 21; see also NSW Council for Civil Liberties, Submission No. 175, p. 13;  Law Council of Australia, 
Submission No. 96, p. 58.  
63  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 18. 
64  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 6. 
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4.114 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law argued that it would not be necessary 
to create an indemnity scheme for ASIO as it would be unlikely that ASIO 
officers would be prosecuted for crimes committed in the course of their duties 
because the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has a discretion 
whether or not to prosecute individuals for terrorism and other offences:  
It is highly unlikely that an ASIO officer would be prosecuted for 
activities done in the course of an undercover operation.65 
4.115 The Attorney-General’s Department argued that ASIO would not be able to rely 
on prosecutorial discretion, even where it was available:  
While a general prosecutorial discretion is available, decisions on whether 
to pursue a prosecution are determined on a case-by-case basis by the 
relevant Director of Public Prosecutions.  It is not normal practice for the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to give advance indemnities or 
immunities from future prosecution.  In addition, there is no equivalent 
mechanism to provide indemnity from civil proceedings.66 
Committee comment  
4.116 The Committee received evidence that there are occasions on which ASIO 
officers and sources are placed in positions where, in order to carry out their 
duties, they may need to engage in conduct which may, in ordinary 
circumstances, be a breach of the criminal law. The Committee understands that 
such occasions would be seldom but may from time to time arise. The Committee 
also understands that it will not be possible for ASIO to rely on the existing 
framework under which the AFP operates.  
4.117 The Committee is therefore of the view that the ASIO Act should be amended to 
create a controlled intelligence operations scheme. 
4.118 The discussion paper suggests particular restrictions, reporting and 
accountability mechanisms.  The Committee agrees that an ASIO authorised 
intelligence operations scheme should be subject to strict accountability and 
oversight.  
4.119 The Committee supports the adaptation of the procedures and safeguards in the 
Crimes Act 1914 that apply to the AFP’s controlled operations. This would mean 
that ASIO officers and agents would be exempted from criminal and civil 
liability only for certain authorised conduct.  
4.120 The Committee expects that unreasonable or reckless conduct would not be 
indemnified by an authorised intelligence operation, and the ASIO officer or 
source would be liable for such conduct. 
 
65  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission No. 36, p. 16. 
66  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 6. 
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Recommendation 28 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to create an authorised intelligence 
operations scheme, subject to similar safeguards and accountability 
arrangements as apply to the Australian Federal Police controlled 
operations regime under the Crimes Act 1914. 
 
Named person warrants 
4.121 The Government is considering amending the ASIO Act to establish a named 
person warrant enabling ASIO to request a single warrant specifying multiple 
(existing) powers against a single target, instead of requesting multiple warrants 
against a single target. 
4.122 The discussion paper explains that: 
In approximately one third of cases, more than one ASIO Act warrant 
type is sought against a particular target.  Under the current provisions, 
this requires the preparation of multiple applications, each re‐casting the 
available intelligence case to emphasise the relevant facts and grounds to 
satisfy the different legislative requirements of the various warrant types, 
which is administratively burdensome. 
The same outcome could be achieved with greater efficiency and with the 
same accountability by enabling ASIO to apply for a single warrant 
covering all ASIO Act warrant powers where the relevant legislative 
thresholds are satisfied.67 
4.123 As noted above, ASIO Act warrants are issued by the Attorney-General at the 
request of the Director-General of Security.   
4.124 The different types of warrants involve different activities and consequently 
different levels of intrusiveness.  In addition, the precise matters in respect of 
which the Attorney-General must be satisfied vary depending on the power to be 
exercised under the warrant.   
4.125 The warrants are also required to specify the particular activities or things that 
are authorised in the particular circumstances. 
4.126 The notion that the different types of warrants with their different powers could 
be combined into a single type raised several issues with submitters. 
 
67  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 45. 
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4.127 The Castan Centre for Human Rights Law objected to the asserted benefit of 
reducing administrative burdens, arguing that: 
Administrative burden is a small price to pay in order to preserve a 
regime which creates a strong presumption against the permissibility of 
covert intelligence intrusion into people’s affairs.68 
4.128 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked if there are any benefits, beyond 
administrative convenience, in creating a named person warrant that would 
enable all ASIO powers to be used against a single target.  The Department 
explained that efficiency could be introduced without weakening accountability: 
The same outcome could be achieved with greater efficiency and with the 
same accountability by enabling ASIO to apply for a single warrant 
covering all powers proposed to be used against the target where the 
relevant legislative thresholds are satisfied. The proposal is intended to 
cover various warrant powers in Division 2 of Part III other than foreign 
intelligence collection warrants, and it would not include questioning or 
questioning and detention warrants.69 
4.129 The Law Council of Australia noted that the current warrant processes require 
the Attorney-General to consider the use of each power separately, which allows 
the Attorney-General to consider the particular nature of the power to be 
exercised, the benefit this is likely to have to the collection of intelligence relevant 
to security and that:   
This type of assessment would be made significantly more difficult if a 
single warrant covering multiple powers were introduced.70  
4.130 The Attorney-General’s Department countered that:  
Arguably, a named person warrant could enhance the Attorney-General’s 
assessment of the appropriateness of the use of particular powers against 
a single person when issuing a warrant, and whether the use of a 
particular power or number of powers will assist ASIO in obtaining 
intelligence relevant to security.71   
4.131 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) questioned how the 
Government intends to reconcile the different tests and thresholds for the 
different warrants into a combined warrant.  The IGIS further asked if there was 
an intention to shift the decision-making process for which powers would be 
exercised from the Attorney-General, to the Director-General of ASIO:   
 
68  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission No. 142, p. 4. 
69  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 11. 
70  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 70. 
71  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 11. 
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While such a scheme might be administratively simpler, there is the risk 
that the warrant would authorise activities that were not proportionate to 
the threat to security and may shift the balance between what is currently 
authorised by the Attorney-General and what is authorised by the 
Director-General.72   
4.132 The Attorney-General’s Department, being aware of the IGIS’ concern, 
explained: 
It is important to note that it is not proposed that a named person warrant 
would provide a blanket authority for ASIO to use any special power. The 
warrant would need to specify which powers are covered and the use of 
each power would need to be justified and meet the relevant legislative 
threshold. It is not intended that this proposal will weaken any of the 
thresholds.73 
Committee comment 
4.133 The Committee received evidence that there would be a benefit to ASIO and to 
the Attorney-General in being able to issue a single warrant to authorise the use 
of multiple powers, over one person, for the same investigatory purpose. 
4.134 The Committee notes that this proposal does not intend to weaken any of the 
thresholds for the use of the various special powers. 
4.135 The Committee has been advised that it is not proposed that a named person 
warrant would provide a blanket authority for ASIO to use any special power 
and that the Attorney-General will have to decide which particular powers will 
be covered by each warrant.  
4.136 In classified evidence a case was made supporting the establishment of a named 
person warrant. While it is the preference of the Committee wherever possible 
not to rely on classified evidence, in this instance it has been unavoidable. While 
the classified evidence was sufficient to give in principle support to the proposal, 
the Committee believes that further examination is necessary. 
 
 
72  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 19. 
73  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 11.  
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Recommendation 29 
 The Committee recommends that should the Government proceed with 
amending the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to 
establish a named person warrant, further consideration be given to the 
factors that would enable ASIO to request a single warrant specifying 
multiple powers against a single target. The thresholds, duration, 
accountability mechanisms and oversight arrangements for such 
warrants should not be lower than other existing ASIO warrants. 
 
Surveillance devices – use of optical devices 
4.137 The Government is considering amending the ASIO Act to modernise the 
warrant provisions to align the surveillance device provisions with the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (SD Act).  
4.138 The discussion paper notes that the ASIO Act provisions governing ASIO’s 
capabilities with respect to electronic surveillance have not been updated to align 
with legislation governing the use of electronic surveillance by law enforcement.  
The discussion paper proposes aligning the surveillance device provisions in the 
ASIO Act with the more modern SD Act, which provides for warrants for the use 
of surveillance devices by the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime 
Commission and the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity.  
4.139 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked on notice for further information 
on the purpose of aligning the two pieces of legislation.  The Department 
explained how the ASIO Act provisions had fallen behind the equivalent 
provisions for law enforcement agencies:   
For example, ASIO’s ability to use optical surveillance devices is tied to its 
ability to use listening devices. This is a relic of the time in which the 
ASIO Act was first drafted. Additionally, the administrative and 
procedural provisions governing the use of listening and tracking devices 
in the ASIO Act are not aligned with provisions governing the use of 
surveillance devices by law enforcement.  Some of the differences where 
alignment is proposed would be: 
 addressing the lack of a separate optical surveillance device warrant 
 the provision of a single surveillance device warrant 
 the ability to adapt new future technologies by allowing surveillance 
devices to be prescribed in regulation, and 
 clarifying that certain surveillance devices may be used in limited 
circumstances without a warrant (for example, the use of an optical 
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device that does not involve entry onto premises without permission 
or interference without permission of any vehicle or thing).74 
4.140 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security commented that: 
If the proposal is only to modernise the language of the ASIO Act – which 
for example rather confusingly includes a device for recording images 
within the definition of a ‘listening device’ – then this is a more focussed 
proposal that does not raise propriety concerns75. 
Committee comment 
4.141 The Committee did not receive any evidence contradicting the IGIS and AGD 
evidence.  Consequently, there is no apparent reason to doubt the desirability of 
aligning those two pieces of legislation. 
 
Recommendation 30 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to modernise the warrant provisions 
to align the surveillance device provisions with the Surveillance Devices 
Act 2004, in particular by optical devices. 
Person searches 
4.142 The Terms of Reference state that the Government is considering amending the 
ASIO Act to enable person searches to be undertaken independently of a 
premises search.  
4.143 The ASIO Act currently contains the power to search a premises.  That power 
also contains a further power to search a person who is at or near the premises 
where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has, on his or her 
person, records or other things relevant to the security matter. 
4.144 The discussion paper explains that: 
Where ASIO assess that a particular person may be carrying items of 
relevance to security, a search warrant relating to a particular premises 
must be sought.  It is only on or near the premises specified in the warrant 
that a person may be searched.  However, it is not always feasible to 
execute a search warrant on a person of interest while they are ‘at or near’ 
the premises specified in the warrant.76 
 
74  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 9. 
75  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 20. 
76  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 48. 
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4.145 The existing limitation leads to a practical problem that:   
For example, some persons of interest employ counter‐surveillance 
techniques such that predicting the likely timing and location at which a 
search would yield the desired intelligence dividend is not always 
possible.77  
4.146 When answering a question about the purpose of enabling person searches to be 
undertaken independently of a premises search, the Attorney-General’s 
Department gave a more detailed example of where a person search could be 
executed away from a specified premises: 
As noted in the discussion paper, the sort of scenario where power to 
search a person might be relevant is where a foreign agent is passing 
security relevant material to someone in a public space, such as a park.78 
4.147 The discussion paper proposes that that problem could be addressed by enabling 
ASIO to request a warrant to search a specified person rather than premises so 
that there would be ‘sufficient operational flexibility’ while maintaining 
appropriate accountability via the warrant process.   
4.148 The discussion paper also suggests that the existing safeguard that ASIO Act 
search warrants do not authorise a strip search or a search of a person’s body 
cavities will remain in place.79 
4.149 The IGIS noted that this proposal is better described, not as an extension of the 
existing power to search premises, but is rather a proposal to introduce a new 
class of warrant. The IGIS argued, therefore, that it is important to carefully 
consider of the restrictions and conditions that should apply to the new warrant: 
I am aware of one category of activities where ASIO currently relies on 
premises search warrants to achieve what is in effect a person search. 
While I do not have concerns about the legality of the current approach, 
from an oversight and transparency perspective it would be preferable for 
the legislation to provide a specific mechanism for person searches with 
appropriate limits rather than using a premises search warrant for this 
purpose.  
Care needs to be taken that those undertaking a person search have 
appropriate training and qualifications. To this end it may be preferable 
to require that, where possible, such searches are undertaken by law 
enforcement officers who have specific training in this regard.80 
 
77  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 48. 
78  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 10. 
79  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 48. 
80  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 20 
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4.150 The search power proposal was criticised in a number of submissions, including 
the acting Victorian Privacy Commissioner: 
I consider an alteration of the warrant procedure in such a fashion to be 
extraordinarily broad and intrusive.  It would have a serious adverse 
impact on an individual’s privacy, may unduly infringe a number of 
human rights and freedoms (such as the freedom from arbitrary search 
and seizure), and interfere with the privacy of one’s home and family.  In 
particular, despite the safeguards in place, there is a possibility of using a 
person search to repeatedly harass a target at multiple locations (eg work, 
home, in a public space etc).81 
4.151 In response, the Attorney-General’s Department explained that the person search 
proposal would not lead to a series of  searches or the possibility of ASIO 
harassing suspects: 
ASIO would only be able to conduct one search per warrant and could 
not use the warrant to harass the target at multiple locations. This 
proposal is not recommending ASIO be given stop and search powers, 
such as those available to police in some circumstances.82 
4.152 Liberty Victoria submitted that allowing the search of people away from pre-
determined premises could be disruptive to the lives of searched people if they 
were to be searched in public spaces and offered that: 
While we recognise that the current ‘at or near’ requirement poses 
operational challenges, we believe that the appropriate solution lies with 
operational tactics, not with legislative amendment.83 
4.153 The Castan Centre for Human Rights Law submitted that ASIO’s existing search 
warrant power remains controversial and that search powers should only be 
granted to police: 
If individuals are suspected of committing criminal offences there is 
already ample provision under state and Commonwealth law for police 
officers to exercise powers of arrest and/or search.  Steps should not be 
taken which would give ASIO even the hint of the character of a secret 
police force.84 
4.154 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre for Public Law agreed that search powers are better 
delegated to police forces than to an intelligence agency but suggested means to 
mitigate their existence: 
 
81  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No. 109, p. 5. 
82  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 10. 
83  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 12. 
84  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission No. 142, pp.4-5; see also: Law Council of Australia, 
Submission No. 96, p. 58. 
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However, in the event that a separate category of person search warrant is 
established, ASIO searches must be accompanied by similar safeguards as 
apply to searches by law enforcement officers.  If not, there is a risk that 
ASIO searches will be used as a means of circumventing the safeguards 
attaching to law enforcement searches.85 
4.155 The Attorney-General’s Department elaborated on the safeguards that might 
apply if ASIO was allowed to conduct these searches independent of particular 
premises: 
The existing safeguards that apply to searching a person when on a 
premises would also continue to apply, including: 
 Not authorising a strip search or a search of a person’s body cavities. 
 Where practicable, the search must be carried out by a person of the 
same sex as the person being searched.  
 Key requirements in the ASIO Guidelines that are relevant would be 
the requirement of proportionality, to use the least intrusive powers 
where possible, and the need to have regard to the cultural 
sensitivities, values and mores of certain persons. 
 ASIO has internal policies, procedures and training requirements that 
relate to the proper conduct of searches. 
 The exercise of this power, as with all ASIO’s powers, would be subject 
to oversight by the IGIS.86  
Committee comment  
4.156 The Committee is very mindful of the importance of maintaining the clear 
distinction between intelligence and law enforcement. ASIO is not a law 
enforcement agency; it is an intelligence agency. Its statutory charter makes this 
clear. The Committee has serious misgivings about whether this power would 
take ASIO into the realm of law enforcement and policing. As well, we note that 
ASIO did not, upon inquiry, press for this power. 
 
Recommendation 31 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 not be amended to enable person searches to be 
undertaken independently of a premises search. 
 
 
85  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission No. 36, p. 13.  See also: Tasmanian Association of 
Community Legal Centres, Submission No. 184, p. 4. 
86  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 10. 
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Authorisation lists for warrants 
4.157 The Government is considering amending the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) to establish classes of persons able to execute 
warrants. 
4.158 Section 24 of the ASIO Act provides that the Director‐General (or senior officer 
authorised in writing by the Director‐General for the purposes of this section) 
may approve certain officers and employees to execute warrants issued under 
Division 2 of Part III of the ASIO Act. 
4.159 The discussion paper explains that the requirement to maintain a list of the 
individual names of employees who may be involved in executing a warrant can 
create operational inefficiencies for ASIO. For example, sometimes the execution 
of a warrant takes place in unpredictable and volatile environments and ASIO 
needs to be able to quickly expand the list of authorised persons.87 
4.160 The discussion paper proposes that: 
The problem could be overcome in large part if the Director‐General 
could approve classes of people to execute a warrant.  For example, the 
Director‐General could authorise officers of a certain level within a 
particular Division of ASIO.  Such persons at any one time would be 
readily ascertainable ensuring the level of accountability is not 
diminished, while improving operational efficiency.88 
4.161 The proposal to alter authorisations from specific named individuals to classes of 
people received limited public comment.  Mr Mark Newton, submitting in a 
private capacity, stated:   
I have no objection to authorisation lists for warrants, provided the 
persons on the authorisation lists would otherwise qualify as officers and 
employees able to execute warrants under the current version of Division 
2 of Part III of the ASIO Act.89   
4.162 Arguing in the contrary, the Law Council of Australia was of the view that 
specifically naming particular officers within ASIO offered an accountability 
benefit: 
For the Law Council, moving beyond the existing level of flexibility to 
allow the Director-General to authorise a list of persons based on a certain 
level within a particular Division of ASIO would tip the balance too far in 
favour of operational efficiency, and away from the need to strictly 
regulate the use of these intrusive and extraordinary powers.  As noted 
 
87  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 49. 
88  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 49. 
89  Mr Mark Newton, Submission No. 87, p. 12. 
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elsewhere in this submission, improving operational efficiency, while a 
worthy goal, is not of itself enough to justify an expansion of powers or in 
this case, a dilution of important safeguards.90  
4.163 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, who would be empowered to 
carry out that oversight function was of the view that: 
While this could be operationally effective, it would be essential for ASIO 
to ensure that all officers in a particular class were fully trained and 
understood the limits of their authorisation. As noted above in relation to 
[person search warrants] there may be cases where the best qualified 
officers to conduct a particular search are law enforcement officers.91 
4.164 Telstra advised that telecommunications industry participants that carry out 
interception activities on behalf of ASIO would need to be kept advised of which 
individual officers fall within the proposed classes in order to ensure that the 
industry participants can remain fully aware of which officers are in fact so 
authorised: 
Telstra agrees that the classes of persons who are eligible to execute a 
warrant will need to be clearly defined as to what types of warrants they 
can authorise and under what law.  Careful consideration will also need 
to be given to the appropriate levels of oversight and record keeping.  A 
list of persons will then need to be conveyed to C/CSPs to reduce any risk 
of harm, unauthorised interception or breaches of customer privacy by 
persons who are not eligible to execute a warrant.92 
Committee comment 
4.165 It is not clear what benefit there is in maintaining the current requirement to 
specifically name ASIO officers who are authorised to execute warrants.  
Allowing the Director-General of ASIO to delegate those functions to a class of 
people appears sensible.   
4.166 The Committee accepts the rationale for moving to authorising ASIO officers by 
position rather than specific name.   
 
 
90  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 73; see also: New South Wales Young Lawyers, 
Submission No. 133, p. 9. 
91  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 21. 
92  Telstra, Submission No. 189, p. 14. 
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Recommendation 32 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to establish classes of persons able to 
execute warrants. 
 
Clarifying ASIO’s ability to co-operate with private sector 
4.167 The Terms of Reference to this inquiry state that the Government is considering 
amending the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) to 
clarify ASIO’s ability to co-operate with the private sector. 
4.168 The ASIO Act enables ASIO to cooperate with authorities of the Commonwealth 
and States and Territories where it is necessary or conducive to the functions of 
ASIO.  However, it is unclear whether the Act implies that ASIO should not 
cooperate with organisations outside of government. 
4.169 The discussion paper explains that it is conducive to ASIO’s functions to 
cooperate with the private sector as the private sector plays a role in Australia’s 
national security, including by owning and operating a significant proportion of 
Australia’s critical infrastructure.  ASIO’s Business Liaison Unit provides an 
interface between Australian business and the Australian Intelligence 
Community by providing security reporting that can be used for private sector 
risk management.93   
4.170 Consequently, the discussion paper suggests it may be desirable to amend the 
ASIO Act to avoid any doubt about ASIO’s ability to cooperate with the private 
sector. 
4.171 Despite ASIO already interacting with some elements of the private sector on 
critical infrastructure matters,  the Australian Privacy Foundation disagreed that 
ASIO should be able to co-operate with the private sector: 
The Committee should express serious concern about the continued trend 
to enlist corporations as part of the national security apparatus.  All 
responsibilities of corporations and individuals must be explicit and clear 
at law and not subject to discretionary interpretation by law enforcement 
and national security agencies of rubbery clauses that permit or require  
“cooperation”.94   
4.172 Conversely, Mr Ian Quick, submitting in a private capacity, agreed as to the need 
for ASIO to co-operate with private sector entities: 
 
93  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 49. 
94  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission No. 162, p. 10. 
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There is no doubt that ASIO should be able to cooperate with the private 
sector, the big issue is on what basis, with what oversight, what 
permissions it requires (or should require) on a case by case basis, etc 
etc.95  
4.173 Oversight of ASIO’s co-operation with private sector entities by the IGIS would 
be one of the oversight mechanisms that would give the Committee comfort.  
Indeed, the IGIS offered as much in her submission: 
My office regularly inspects the files of ASIO’s interactions with, for 
example, State law enforcement agencies. We also have the ability to 
review ASIO’s cooperation with private sector entities if appropriate.96 
Committee comment 
4.174 ASIO’s co-operation with private sector organisations is clearly necessary given 
that so much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is controlled and secured by the 
private sector.  There is a clear public interest in the Government, through its 
security intelligence agency, to advise on security threats to all parties that are 
involved in providing critical infrastructure.  
4.175 The Committee offers support to amending legislation to give ASIO a clear 
mandate to co-operate with the private sector.  
4.176 The Committee appreciates that there are issues of confidentiality likely to arise 
in dealing with the private sector. The Committee has an open mind as to 
whether those confidentiality issues should be addressed by legislation or 
administrative arrangements.  The Committee recommends that the Government 
clarify the types of information that would be shared and what handling and 
dissemination limitations would apply in legislation.  For example, creating 
similar limitations for co-operating with the private sector as currently exist for 
ASIO’s co-operation with various government bodies.  
  
Recommendation 33 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to formalise ASIO’s capacity to co-
operate with private sector entities.  
 
 
95  Mr Ian Quick, Submission No. 95, p. 12. 
96  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 21 
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Identifying ASIO officers 
4.177 The Terms of Reference to the Inquiry state that Government is expressly seeking 
the views of the Committee on Amending the ASIO Act to enable ASIO to refer 
breaches of section 92 of the ASIO Act (publishing the identity of an ASIO 
officer) to authorities for investigation. 
4.178 The discussion paper explains that section 92 makes it an offence for a person to 
publish the identity of an ASIO officer.  The offence is punishable by 12 months 
imprisonment.  
4.179 However, section 18 of the ASIO Act limits the circumstances in which a person 
can communicate information or intelligence acquired through their association 
with ASIO.  In particular, information may only be passed to law enforcement 
agencies in relation to a ‘serious crime’ (defined as an offence punishable by 
imprisonment exceeding 12 months). 
4.180 Because the ability to pass information to law enforcement only applies if the 
maximum penalty for an offence exceeds 12 months and the maximum penalty for 
the section 92 offence is precisely 12 months, ASIO is therefore precluded from 
passing information about the possible commission of this offence to law 
enforcement agencies. 
4.181 The Committee received limited comment on this particular proposal.  Ms Stella 
Gray, submitting in a private capacity, objected to the existence of section 92 in 
its current formulation: 
Under The ASIO Act 1979 it is a serious offence to publicly identify ASIO 
officers or agents, which means detainees are unable to take ASIO or one 
of its officers to court for torture prolonged interrogation and other 
abuses.97 
4.182 Similarly, Mr Mark Newton contended that the ASIO Act should be amended to 
allow for identifying ASIO officers in limited circumstances:  
I object to section 92 in its current form.  There have been times in recent 
history when it would be in the public interest to identify ASIO officers, 
specifically those who are likely to be involved in criminal acts.  I would 
not support any strengthening of section 92 unless and until it is amended 
to include a workable public interest exception.98  
Committee comment 
4.183 The Committee agrees that there is a need to allow ASIO to refer breaches of 
section 92 to law enforcement for investigation. 
 
97  Ms Stella Gray, Submission No. 152, p. 8. 
98  Mr Mark Newton, Submission No. 87, p. 12. 
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4.184 Regarding the idea of a public interest defence for identifying ASIO officers, the 
Committee foresees a significant risk in allowing for the identification of ASIO 
officers.  Because of the inherent secrecy of ASIO’s work, it is necessary to keep 
each officer’s association with ASIO secret.  If that secrecy is breached and an 
ASIO officer’s identity is disclosed then their career is effectively finished.  In 
some cases there may be risks to the safety of an officer due to unauthorised 
disclosure of their identity. 
4.185 Allowing a public interest defence for disclosure of an ASIO officer’s identity 
leads to the dilemma that an ASIO’s officers identity would be disclosed with the 
negative consequences effective immediately.  However, the public interest of 
exposing an ASIO officer’s identity, if any, would not be determined until a 
much later date. 
4.186 For these reasons the Committee does not support a mechanism that would 
allow for the disclosure of an ASIO officer’s identity.  
 
Recommendation 34 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended so that ASIO may refer breaches of 
section 92 to law enforcement for investigation. 
Matters on which the Government expressly seeks the 
Committee’s views – ASIO Act amendments 
4.187 The third category of proposals is those that the Government expressly seeks the 
views of the Committee.  The proposals are to amend the ASIO Act to: 
 Allow for the incidental entry onto premises while executing warrants; 
 Clarify when force can be used in the execution of warrants; and 
 The creation of an evidentiary certificates regime for some ASIO warrants. 
Incidental entry onto premises 
4.188 The Government expressly seeks the views of the Committee on amending the 
ASIO Act to clarifying that the ‘incidental power in the search warrant provision 
authorises access to third party premises to execute a warrant’.   
4.189 The discussion paper elaborates that: 
Sections 25 and 25A of the ASIO Act currently enable an officer, in the 
execution of a search or computer warrant, to do any thing that is 
reasonably incidental to the exercise of powers under that warrant.  It is 
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not clear whether this incidental power includes entry to a third party’s 
premises for the purposes of executing the search or computer warrant. 
Additionally, it may be necessary to enter a third party premises for the 
purposes of installing a surveillance device. Clarification of the scope of 
the incidental power would assist ASIO in executing search and computer 
warrants.99 
4.190 Reponses to the proposal were not welcoming.  Mr Mark Newton argued against 
allowing for incidental entry onto premises:  
I absolutely do not support the Incidental Entry proposal.  If ASIO wants 
to gain access to a premises, it should get a warrant. If it then becomes 
apparent that they need access to a different premises, they should get a 
different warrant.  If they can’t justify the second warrant, they shouldn’t 
enter the premises.  It’s that simple.100 
4.191 Similarly, NSW Young Lawyers highlighted important issues that the discussion 
paper did not address in the description of the proposal: 
The proposal does not specify which third parties could be covered by 
such a power, whether there would be limits of proximity or otherwise in 
this respect. The proposal does not specify whether a warrant or any 
other kind of formal procedure would be necessary to enable ASIO to 
exercise the proposed powers.101 
4.192 The Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner highlighted the human rights 
risks that an incidental entry proposal might raise if not properly confined and 
authorised by law: 
Any encroachment into the privacy of a person’s domicile should be 
treated seriously and should only occur when absolutely necessary. This 
is an essential principle of human rights law, mentioned in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 17), which states 
that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence.102 
4.193 The Attorney-General’s Department was asked why ASIO would need an 
additional power to be able to enter premises that are not related to the premises 
of the target person.  The Department explained that the intent of the proposal 
was to clarify the current operation of ASIO’s ability to do anything that is 
reasonably incidental to the exercise of powers under that warrant: 
 
99  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 48. 
100  Mr Mark Newton, Submission No.87, p. 13.  See also:  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission No. 109, p. 6.  
101  New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No. 133, p. 8. 
102  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No. 109, p. 6. 
AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LEGISLATION REFORM  127 
 
When executing search warrants, it may occasionally be necessary for 
ASIO officers to enter third party premises to access or exit the target 
premises.  This may be because there is no other way to gain access – such 
as where the target premises are in an apartment block and entry is 
through common areas or adjoining premises – or due to ‘emergency’ and 
unforeseen circumstances – such as when the target person unexpectedly 
returns to the premises during the search. 
The incidental power in the warrant provisions is currently relied on 
where it is necessary to access third party premises.  However, it would 
be preferable to specifically deal with the circumstances that ASIO may be 
permitted to access third party premises, to provide greater clarity about 
the detail of the authorisation.103 
4.194 The Department further explained that entry onto third party premises would 
authorise entry where consent could not be obtained:  
It is ASIO’s practice to approach the owner of the third party premises to 
seek their consent to access the premises for the purposes of executing the 
warrant where possible. The proposed amendment is designed to ensure 
clear legal authority to enter a third party premises in those circumstances 
where doing so is necessary but where it is not possible to obtain consent 
to do so, including in an ‘emergency’ situation where access to third party 
premises may be necessary to avoid detection.104 
Committee comment 
4.195 The Committee shares community concerns that the existing incidental entry 
power might lead to arbitrary interference with an innocent person’s home or 
property.  It is not desirable that any agency should be given an unfettered 
discretion to intrude into places that are not the subject of lawful investigation 
purely because of a geographical coincidence in being located close to a premises 
of interest. 
4.196 However, on balance, the Committee appreciates that there may be a need for 
incidental entry onto premises to give effect to ASIO warrants in some limited 
circumstances, particularly unforeseen or emergency situations. 
4.197 The Committee accepts that the proposal as clarified by the Attorney-General’s 
Department would not lead to the arbitrary interference with an innocent 
person’s home or property as the scheme is intended to operate with 
requirements of proportionality and using as little intrusion into privacy as 
possible.  
 
 
103  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 8. 
104  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 8. 
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Recommendation 35 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to clarify that the incidental power 
in the search and computer access warrant provisions includes entry to a 
third party’s premises for the purposes of executing those warrants. 
However, the Committee is of the view that whatever amendments are 
made to facilitate this power should acknowledge the exceptional nature 
and very limited circumstances in which the power should be exercised. 
 
Use of force 
4.198 The Government expressly seeks the views of the Committee on amending the 
ASIO Act to allow reasonable force to be used at any time during the execution 
of a warrant, not just on entry.  
4.199 The discussion paper notes that the ASIO Act allows the use of force in the 
execution of search, computer access and tracking device warrants but that the 
legislative drafting of headings to those provisions suggest that force may only 
be used to facilitate entry to target premises.  The paper notes that, contrarily, the 
substantive bodies of the warrant provisions are not so limited.  It is suggested 
that technical legislative amendments may be necessary to correct those drafting 
anomalies.105  
4.200 The Attorney-General’s Department explained that confusion over the limits of 
ASIO’s use of force came about as unintended consequences of amendments to 
other legislation: 
A number of the ASIO warrant provisions provide that ASIO may be 
authorised to ‘use any force that is necessary and reasonable to do the 
things specified in the warrant’ (subsections 25(7), 25A(5A), 26B(4) and 
26C(4)).  These provisions are found under headings relating to 
‘authorisation of entry measures’. In light of changes made in 2011 to 
section 13 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, the headings form part of the 
ASIO Act.  However, the terms of the use of force provision are not stated 
so as to limit the use of force to enter the premises.  At the time these 
subsections were inserted into the ASIO Act, in 1999 and 2005, there does 
not appear to have been an intention to limit the use of force to entry, as 
headings were specifically excluded from the Act at that time.106 
 
105  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 48. 
106  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 12. 
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4.201 The Human Rights Law Centre in its submission argued: 
The Government’s proposal to allow ASIO to use reasonable force at any 
time during the execution of a warrant, not just on entry, may raise 
concerns in relation to the right of liberty and security of person, which is 
enshrined in article 9 of the ICCPR.107 
4.202 The Human Rights Law Centre further argued that to address human rights 
concerns about the use of force, the law should be carefully framed: 
A human rights-based approach to the use of force can be characterised as 
requiring the state to act in the three stages involved in the use of force: 
 before the use of force – putting in place systems to protect human 
rights and avoid or minimise resort to force, such as proper policies 
and training; 
 during the use of force – requiring that force be used in a proportionate 
way; and 
 after the use of force – ensuring that there are accountability 
mechanisms in place to hold agents of the state to account for their use 
of force.108 
4.203 To understand the impact of this proposal the Attorney-General’s Department 
was asked on notice about the circumstances it envisaged that reasonable force 
may be used during the execution of a warrant.  The Department explained: 
In addition to the possible need to use force to enter a premises, it may be 
necessary to use force to obtain access to a locked room or locked cabinet, 
or to use force to install or remove a surveillance device. The proposal is 
intended to ensure the power to use any force that is necessary and 
reasonable to do the things specified in a warrant is not read down by 
reference to the heading and limited to entry.  
The existing provision requires that the use of force must be reasonable 
and necessary to do what is required to execute the warrant. The ASIO 
Guidelines requirement of proportionality and using as little intrusion 
into privacy as necessary are also relevant safeguards in this context.109 
Committee comment 
4.204 The Committee is of the view that ASIO’s power to use reasonable force during 
the execution of a search warrant should extend to all of the acts undertaken for 
the purpose of the execution of the warrant, not just on entry to the premises. If 
there is any doubt about the existence of that power, that doubt should be 
removed. The Committee emphasises that the purpose of this proposal is not to 
 
107  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission No. 140, p. 8. 
108  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission No. 140, p. 8. 
109  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No. 236, p. 12. 
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authorise the use of force against a person, but against property in order to 
facilitate the conduct of the search. 
 
Recommendation 36 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to clarify that reasonable force can 
be used at any time for the purposes of executing the warrant, not just 
on entry, and may only be used against property and not persons. 
 
Evidentiary certificates 
4.205 The Government has requested the Committee’s advice on whether an 
evidentiary certificate regime should be introduced to protect the identities of 
officers and sensitive capabilities of ASIO involved in the execution of warrants 
under the ASIO Act.   
4.206 The discussion paper proposes that the evidentiary certificate regime would be 
similar to those which exist under the TIA Act and Surveillance Devices Act 2004.  
This would avoid the need for ASIO to rely upon public interest immunity 
claims or orders obtained under the National Security Information (Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings) Act 2004. 
4.207 The purpose of evidentiary certificates is to protect sensitive information, 
sensitive capabilities and the identities of individuals from public disclosure.  
4.208 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre for Public Law was of the view that evidentiary 
certificates would be appropriate for ASIO warrants that authorise powers that are 
technological in nature:  
We accept that it would be appropriate to adopt a similar evidentiary 
certificate regime in respect of some of the warrant powers in the ASIO 
Act. That is, those warrant powers which are technological in nature.110 
4.209 Noting that evidentiary certificates are already issued under the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 for the same purposes of 
protecting sensitive capabilities and the identities of people involved in 
interception activities, NSW Young Lawyers highlighted the acceptable limits 
that evidentiary certificates should be allowed:  
The evidentiary certificate provision(s) sought to be introduced should 
not be drafted in a way that prevents a defendant from challenging the 
 
110  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission No. 36, p. 15.  See also:  New South Wales Young 
Lawyers, Submission No. 133, p. 13 and NSW Council for Civil Liberties, Submission No. 175, p. 17. 
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accuracy of anything said or relied on in the intercepted communication.  
Furthermore the certificate should not operate to preclude a defendant 
from being able to provide evidence inconsistent with the Crown’s case in 
respect of the interception, or indeed any evidence that would undermine 
a fact in a certificate. Importantly the evidentiary certificate should not 
operate to preclude the operation of s 137 of the Evidence Act, which 
would apply where the probative value of a certificate is outweighed by 
the unfair prejudice it would cause to a defendant. It may be that an 
evidentiary certificate goes to the exercise of the court’s discretion in this 
regard, but there will be other factors influencing the exercise of the 
court’s discretion. Although national security will be carefully considered 
by the court, a certificate in this context should not be able to dictate an 
outcome in the face of inconsistent or doubtful evidence.111 
Committee comment 
4.210 The Committee agrees that there is a legitimate need to protect the technological 
capabilities of ASIO when information under warrant is eventually led in 
evidence as part of a prosecution.  Evidentiary certificates issued under the TIA 
Act have been proven to effectively protect capabilities without prejudicing the 
rights of defendants to a fair trial. 
4.211 With that being said, there ought to be a limit to the extent to which those 
evidentiary certificates can be utilised.  The Committee does not think it 
appropriate that ASIO evidentiary certificates be used to prove, without 
challenge, the material facts in question.   
4.212 This would mean that evidentiary certificates could be used to prove the validity 
of how information was obtained, but not whether the information itself is true.  
It would grossly unfair to a defendant if an element of an offence would be 
determined by the prosecution simply issuing a certificate to that effect.   
4.213 The Committee is of the view that any future amendments for an ASIO 
evidentiary certificate scheme should be drafted in a way such that ultimate facts 
are not to be the subject of an evidentiary certificate, and that the content of such 
a certificate would be limited to certain technical facts removed from a fact in 
issue before a court. 
 
 
111  New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No. 133, p. 13;  See also:  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of 
Public Law, Submission No. 36, p. 15  and NSW Council for Civil Liberties, Submission No. 175, p. 17. 
132 INQUIRY INTO POTENTIAL REFORMS OF AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION 
 
  Recommendation 37 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to introduce an evidentiary 
certificate regime to protect the identity of officers and sources. The 
Committee also recommends that similar protections be extended to 
ASIO in order to protect from disclosure in open court its sensitive 
operational capabilities, analogous to the provisions of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the 
protections contained in the counter terrorism provisions in the 
Commonwealth Criminal code.  
The Committee further recommends that the Attorney-General give 
consideration to making uniform across Commonwealth legislation 
provisions for the protection of certain sensitive operational capabilities 
from disclosure in open court. 
Matters on which the Government expressly seeks the 
Committee’s views – Intelligence Services Act amendments 
4.214 In addition to the above proposed amendments to the ASIO Act, the Government 
also expressly seeks the Committee’s views on amending the Intelligence Services 
Act 2001 (the IS Act) to: 
 Add a new ministerial authorisation ground to allow the investigation of a 
person who is, or is likely to be, involved in intelligence or counter‐
intelligence activities; 
 Enable the Minister of an Agency under the IS Act to authorise specified 
activities which may involve producing intelligence on an Australian person 
where the Agency is cooperating with ASIO; and  
 Enable ASIS to provide training in self‐defence and the use of weapons to a 
person cooperating with ASIS. 
4.215 Australia’s foreign intelligence agencies, the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Service (ASIS), the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and the Defence Imagery 
and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), collect intelligence in accordance with 
requirements set by Government and operate under the Intelligence Services Act 
2001 (the IS Act). These agencies have identified problems arising out of the 
operation of the IS Act, as described in the sections which follow. 
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Section 9 – Ministerial authorisations 
4.216 The Government expressly seeks the Committee’s views on amending the 
Intelligence Services Act to add a new ministerial authorisation ground where 
the Minister is satisfied that a person is, or is likely to be, involved in intelligence 
or counter‐intelligence activities. 
4.217 The IS Act imposes strict controls on the ability of ASIS, DSD and DIGO to 
produce intelligence on an Australian person.   
4.218 The Minister responsible for each Australian foreign intelligence agency is 
required to direct that the agency obtain authorisation from the Minister before 
undertaking activities for the purposes of producing intelligence on an 
Australian person. 
4.219 The grounds on which a foreign intelligence agency may seek a ministerial 
authorisation are laid out in section 9 of the IS Act and, inter alia, include acting 
for, or on behalf of, a foreign power and activities that are, or are likely to be, a 
threat to ‘security’ (as defined in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Act 1979). 
4.220 The discussion paper notes that those grounds ‘do not specifically cover the 
situation where a person is or is likely to be involved in intelligence or counter-
intelligence activities.’ 
A new item could be added to the list in section 9(1A)(a) of the IS Act 
which would allow the Minister to give an authorisation if he or she is 
satisfied that the person is, or is likely to be, involved in intelligence or 
counter-intelligence activities.112 
4.221 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre for Public Law argued that the necessity of the 
proposed new ministerial authorisation ground was unclear.  It was further 
contended that such counter-intelligence activities would fall within the existing 
ministerial authorisation ground of ‘activities that are, or are likely to be, a threat 
to security’.113  
4.222 ASIS’s submission elaborated on the discussion paper and stated that the 
purpose of investigating a person for intelligence or counter-intelligence 
activities relates to operational security: 
Operational security is about the protection of the integrity of ASIS 
operations from the risk of being undermined by foreign and non-State 
adversaries such as terrorist organisations, or reliance on inaccurate or 
false information.  It is important to the protection of individuals, 
maintaining the effectiveness of ASIS and other Australian intelligence 
 
112  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 52. 
113  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission No. 36, pp. 19–20.   
134 INQUIRY INTO POTENTIAL REFORMS OF AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION 
 
and security agencies, as well as protecting Australia’s international 
reputation.114 
4.223 ASIS further submitted that such necessary counter-intelligence collection would 
not fall within any current ground for the issuing of ministerial authorisations.115 
Committee comment 
4.224 Provided that ministerial authorisations would be subject to existing approval 
mechanisms, the Committee recommends that a new ministerial authorisation 
ground be created to enable the authorisation of activities for the purpose of 
producing intelligence on an Australian person who is, or is likely to be 
involved, in activities that will, or are likely to, undermine operational integrity. 
 
Recommendation 38 
 The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to add a new ministerial authorisation ground where the 
Minister is satisfied that a person is, or is likely to be, involved in 
intelligence or counter‐intelligence activities in circumstances where 
such an investigation would not currently be within the operational 
authority of the agency concerned. 
 
Section 13A – Co-operation with intelligence agencies 
4.225 The Terms of Reference state that the Government expressly seeks the 
Committee’s views on amending the IS Act to enable the Minister of an agency to 
authorise specified activities which may involve producing intelligence on an 
Australian person or persons where an IS Act agency is cooperating with ASIO 
in the performance of an ASIO function.  
4.226 Section 13A of the IS Act allows the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), 
the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation (DIGO) to obtain ministerial authorisations to allow co-operation 
with other bodies in the performance of those other bodies’ functions.   
4.227 The discussion paper explains that the purpose of amending section 13A would 
be to ‘better meet the intention of enabling Australia’s intelligence agencies to 
 
114  Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Submission No. 219, p. 3. 
115  Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Submission No. 219, p. 3. 
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cooperate and assist each other in the performance of each other’s functions to 
protect Australia and Australians’.116 
4.228 The discussion paper further notes that there are differences in the legislative 
regimes which apply to ASIS, DSD and DIGO under the IS Act and to ASIO 
under the ASIO Act when they produce intelligence on Australians.   
4.229 For example, ASIO can collect intelligence about an Australian of security 
interest, whether that person is in Australia or overseas, based on internal 
approvals, whereas ASIS would in all cases require the approval of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and the agreement of the Attorney-General to do the same 
thing. 
4.230 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of New South Wales 
criticised this proposal holding that it would ‘radically alter’ the requirement for 
IS Act agencies to obtain a ministerial authorisation before collecting intelligence 
on Australians:  
It would amend 13A to allow the Minister to authorise ASIS, DSD or 
DIGO to produce intelligence on an Australian where the agency is 
cooperating with ASIO in the performance of an ASIO function. In 
essence, it would create a parallel, and significantly broader, 
ministerial authorisation regime for ASIS, DSD and DIGO to produce 
intelligence on Australians.117 
4.231 However, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) noted in her 
submission that in some instances the level of privacy protection given to an 
Australian would depend, not on the matter being investigated or the tools used 
in the investigation, but on which agency was conducting the investigation.  The 
IGIS concluded that: 
Through my experience in the oversight of the agencies I am aware of the 
operational difficulties and anomalies of the current regime and can see 
the need for change.118 
4.232 Rather than support the discussion paper’s suggestion for dealing with the 
inconsistent privacy protections for Australians who are of interest to both ASIO 
and a foreign intelligence agency, the IGIS proposed an alternative solution. 
4.233 The IGIS proposed that an equivalent common standard across the IS Act and the 
ASIO Act be introduced to particularly intrusive activities involving the purpose 
of collecting intelligence on an Australian person.  
 
116  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 51. 
117  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission No. 36, pp. 20-21. 
118  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 24. 
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4.234 The solution proposed by the IGIS was also endorsed by ASIS which considered 
the IGIS’s proposal to be ‘an elegant solution’.119  
Committee comment  
4.235 The Committee in turn agrees with the IGIS alternative solution to this particular 
proposal.  This alternative solution would ensure that the inconsistent privacy 
protection would be eliminated and a consistent standard across all intelligence 
agencies would apply. 
4.236 The Committee also notes that where ASIS proposes to collect intelligence on an 
Australian person to assist ASIO with its functions, this would still need to be at 
the request of ASIO. 
 
Recommendation 39 
 The Committee recommends that where ASIO and an Intelligence 
Services Act 2001 agency are engaged in a cooperative intelligence 
operation a common standard based on the standards prescribed in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 should apply for 
the authorisation of intrusive activities involving the collection of 
intelligence on an Australian person.  
 
ASIS co-operation on self-defence and weapons training  
4.237 The Government expressly seeks the Committee’s views on amending the IS Act 
to enable ASIS to provide training in self‐defence and the use of weapons to a 
person cooperating with ASIS.  
4.238 The IS Act was amended in 2004 to to enable ASIS staff members and agents to 
receive training in the use of weapons and self-defence techniques in certain 
limited circumstances. 
4.239 ASIS is only permitted to provide training in the use of weapons to ASIS staff 
members and agents. The IS Act does not currently enable ASIS staff members to 
participate in joint training in the use of weapons with persons who are lawfully 
cooperating with ASIS.  This applies even though ASIS staff members are 
authorised to use weapons to protect such persons. 
4.240 To remedy this inconsistency the discussion paper proposes that ASIS would be 
allowed to engage in weapons training with Commonwealth, State and Territory 
bodies that have their own rights to carry weapons in the course of their duties.  
 
119  Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Submission No. 219, p. 1. 
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ASIS would also be enabled to cooperate with a limited number of approved 
overseas authorities in the delivery of training in self-defence and weapons.120   
4.241 The Pirate Party of Australia submitted that allowing the Foreign Minister to 
approve foreign bodies to receive such training ‘is deeply concerning’: 
This could be used to train insurgent armies, assassination squads and 
even terrorists.  Such activities are not justified under any circumstances 
and is contrary to Australia’s national interest.  Any tool created to fight 
foreign enemies can be turned upon the Australian people or at minimum 
be justification for our enemies to adopt the same strategies against us.121 
4.242 Similarly, the Human Rights Law Centre expressed concern that weapons and 
self-defence training:  
…may pose risks to right to life contained in article 6 of the ICCPR. These 
proposals should have regard to human rights standards on the use of 
force.122 
4.243 Contrarily, ASIS’s submission asserted that the current carriage of weapons by 
ASIS is strictly for defensive purposes in accordance with the limitations 
imposed by Schedule 2 of the IS Act.123   
4.244 Similarly, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security noted in her 
submission that: 
Generally I am satisfied that the powers afforded to ASIS under Schedule 
2 of the ISA are reasonable given the high threat environments in which it 
conducts some of its more sensitive activities, that the numbers of 
individuals who are authorised to use weapons is quite small and these 
authorisations are not being misused. I have been briefed on the need for 
joint training activities and have no propriety concerns with what has 
been proposed. If the proposed amendments are made I will monitor their 
implementation.124 
Committee comment 
4.245 The Committee is of the view that as ASIS officers are permitted at law to co-
operate with certain agencies and use weapons and self-defence techniques to 
protect themselves and their partner agencies, it is reasonable for ASIS to be able 
to train with those same partners in the self-defence techniques and with the 
weapons that are intended to save their lives.   
 
120  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats, Discussion 
Paper, July 2012, p. 54. 
121  Pirate Party Australia, Submission No. 134, p. 31. 
122  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission No. 140, p. 8. 
123  Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Submission No. 219, p. 3. 
124  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission No. 185, p. 25. 
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4.246 Indeed, the lack of such joint training poses an unacceptable danger to ASIS 
officers and agents.       
 
Recommendation 40 
 The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to enable ASIS to provide training in self‐defence and the use 
of weapons to a person cooperating with ASIS. 
 
Concluding comment 
4.247 The Committee has carefully considered each of the reform proposals. Where the 
Committee has recommended draft amendments be made to the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001, 
these amendments should first be released as an exposure draft for consultation. 
The Government should expressly seek the views of key stakeholders, including 
the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security. 
4.248 Consistent with the approach recommended for reform of the TIA Act in chapter 
two, the Committee recommends that the reforms to the AIC legislation be 
subject to public consultation and Parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
Recommendation 41 
 The Committee recommends that the draft amendments to the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the 
Intelligence Services Act 2001, necessary to give effect to the Committee’s 
recommendations, should be released as an exposure draft for public 
consultation. The Government should expressly seek the views of key 
stakeholders, including the Independent National Security Legislation 
Monitor and Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that 
the draft legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
 
 5 
 
Data Retention 
Introduction 
5.1 The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) Discussion Paper notes that the 
Australian Government is seeking the Committee’s views on a mandatory data 
retention regime.1 
5.2 Specifically, the Discussion Paper states that the Committee should consider: 
Applying tailored data retention periods for up to 2 years for parts of a 
data set, with specific timeframes taking into account agency priorities 
and privacy and cost impacts.2 
5.3 The Discussion Paper discusses the importance of accessing communications 
data in investigating crime and threats to national security: 
Lawful interception and access to telecommunications data are cost-
effective investigative tools that support and complement information 
derived from other sources.3 
 
1  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving Threats, July 2012, 
p. 13. 
2  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving Threats, July 2012, 
p. 13. 
3  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving Threats, July 2012, 
p. 14. 
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5.4 Furthermore: 
Telecommunications data is commonly the first source of important lead 
information for further investigations and often provides a unique and 
comprehensive insight into the behaviour of persons of interest.4 
5.5 The Discussion Paper also explains why reforms in this area are necessary: 
Currently, authorised access to telecommunications data, such as 
subscriber details, generated by carriers for their own business purposes 
is an important source of information for agencies. As carrier’s business 
models move to customer billing based on data volumes rather than 
communication events (for example number of phone calls made), the 
need to retain transactional data is diminishing. Some carriers have 
already ceased retaining such data for their business purposes and it is no 
longer available to agencies for their investigations.5 
5.6 In subsequent correspondence to the Committee, the Attorney-General clarified 
the data set, noting that it is similar to that set out under the European Union 
data retention directive. 
5.7 In this letter, Attorney-General the Hon Nicola Roxon MP stated that: 
‘Telecommunications data’ is information about the process of a 
communication, as distinct from its content. It includes information about 
the identity of the sending and receiving parties and related subscriber 
details, account identifying information collected by the 
telecommunications carrier or internet service provider to establish the 
account, and information such as the time and date of the communication, 
its duration, location and type of communication.6 
5.8 Furthermore, Attorney-General Roxon noted that the Government does not 
‘propose that a data retention scheme would apply to the content of 
communications’, including ‘the text or substance of emails, SMS messages, 
phone calls or photos and documents sent over the internet’. Access to these 
would continue to be authorised only under warrants issues in accordance with 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act).7 
 
4  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving Threats, July 2012, 
p. 21. 
5  Attorney-General’s Department, Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving Threats, July 2012, 
p. 21. 
6  Letter from Attorney-General Nicola Roxon to the Hon Anthony Byrne MP, 17 September 2012, 
Appendix F. 
7  Letter from Attorney-General Nicola Roxon to the Hon Anthony Byrne MP, 17 September 2012, 
Appendix F. 
DATA RETENTION 141 
 
5.9 Many submitters to this inquiry expressed their concerns about content being 
retained under any mandatory data retention regime. However, the Attorney-
General and AGD categorically ruled out retaining content in evidence to the 
Committee. 8 This would preclude access to content such as the substance of text 
messages and emails, about which many submitters expressed concern. 
Nevertheless, the vital definitional issue of what constitutes ‘data’ and ‘content’ 
is examined. 
The current regime 
5.10 According to the report on the TIA Act that is published by AGD annually, 
enforcement agencies are able to access certain communications data under part 
4-1 of TIA Act, however access to the actual content of this communication is 
prohibited except under a warrant.9 
5.11 The communications data that can be accessed includes: 
 subscriber information; 
 telephone numbers of the parties involved in the communication; 
 the date and time of a communication; 
 the duration of a communication; 
 Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and Uniform Resource Locators 
(URLs) to the extent that they do not identify the content of a 
communication; and 
 location-based information.10 
5.12 A table listing the telecommunications data currently provided to agencies by 
Telstra under the provisions of the TIA Act is available at Appendix H. 
5.13 Under the current regime, law enforcement agencies may access historical 
communications data in circumstances where it is considered reasonably 
necessary for: 
 the enforcement of criminal law; 
 the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or 
 the protection of public revenue.11 
 
8  A letter from the Secretary of AGD, Mr Roger Wilkins AO, clarifying the data set can be found at 
Appendix G. 
9  Attorney-General, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act: Report for the year ending June 2011, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 10. 
10  Attorney-General, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act: Report for the year ending June 2011, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 10. 
11  Attorney-General, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act: Report for the year ending June 2011,  
Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 11. 
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5.14 Access to prospective communications data, however,  
...may only be authorised by a criminal law-enforcement agency when it 
is considered reasonably necessary for the investigation of an offence with 
a maximum prison term of at least three years.12 
5.15 For ASIO, these authorisations may only be made where the person making the 
authorisation is ‘satisfied that the disclosure would be in connection with the 
performance by the Organisation of its functions’.13 
5.16 The TIA Act also sets out who is able to make these authorisations: 
 Head of an agency; 
 the deputy head of an agency; or 
 an officer or employee of the agency covered by an approval, in writing, of the 
head of the agency.14 
5.17 The regime governing access to prospective data is very similar to that for 
historical data. The key difference is that the authorisation for access to 
prospective data either ends at a specified time, or ends after 90 days.15 
5.18 It is important to note that the AGD Discussion Paper proposes no changes to the 
regime for accessing communications data, and simply raises the possibility of 
making retention of the relevant data mandatory for carriers/carriage service 
providers (C/CSPs).  
The international experience 
5.19 During this inquiry, the experience of the European Union in implementing a 
data retention regime in its member countries was raised by several submitters 
and witnesses.16 As a result, the Committee explored this experience to see what 
lessons it can offer in terms of potential data retention regimes in Australia. 
5.20 The two relevant international examples of data retention regimes that the 
Committee explored were implementations of the European Union’s data 
retention directive; particularly the controversy surrounding its implementation 
in Germany, and the United Kingdom’s voluntary data retention scheme. 
 
12  Attorney-General, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act: Report for the year ending June 2011,  
Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 11. 
13  TIA Act, Part 4-1. 
14  TIA Act, Part 4-1. 
15  TIA Act, Part 4-1. 
16  See Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission No. 165; Law Council, Submission No. 96; Pirate Party of 
Australia, Submission No. 134; Human Rights Law Centre, Submission No. 140. 
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EU data retention directive 
5.21 On 15 March 2006 the European Parliament and the Council of the EU passed a 
directive requiring all member states to transpose laws mandating the retention 
of telecommunications data for periods between six months and two years, 
according with their legal and constitutional processes.17 
5.22 According to the Law Council, the EU Data Retention Directive: 
…requires providers of publicly available electronic communications 
services and public communication networks to retain communications 
data for the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime as 
defined by each Member State.18 
5.23 This directive ‘does not permit the retention of data revealing the content of the 
communication’, and instead focuses on a ‘wide range of other 
telecommunications data’ that allows enforcement and security agencies to: 
 Trace and identify the source of a communication, such as the calling 
telephone number, the name and address of the subscriber or 
registered user… or the name and address of the internet subscriber or 
registered user to whom an Internet Protocol (IP) address, user 
identification or telephone number was allocated at the time of the 
communication; 
 Identify the destination of a communication, such as numbers dialled 
or the name and address of the internet subscriber or registered user 
and user ID of the intended recipient of the communication; 
 Identify the data, time and duration of a communication, such as the 
data and time of the start and end of a telecommunication, the data 
and time of the log-in and log-off of the internet access service, the date 
and time of the log-in and log-off of the internet email service; 
 Identify the type of communication; such as the telephone service used 
or the internet service used; 
 Identify users’ communication equipment, such as the International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity of the calling party or the digital subscriber 
line or other end point of the originator of the internet communication; 
and 
 Identify the location of mobile equipment, such as the location label at 
the start of the telecommunication.19 
5.24 The EU Data Retention Directive required member states to ‘implement 
measures to ensure this data is retained for periods between six months and two 
years from the date of the communication’, the Law Council told the Committee, 
 
17  European Union Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. 
18  Law Council, Submission No. 224, p. 6. 
19  Law Council, Submission No. 224, p. 6. 
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and also makes provisions for access to the data and the security of the retained 
data.20 
5.25 While the Directive has been implemented in several countries, and notably in 
the UK via a voluntary code of practice, it has been subject to successful 
constitutional challenges in three EU member states: Germany, Romania and the 
Czech Republic.  
5.26 According to the Law Council: 
The Romanian Court accepted that interference with fundamental rights 
may be permitted where it respects certain rules and where adequate and 
sufficient safeguards are provided to protect against potential arbitrary 
state action. However, the Court found the transposing law to be 
ambiguous in its scope and purpose with insufficient safeguards. The 
Court held that a ‘continuous legal obligation’ to retain all traffic data for 
six months was incompatible with the rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression…21 
5.27 In the case of Germany, the Law Council stated: 
The German Constitutional Court said that data retention generated a 
perception of surveillance which could impair the free exercise of 
fundamental rights. It explicitly acknowledged that data retention for 
strictly limited uses along with sufficiently high security of data would 
not necessarily violate the German Basic Law. However, the Court 
stressed that the retention of such data constituted a serious restriction of 
the right to privacy and therefore should only be admissible under 
particularly limited circumstances, and that a retention period of six 
months was at the upper limit of what could be considered proportionate. 
The Court further held that data should only be requested where there 
was already a suspicion of a serious criminal offence or evidence of a 
danger to public security, and that data retrieval should be prohibited for 
certain privileged communications which rely on confidentiality.22  
5.28 Finally, in the case of the Czech Republic, the Law Council told the Committee: 
The Czech Constitutional Court annulled the transposing legislation on 
the basis that it was insufficiently precise and clear in its formulation. The 
Court held that the definition of authorities competent to access and use 
retained data and the procedures for such access and use were not 
sufficiently clear in the transposing legislation to ensure the integrity and 
 
20  Law Council, Submission No. 224, p. 7. 
21  Law Council, Submission No. 224, p. 9. 
22  Law Council, Submission No. 224, pp. 9-10. 
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the confidentiality of the data. Because of this, the individual citizen had 
insufficient guarantees and safeguards against possible abuses of power 
by public authorities. In obiter dictum the Court also expressed doubt as 
to the necessity, efficiency and appropriateness of the retention of traffic 
data given the emergence of new methods of criminality such as through 
the use of anonymous SIM cards.23 
5.29 In addition to these successful challenges, there are currently cases in Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Hungary and Ireland being mounted to challenge the implementation of 
the EU Data Retention Directive, the latter has ‘been referred to the European 
Court of Justice’.24 It must be noted, however, that these challenges took place in 
countries with human rights frameworks that are significantly different to those 
in Australia. 
UK voluntary data retention 
5.30 The Law Council told the Committee that the UK has implemented the EU data 
retention directive via a voluntary code of practice relating to data retention: 
The United Kingdom (UK) has a system of voluntary data retention 
which derives from Part 11 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001. Telephone operators and Internet Service Providers retain some 
data under a voluntary arrangement with the UK Home Office.25 
5.31 The NSW Young Lawyers elaborated on how this code works: 
In the UK, this convention has been the basis upon which the Home 
Office has issued a voluntary code of conduct under which telephone and 
internet service providers retain some data. The legislation enabling the 
Convention in the UK also provides that if the Secretary of State is 
unconvinced of the efficacy of such a voluntary program, then the Code 
may be made mandatory. The code has not subsequently been made 
mandatory and requires only a small subset of data be kept for up to 12 
months, principally consisting of subscriber information that would be 
necessary for billing.26 
5.32 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) and the 
Communications Alliance noted that the costs of the voluntary data retention are 
fully borne by the UK Government, and that this is a part of the voluntary code 
 
23  Law Council, Submission No. 224, p. 10. 
24  Law Council, Submission No. 224, p. 10. 
25  Law Council, Submission No. 96, p. 38. 
26  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission No. 133, p. 10. 
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of practice.27 Further, in order to have these costs borne by the government, UK 
service providers must be a part of the voluntary code.28  
5.33 The UK Parliament is currently considering a Draft Communications Data Bill that 
will, amongst other things, make the retention of data mandatory for 12 
months.29 However, the UK Bill differs significantly from the potential reform 
being considered in Australia. For instance, the data to be collected and stored 
under the UK Draft Bill is limited only in terms of what is considered ‘necessary’ 
by the UK Home Office, which extends to data such as ‘web logs’.30 
5.34 In this regard, a report produced by the UK Intelligence and Security Committee 
(ISC), was broadly supportive of the need for reform: 
The Agencies require access to communications data – in certain tightly 
controlled circumstances and with appropriate authorisation – in the 
interests of national security. We recognise that changing technology 
means that the Agencies are unable to access all the communications data 
they need, that the problem is getting worse, and that action is neeed 
now. We accept that legislation to update the current arrangements 
governing the retention of communications data offers the most 
appropriate way forward.31  
5.35 At the end of its inquiry the Committee was provided with the ISC report 
published in February 2013. The ISC reached three key conclusions: 
 The intelligence agencies need to continue to have access to 
telecommunications data; 
 There is a gap emerging in their ability to access this data; and 
 While legislation is not a perfect solution, it is the best available option in 
contrast to other investigatory methods and a voluntary approach.32 
5.36 Furthermore, the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill of the 
UK Parliament has produced a report on the draft bill which was also broadly 
supportive of the need for reform. However, this report also cautioned: 
 
27  AMTA and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, p. 14. 
28  UK Home Office, Explanatory Memorandum to the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009, pp. 1-2. 
29  Draft Communications Data Bill 2012, United Kingdom. 
30  Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill, UK Parliament, Draft Communications Data 
Bill, December 2012, p. 24. 
31  UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Press release, 11 December 2012, viewed 18 December 2012, 
<http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/11december2012>. 
32  UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Access to Communications Data by Intelligence and Security 
Agencies, UK Parliament, February 2013. 
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…the current draft Bill is too sweeping, and goes further than it need or 
should. We believe that, with the benefit of fuller consultation with CSPs 
than has so far taken place, the Government will be able to devise a more 
proportionate measure than the present draft Bill, which would achieve 
most of what they really need, would encroach less on upon privacy, 
would be more acceptable to CSPs and would cost the taxpayer less.33 
Responses to data retention 
5.37 The potential data retention regime attracted a large amount of criticism and 
comment from organisations and concerned individuals. These organisations 
and individuals generally considered any potential data retention regime a 
significant risk to both the security of their information, and their privacy. In 
addition to these general comments, the Committee received a large volume of 
form letter correspondence. A collective sample of some of these comments and 
the form letters can be found in Box 5.1. 
5.38 Conversely, the data retention regime received a high level of support from law 
enforcement and national security agencies. These agencies largely argued that 
data retention was necessary for them to maintain their current capabilities into 
the future. 
5.39 This section outlines these perspectives by grouping them under the following 
headings: 
 Privacy and civil liberties; 
 Security; 
 Feasibility and efficacy; and 
 Cost. 
 
33  Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill, UK Parliament, Draft Communications Data 
Bill, December 2012, p. 74, viewed 18 December 2012, 
<www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/draft-communications-
bill/publications/>. 
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Box 5.1 Community responses to the mandatory data retention regime proposal 
‘As both an Australian citizen and a small business owner I am seriously concerned 
about the over‐reaching changes proposed by this reform. I believe it is inherently wrong 
to log and track activity via an individual’s ISP and/or participation in social network/s.’ 
(Mr Craig Veness, Submission No. 13, p.1 and other submitters (in common form).) 
‘By tracking and recording every single Australian online, and keeping these records for 
two years, this proposal will destroy our online privacy, make every Australian into a 
criminal, give too much power to the government, and go far and beyond what is 
necessary. Specifically, I oppose the proposals to: 1)Keep all Australians’ online data for 
two years 2)Track everything said on Twitter, Facebook & other social media…’ (Ms 
Rhonda Palmer, Submission No. 20, p. 1 and other submitters (in common form).) 
‘The proposal that internet services providers retain all data on all users for a period of 
two years turns all citizens into suspects. This proposal is undemocratic and 
unacceptable; it also creates a security risk as the preserved data can be made available 
and misused.’ (Mr Josh Fergeus, Submission No. 53, p. 1 and other submitters (in common 
form).) 
‘[I] have a concern that the data collection proposed by the Australian government will 
increase the fear and nervousness that as people living in a free democratic country we 
should be free from feeling, an untrusted, and being watched for criminal behaviour by 
our own government, by businesses not designed to monitor the information its 
customers disclose to each other in private conversation.’ (Ms Odette Stephens, 
Submission No. 1, p. 1.) 
 ‘I am strongly opposed to the draconian proposals from Australia’s intelligence 
community, that telephone and internet data of every Australian be retained for up to 
two years and intelligence agencies be given increased access to social media sites such 
as Facebook and Twitter. Such data retention schemes are extremely unpopular, have 
been a subject of much global debate and outrage, most ISPs and the majority of 
Australians share these sentiments.’ (Mr Mark Simpson, Submission No. 2, p. 1.) 
‘I don’t believe national security justifies the proposed levels of intrusion into citizens’ 
private lives.’ (Mr Malcolm Rieck, Submission No. 21, p.1.) 
‘It would be a great shame if a country such as ours were to adopt such an invasive and 
unnecessary data retention policy that infringes on the basic privacies of citizens, which 
instead of presuming innocence until guilty, collects data on them and stores it as if they 
were criminals. Should it become law that conversations between two people walking 
down the street were to be recorded by the government, it would be considered a gross 
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invasion of privacy akin to the invasions of privacy that were present in Soviet era 
Russia.’ (‘James’, Submission No. 7, p. 1.) 
‘This concept of long term data retention is especially concerning these days, considering 
how much of our life takes place on the internet.’ (Mr Peter Serwylo, Submission No. 22, p. 
1.) 
‘This is crazy. ALL customers, and ALL their data? The people who thought this up are 
sick.’ (Mr Joe Stewart, Submission No. 32, p. 1.) 
‘We do not need our government to spy on us all the time. I would rather we had the 
occasional act of terrorism than live under an oppressive government.’ (Mr Sam Watkins, 
Submission No. 29, p. 1.) 
‘I am a middle‐aged, middle class, professional woman with no dark secrets to hide and 
nothing to fear from anyone knowing anything whatsoever about my online activities, 
but I can hardly believe that this is even being considered in Australia. When I first heard 
it I thought “Surely this is a joke.”’ (Ms Mary Annesley, Submission No. 73, p. 1.) 
‘The vast majority of Australians are decent people and we do not need or want the 
spectre of the government hovering over our most intimate moments.’ (Dr James G. 
Dowty, Submission No. 35, p. 2.) 
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Privacy and civil liberties 
Community views 
5.40 A range of organisations and individuals objected to the potential data retention 
regime on civil liberties and privacy grounds.  
5.41 The Law Council of Australia expressed its concerns about this proposal, stating: 
Introducing a requirement to retain certain data for up to two years, even 
with accompanying safeguards, constitutes a significant expansion of the 
telecommunications interception and access regime, and one that the Law 
Council considers has not yet been shown to be a necessary or 
proportionate response to investigating serious criminal activity or 
safeguarding national security, particularly given the very serious 
impacts such a reform will have on the privacy rights of many members 
of the community.34 
5.42 The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) was similarly strident in its criticism of the 
potential impacts of data retention, stating that the ‘imposition of such an 
extraordinary, systematic and universal program would render any presumed or 
existent Australian right to privacy empty’.35 
5.43 The IPA characterised any potential data retention regime as representing ‘a 
significant incursion on the civil liberties of all Australians’, stating that: 
Data retention would be a continuous, rolling, systematic invasion of the 
privacy of every single Australian, only justified because a tiny 
percentage of those Australians may, in the future, be suspects in criminal 
matters. Indiscriminate data retention is an abrogation of our basic legal 
rights.36 
5.44 Blueprint for Free Speech shared the overall concerns about the impact of any 
data retention scheme on the privacy of internet users in Australia, stating ‘this 
measure would dramatically reduce privacy in Australia, with very few 
demonstrated national security benefits’.37 
5.45 The Pirate Party told the Committee that the data retention proposal was: 
…indicative of a shift in focus by law enforcement and intelligence 
organisations from protecting the populace and the presumption of 
 
34  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 37. 
35  Institute of Public Affairs, Submission No. 139, p. 4. 
36  Institute of Public Affairs, Submission No. 139, p. 3. 
37  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission No. 165, p. 6. 
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innocence to one of constant surveillance and suspicion of the populace. 
Where the existing targeted surveillance is akin to spear fishing, 
mandatory data retention is more like drift net fishing. The risk to 
individual privacy is enormous.38 
5.46 The Human Rights Law Centre took a similar view, stating that the ‘vast quantity 
of private data that could be stored and accessed’, coupled with its extension to 
ancillary providers, could ‘severely limit the right to privacy’. As such, any data 
retention scheme would need to be shown to be proportionate to the desired 
outcomes: 
…if the Government wishes to limit the right to privacy, it must state the 
overriding public interest in limiting the right and establish that the 
means used are reasonable, necessary and proportionate. In this instance, 
the Government has not provided any significant information to show 
that there is an overriding public interest in implementing a data-
retention system.39 
5.47 In regard to maximising the privacy of consumers of telecommunications 
services, Mr Daniel Nazer raised the concept of ‘data minimisation’, noting that it 
is considered by privacy experts as ‘an essential tool for privacy protection’. Mr 
Nazer quoted the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, Dr Ann Cavoukian, on the 
benefits of data minimisation: 
Data minimization is essential to effective privacy protection, and can 
save organizations the risk and expense of managing personal 
information they may have no need for. Where there is no personal 
information, there is no consequent duty of care, with all that it implies. 
Further, data minimization requirements assists organizations to think 
through what personal information is actually necessary for their 
purposes, and guards against secondary uses and possible function 
creep.40 
5.48 Mr Nazer went on to note that: 
Mandatory data retention flatly contradicts the principle of data 
minimisation. Instead, it forces service providers to store enormous 
amounts of data for which they have no business need.41 
5.49 Similarly, Liberty Victoria told the Committee of its view that ‘the very collection 
of the data would in and of itself raise significant privacy concerns’.42 It went on 
 
38  Pirate Party, Submission No. 134, p. 26. 
39  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission No. 140, p. 7. 
40  Mr Daniel Nazer, Submission No. 110, p. 4 
41  Mr Daniel Nazer, Submission No. 110, p. 4 
42  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 5. 
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to state that data retention is ‘inherently more invasive’ than the traditional 
‘targeted interception’ approach, noting: 
It constitutes a significant intrusion into the privacy of each end user of 
telecommunications services and creates a situation in which a single 
security breach would have dramatic consequences. It represents a 
significant move away from the ‘targeted’ approach of the [TIA Act] 
which requires specific identification of communications and their 
relevance to an agency’s activities before information can be collected.43 
5.50 Furthermore, Liberty Victoria also submitted that ‘it is inevitable that, once a 
database of retained communications data is established, efforts will be made to 
extend its use for new purposes’. As such, Liberty Victoria proposed that 
safeguards be put in place to ensure the retained data was used ‘only where 
there is a demonstrated need’.44  
5.51 The New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties (NSW CCL) noted similar 
concerns about the perceived diminution in privacy, and drew attention to the 
international experience: 
...the present data retention laws contravene international standards. The 
German Constitutional Court in March 2010 declared the German data 
retention laws unconstitutional, because of lack of proportionality in 
balancing right of privacy against interest in prosecuting crime. One of 
the aspects which the Court held was disproportional was that it applied 
to too wide a range of crimes, and should be permitted only for 
investigation of crimes of the most serious kind.45 
5.52 The Australian Interactive Media Industry Association’s Digital Policy Group 
raised its concerns about the presumption of guilt which it perceived was 
inherent in any blanket data retention proposal. As a result, it suggested an 
alternative approach: 
A system allowing for requests for preservation and retention of user data 
made by a judge or authorised law enforcement officials would lessen the 
risk from such blanket intrusion into privacy.46 
5.53 Ms Stella Gray, submitting in a private capacity, shared the concern about the 
presumption of innocence, noting: 
Pre-emptive surveillance of an entire population does away with the legal 
principle of the presumption of innocence. Any serious consideration of 
 
43  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 2. 
44  Liberty Victoria, Submission No. 143, p. 6. 
45  NSW Council for Civil Liberties, Submission No. 175, p. 16. 
46  Australian Digital Media Industry Association, Submission No. 198, p. 4. 
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implementing such a system, in a democratic country such as Australia, 
should be anathema to policy makers.47 
5.54 Western Australian Greens Senator Scott Ludlum echoed these concerns about 
the presumption of innocence, saying that indiscriminate data retention is 
‘unacceptable’ as it essentially treats all citizens as suspects.48 The Institute of 
Public Affairs similarly characterised data retention regimes as making ‘internet 
users guilty until proven innocent’.49 
5.55 The Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Dr Anthony Bendall, submitted that data 
retention was ‘characteristic of a police state’ as it goes against both the 
presumption of innocence, and ‘essential dimensions of human rights and 
privacy law: freedom from surveillance and arbitrary intrusions into a person’s 
life.’50 
5.56 At a public hearing, Dr Bendall elaborated on this concern, noting that data 
retention: 
...entirely undermines the fundamental underpinnings of privacy laws, 
which basically are that information should only be collected and stored 
where necessary and for a particular purpose, whereas these proposals 
seem to be that you store all the information just on the off chance that it 
might be useful down the track and you make up your mind how it 
would be useful at that point.51 
5.57 The Law Council agreed that this approach ‘does not sit easily with the notion of 
the presumption of innocence or other traditional criminal law or human rights 
principles’, and thus may breach Australia’s obligations under United Nations 
human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).52 
5.58 The NSW CCL also suggested that any data retention regime would not conform 
to Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR.53 
5.59 Similarly, Senator Ludlam linked the privacy concerns to human rights and 
Australia’s obligations under UN conventions. In particular, Senator Ludlam 
pointed to the resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council and the 
General Assembly in 2012, which noted the importance of ‘the right of 
 
47  Ms Stella Gray, Submission No. 152, p. 6. 
48  Senator Scott Ludlum, Submission No. 146, p. 26 
49  Institute of Public Affairs, Submission No. 139, p. 3. 
50  Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No. 109, p. 7. 
51  Dr Bendall, Transcript, 5 September 2012, p. 1. 
52  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 39. 
53  NSW Council for Civil Liberties, Submission No. 175, p. 16. 
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individuals to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kind through 
the internet’.54 
5.60 Senator Ludlum quoted the UN Special Rapporteur on the importance of 
governments upholding this principle: 
States are obliged to guarantee a free flow of ideas and information and 
the right to seek and receive as well as to impart information and ideas 
over the internet.55 
5.61 In Senator Ludlum’s view, any restrictions on this right must be demonstrated to 
be proportionate and necessary to the outcomes this restriction will achieve. He 
further contended that the Discussion Paper does not provide an adequate 
justification.56 
5.62 The Law Council discussed the privacy implications of only retaining 
communications data, stating that even if it ‘does not include the content and 
substance of a person’s private communications’, the communications data can 
still reveal ‘crucial’ information about a person, including such things as their 
associations and whereabouts.57 As a result of these concerns, the Law Council 
recommended that the potential reform be rejected unless it could be clearly 
demonstrated that it is ‘indispensable to protect the community from serious 
threats of criminal activity or national security’.58 
5.63 iiNet agreed that any potential data retention regime could negatively impact 
privacy, and related this concern to Australia’s National Privacy Principle (NPP) 
under the Privacy Act 1988.  
5.64 iiNet noted that NPP 1.1 states that: 
...an organisation must not collect personal information unless the 
information is necessary for one or more of its functions or activities. 
Therefore, if collection of telecommunications data or subscriber 
information is necessary for one or more of the functions or activities of a 
C/CSP (for example providing a telecommunications service), there will 
be no issue. However, if a C/CSP decided off its own bat (i.e. without any 
legal obligation to do so) to collect and retain data that is personal 
information solely because that data had the potential to be of use to law 
enforcement agencies, that C/CSP would likely be in breach of NPP 1.1. 
Therefore, the effect of the proposed reform is to effectively provide a 
 
54  Senator Scott Ludlum, Submission No. 146, p. 2. 
55  Senator Scott Ludlum, Submission No. 146, p. 2. 
56  Senator Scott Ludlum, Submission No. 146, p. 2. 
57  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 37 
58  Law Council of Australia, Submission No. 96, p. 39. 
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statutory exemption to NPP 1.1 and allow personal information to be 
collected and retained where the sole reason for the collection and 
retention of that personal information is the fact that it may be of use to 
law enforcement agencies.59 
5.65 The AMTA and the Communications Alliance shared this concern, noting: 
Industry requires that any data retention legislation must also contain a 
caveat which expands upon the current concept of immunity to 
incorporate acting in good faith, and provide immunity to the reporting 
obligations under the Privacy Act.60 
5.66 Mr Bernard Keane, submitting in a private capacity, argued that extending data 
retention from fixed line and mobile telephones to the internet constitutes a 
significant expansion of the powers held by law enforcement and security 
agencies, and thus would constitute a significant intrusion on privacy: 
Australians, like citizen around the world, do not use online  
communications in the same way, or for the same purposes, as they used 
phones. They did not commit huge amounts of personal information to 
permanent storage on the phone. They did not leave crucial financial 
details on the phone. The phone was not their primary tool for interacting 
with communities that are important to them. The telephone did not 
enable contact with communities around the globe that are of critical 
importance to citizens.61 
5.67 As such, Mr Keane posited that: 
Any attempt therefore to impose the telecommunications interception 
laws on the internet represents not a logical extension of that law to ‘keep 
up with technology’ on a like‐for‐like basis but a dramatic extension of 
surveillance into citizens’ lives far beyond that enabled by 
telecommunications interception.62 
5.68 Mr Ian Quick, submitting in a private capacity, expressed a similar concern to 
that of Mr Keane, noting that if data on internet browsing is retained, this would 
constitute a much greater invasion of privacy than telecommunications data: 
It is a massive invasion of everyone’s privacy, as the usage database will 
contain every page they accessed – such as every article they have read on 
a newspaper site, any online political activity they have done, anything 
they have done on ebay, what books they have bought on Amazon, which 
 
59  iiNet, Submission No. 108, p. 12. 
60  AMTA and Communications Alliance, Submission No. 114, p. 16. 
61  Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, p. 13. 
62  Mr Bernard Keane, Submission No. 117, p. 14. 
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Facebook pages they have gone to, etc. - and a lot of information that is 
also often included in the URL.63 
5.69 Electronic Frontiers Australia (EFA) took a similar view, and told the Committee 
that unlike the communications data associated with traditional telephony, 
internet communications data was far more intrusive: 
Even if it were to be specified that the actual content of communications is 
not to be retained, information such as addresses of websites visited, 
email addresses and phone numbers to which messages are sent and 
received from, details of phone calls sent and received, and other online 
communications activities, along with associated dates, times and 
locations does amount, in many cases, to content and is highly personal 
data.64 
5.70 EFA raised its concern that, in aggregate, examination of this type of data ‘will 
reveal highly intimate details of a person’s life’, including such things as 
‘religious and political affiliations, sexual orientation, health issues’ and other 
‘highly-sensitive information’.65 
5.71 Mr Adrian Gasparini, submitting in a private capacity, shared the concern that 
the data to be retained could reveal intimate details about people’s lives: 
A person’s browsing history is a very personal snapshot of that person’s 
life and personality. A person should have the right to keep aspects of his 
personal life completely private. For example, take into consideration 
searches conducted on Google maps; the social networks a person may 
log into; medical symptom related searches on Google; and a snapshot of 
the adult content searched for on various websites. It would be easy to 
determine the identity and address of a person, their circle of friends and 
their partner, possibly identify any affairs being conducted, determine 
their sexual orientation, age, as well as any possible embarrassing medical 
conditions that the person may have searched for.66 
5.72 Mr Daniel Judge, submitting in a private capacity, made a similar point about the 
potential privacy invasion inherent in retaining data on a person’s internet 
browsing history: 
The Internet today is used for a broad range of things and in many cases 
is the first port of call for people before seeing a doctor, or psychologist, or 
lawyer or marriage counsellor or any range of professional services all of 
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which are activities that would be captured and detailed by a mandatory 
date retention scheme. Any such information could be highly 
embarrassing to individuals should it fall into the wrong hands or become 
public knowledge. As such, the decision to retain this data is a highly 
dangerous endeavour when viewed within the context of the damage that 
could be done to people should the wrong information be leaked or 
stolen.67 
5.73 EFA told the Committee that, when it comes to people’s internet browsing, it is 
very difficult to separate data from content, and that this raises further questions 
about the privacy impact of any data retention regime: 
A URL [uniform resource locator] will in many instances allow for the 
content of that website to be accessed well after the fact, providing a 
direct link to content. Many URLs contain sensitive information, such as 
user names and even passwords.68 
5.74 iiNet made a similar point, noting that internet browsing data is often 
synonymous with content: 
When we go to attachment A [of the Attorney-General’s letter noted 
above], we see it includes that certain categories of data must be 
retained—namely, data necessary for identifying (a) the source of a 
communication and (b) the destination of a communication. This is where 
it comes to the interesting part for us. The only conclusion we can draw 
about the destination of a communication when considering internet 
access is that what must be retained are the IP addresses. As noted 
previously, little to no specific guidance is given by the Attorney-
General’s Department on the data to be gathered, so we will continue to 
make assumptions. As I have mentioned, each object or piece of content 
on each page also has an IP address, none of which can be distinguished 
from any other on the page. It is therefore a paradox that requires 
resolution when the Attorney-General’s letter has declared that the data 
revealing content must not be retained but the destination data must be 
retained.69 
5.75 The Law Council drew on an example of this from the constitutional challenge to 
Germany’s data retention laws: 
…even though the storage does not extend to the contents of the 
communications, the data may be used to draw content-related 
conclusions that extend into the users’ private sphere. The observation 
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over time of recipient data, dates, times and place of telephone 
conversations permits detailed information to be obtained on social or 
political affiliations and on personal preferences, inclinations and 
weaknesses. So, even if it is restricted to telecommunications data in that 
sense, in other jurisdictions that has been considered sufficient to indicate 
that the jurisdiction does not consider the scheme to be appropriate.70 
5.76 Even when it comes to traditional telephony, EFA told the Committee that ‘any 
numbers input after connection, in response to a phone tree or other verbal 
prompts’ are essentially content, and in some cases will contain highly sensitive 
information such as personal identification numbers or credit card details.71 
5.77 EFA went on to note that this presents a civil liberties issue, in that the existence 
of such ‘large scale databases of communications activity’ could be abused by 
governments and police. As such, EFA stated: 
While we can earnestly hope that sufficient checks and balances would 
exist to prevent authorities abusing such databases to gather information 
on protesters (for instance), the only way to ensure that this never 
happens is to prevent the data being collected in the first place.72 
5.78 Dr James Dowty, submitting in a private capacity, saw a similar potential for any 
data retention regime to ‘be vulnerable to misuse by future governments’. Dr 
Dowty linked this to the amount of time the data is stored for, noting: 
Once the data retention begins, legislative change could immediately give 
an unscrupulous government access to the web viewing histories, emails 
and text messages of their political opponents and constituents. While the 
current government might be staunchly opposed to such misuses of the 
retained data, there is no guarantee that the government of 2050 will be as 
trustworthy. Of course, the data which is currently retained by CSPs is 
also open to misuse in this way, but the inappropriate use of two years’ 
worth of data is likely to be far more damaging than the misuse of a few 
weeks’ worth.73 
5.79 The Pirate Party made a similar argument, noting that the types of data to be 
retained were open to misuse: 
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It would provide the opportunity for law enforcement and intelligence 
organisations to trawl through available data looking for something 
which might, on the surface, be of interest to them.74 
5.80 The Pirate Party also linked this concern to the exercise of individual rights and 
political freedoms: 
Analysis of the full data set could be used to map all connections and 
interactions of everyone in the country. Methods used to identify any 
criminal organisation or network could just as readily be applied to any 
group or organisation in the country. This could have a chilling effect on 
the exercise of individual rights and democratic participation. This type of 
analysis could then be exploited by law enforcement, intelligence 
organisations, elements within those organisations or other groups with 
which the analysis is shared to suppress organisations and groups which 
are not in and of themselves unlawful.  
5.81 Blueprint for Free Speech raised similar concerns about political freedom, 
arguing that any potential data retention regime would have ‘a serious effect on 
freedom of speech’.75 
5.82 Blueprint for Free Speech argued that: 
Part of freedom of expression is the individual’s right to determine the 
manner in which they communicate. In other words, it is to determine 
who they wish to communicate with and when they wish to stop that 
communication or delete it.76 
5.83 By making the retention of communications data mandatory, Blueprint for Free 
Speech contended that this right could be undermined: 
People have a legitimate expectation that when they delete electronic 
information, it is gone. They do not expect their service provider to 
secretly retain it against their wishes. The [data retention] proposal is 
analogous to secretly collecting everyone’s garbage for two years and 
storing it in case it might assist a criminal investigation at some point in 
the future. In addition, it effectively prevents people from deleting their 
information, which is analogous to passing a law making it illegal to 
destroy your own documents.77 
5.84 As such, Blueprint for Free Speech told the Committee that this diminution in 
privacy, coupled with the inability to, in essence, retract communications after 
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the fact, ‘would have a chilling effect on freedom of expression’.78 Similarly, Dr 
Bendall stated that data retention could have ‘an extreme chilling effect on online 
transactions’.79 
5.85 Mr James McPherson elaborated on how data retention could lead people to not 
say or write things they might otherwise: 
Even if the only data which was logged was email message headers, or a 
list of visited websites, there is more than enough information there to 
build accurate profiles of people, their opinions and their social networks. 
The most likely outcome of such surveillance is self-censorship, to avoid 
harassment by covert agencies ‘just in case’ an expressed opinion might fit 
some criteria which the agencies make up to justify invasive actions.80 
5.86 Ms Stella Gray shared the concerns that any data retention regime would have a 
‘chilling effect on political speech and public discourse’.81  
5.87 Australian Lawyers for Human Rights argued that, in order to maintain the 
‘expectation of privacy’ of legitimate users of telephony and internet 
communications, ‘the minimum amount of confidential data’ should be ‘retained 
for the smallest period of time possible’.82 
5.88 AMTA and the Communications Alliance were similarly concerned about the 
privacy implications of retaining too much data: 
There is likely to be some additional social cost, constituting both the cost 
of loss of privacy and a further additional risk to security as the retained 
data becomes itself a target for unlawful access. Industry believes it is 
generally better for consumers that service providers retain the least 
amount of telecommunications information necessary to provision, 
maintain and bill for services (including calls and transmissions).83 
5.89 Ms Ashley Hull also suggested that, if privacy is to be maintained to the greatest 
possible extent, the data retained should be targeted: 
ISPs shouldn’t be told to keep data for customers whom have not yet been 
targeted by law enforcement with an open case and a warrant. As the 
lines between terrorism, civil disobedience and healthy dissent are 
deliberately blurred, our rights must be protected from these overarching 
sweeping reforms which target the select few while touching all of us. We 
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need to ensure there is no room for ambiguity - The crosshair must be 
aimed precisely.84 
5.90 The IPA suggested that it would be possible to minimise the intrusion into 
privacy at the same time as maintaining the efficacy of law enforcement if the 
data was retained in a targeted fashion, stating that:  
Strictly limited, supervised, and transparent data preservation orders on 
targeted suspects would strike the right balance between individual rights 
and law enforcement.85 
5.91 Mr Nazer made a similar suggestion, noting that Australia should draw on the 
Canadian approach by instituting: 
…a process whereby an agency can secure a temporary preservation 
order that remains in effect only for as long as it takes law enforcement to 
return with a warrant. While any data preservation program would still 
require safeguards to protect privacy, it is certain to be less invasive and 
costly than massive and indiscriminate data retention.86 
Law enforcement and security agencies’ views 
5.92 Law enforcement and national security agencies were adamant that any potential 
data retention regime does not represent an expansion of their powers, and thus 
does not translate into any serious diminution of privacy or a winding back of 
civil liberties. 
5.93 As noted in the section describing the current regime above, law enforcement 
agencies are able to access telecommunications data (as distinct from content) 
under certain circumstances without a warrant. Collective examples arguing the 
importance of communications data to law enforcement agencies in 
investigations are included in Box 5.2. 
5.94 As noted below, this access is tightly controlled by the C/CSPs themselves and is 
only disclosed when properly authorised, and no change is proposed to this 
aspect of the TIA Act by the AGD Discussion Paper. As such, mandating data 
retention will not lead to the removal of the presumption of innocence, as data 
will continue to be accessed only in connection with active investigations. 
5.95 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) noted that access to communications data is 
both a necessary investigative tool and is far less privacy invasive than normal 
interception: 
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Non-content telecommunications data is an important investigative tool 
for the AFP. It can provide important leads for agencies, including 
evidence of connections and relationships within larger associations over 
time, evidence of targets’ movements and habits, a snapshot of events 
immediately before and after a crime, evidence to exclude people from 
suspicion, and evidence needed to obtain warrants for the more intrusive 
investigative techniques such as interception or access to content.87 
5.96 Furthermore: 
There are no operational risks, and from a law enforcement perspective 
and as it relates to data about communications rather than its content, it 
raises fewer privacy concerns than the other covert investigative 
methods.88 
5.97 Victoria Police noted that, as business practices change in the 
telecommunications sector, so does the length of time for which data is retained: 
As carriers change their business practices from billing based on 
volume/length of calls made to billing based on data volumes, the need 
for carriers to retain such data is diminishing. This has enormous 
implications for law enforcement agencies reliant on this data to target 
suspects involved in serious crime.89 
5.98 The Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australian made the point 
that, if data retention is not made mandatory, they could face a diminution in 
their capabilities: 
Agencies will face many challenges as telecommunications technologies 
migrate to IP networks. Investigations across almost all serious crime 
types including corruption, counter-terrorism and homicide rely 
significantly on telecommunications data. Without legislated data 
retention obligations the degradation of investigative capability will be 
significant.90 
5.99 The AGD noted that there was evidence that this capability was already 
diminishing: 
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Anecdotal reporting from agencies is that increasingly requests for 
telecommunications data are not being met as carriers do not retain the 
particular telecommunications data requested. Unfulfilled requests waste 
agency resources, inhibit the making of requests, and can lead to 
investigations being stalled or abandoned with crimes going unsolved.91 
5.100 Furthermore, the AGD disagreed with the submitters who suggested that a data 
preservation scheme would be more appropriate: 
Data preservation involves a C/CSP preserving specific 
telecommunications data identified by an agency that it has available on 
its network in relation to a relevant investigation or intelligence gathering 
activity on notification by an agency. Given the current authority under 
the TIA Act for agencies to access telecommunications data from a C/CSP 
when it has been identified as being relevant to a specific investigation or 
intelligence gathering activity, agencies already have the ability to access 
telecommunications data that the C/CSP has on hand at the time of the 
request or that comes into existence into the future, negating the need for 
data preservation.92 
5.101 The AFP stated that a system of mandatory data retention would not mean any 
actual expansion in the powers of police and security agencies, and thus would 
not constitute an increased intrusion into the privacy of individuals: 
The development of a data retention proposal is intended to ensure a 
national and systematic approach is taken for the availability of non-
content telecommunications data for investigative purposes. Data 
retention would not give agencies new powers. Rather it would ensure 
that existing investigative capabilities remained available and were 
adapted to these changes in industry.93  
5.102 Furthermore, the AFP emphasised that there are constraints on the use of 
communications data in the current legislation: 
The TIA Act provides a high level of accountability and strict access 
requirements to obtain telecommunications information. These 
constraints recognise the responsibility of government to manage the 
competing interests of privacy and the expectations of the community 
that unlawful activity will be investigated and prosecuted, as well as the 
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important role that the telecommunications industry plays in supporting 
law enforcement and investigative activities.94 
5.103 The AFP argued that retaining limited data on internet use bears some similarity 
to the current regime: 
Access to subscriber or account holder data is comparable in intrusiveness 
to open source information such as traditional fixed line telephone 
directories. It aids law enforcement in obtaining information to help 
establish further avenues of inquiry. For IP’s where there are no 
analogous provisions to the directory service concept this non-content 
communications account data is imperative.95 
5.104 Furthermore, the AFP, ASIO and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) stated 
in their joint submission that they ‘do not want the internet browsing history of 
every customer of an ISP to be retained’.96 
5.105 These agencies recognised that browsing data may be considered the same thing 
as content, and thus noted that ‘the TIA Act does not permit the disclosure of the 
contents or substance of a communication without a warrant’, and further that 
they are not ‘seeking any changes to this’.97 
5.106 In regard to the difficulties of separating content from data in some cases, the 
AFP, ASIO and the ACC stated that the EU experience indicates that it is possible 
to separate the two, and further that ‘the suggestion that it is not possible… is not 
consistent with information and feedback we have received from industry 
vendors’.98 
5.107 Furthermore, the AGD told the Committee that there were safeguards in place in 
terms of separating data from content: 
But the safeguard is that a law enforcement agency has to satisfy 
internally that they are seeking information that would fall within a 
definition of data, and it is very clear that they cannot ask for anything 
that is content. The final decision on that is with the industry player, and 
if they cannot extrapolate data from content, then they cannot disclose 
that. In relation to data retention, there has never been a suggestion that it 
would be anything to do with web browsing where this problem has been 
identified.99 
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5.108 At a public hearing, the AFP told the Committee that privacy was central to any 
new or reformed regime around data retention: 
I also want to be clear to the Committee that we understand the 
importance of individual privacy and we support this as a fundamental 
right in this country. I acknowledge that any reform in this area must be 
premised on maintaining appropriate levels of accountability for both 
intercepting agencies and industry in order to protect these rights.100 
5.109 ASIO also told the Committee that there are currently safeguards in place when 
it comes to the use of communications data: 
ASIO accesses telecommunications-associated data (i.e. not content) from 
carriers/carriage service providers under internal authorisations which 
may only be made where the relevant ASIO officer is satisfied that the 
disclosure of the data specified in the authorisation would be in 
connection with the performance of ASIO’s legal functions (and for no 
other purpose). 101 
5.110 Similarly, AGD noted the privacy protections that are a part of the TIA Act: 
The TIA Act contains numerous restrictions on the access, use and 
disclosure of communications lawfully obtained by agencies as well as 
comprehensive record keeping and reporting requirements with 
independent oversight. Broadly the prescriptive nature of the exceptions 
reflects the intrusive nature of the collection of the information as well as 
public expectations about how this information may be dealt with.102 
5.111 Furthermore, ASIO noted that it always acts to ensure any access to 
communications data conform to the following guidelines: 
 inquiries and investigations are to be undertaken using as little 
intrusion into individual privacy as possible;  
 wherever possible, the least intrusive techniques of information 
collection should be used before more intrusive techniques; and  
 any means used for obtaining information must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the threat posed and the probability of its occurrence.103  
5.112 These protections notwithstanding, the AGD was supportive of the idea of 
inserting a privacy focused objects clause into the TIA Act as it ‘will complement 
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the numerous safeguards built into the operation of the TIA Act by underpinning 
the ongoing interpretation of obligations under the Act.’104 
Box 5.2 Law enforcement and national security agencies’ use of communications data 
‘During a recent murder investigation there were a number of open lines of inquiry. 
When a human source provided information implicating a particular, previously 
unknown, person as responsible for the murder, telephone billing records were used to 
link the person nominated by the human source to another key suspect. The billing 
records also ultimately resulted in other lines of enquiry being discounted. The link 
between two of the principal offenders could not have been easily made without access 
to reliable telecommunications data. All the persons involved in that matter have been 
charged with the murder and associated offences and are currently before the courts.’ 
(Letter from Attorney-General Nicola Roxon to the Hon Anthony Byrne MP, 17 
September 2012, Appendix E.) 
‘For example, the [Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission] CMC recently 
identified significant on-line sharing of child exploitation material by the principal target 
who declared that he was abusing children. The principal target was based in 
Queensland. The investigative team provided information to the ISP identifying the 
internet service being used. The Carrier was unable to advise the CMC of the subscriber 
details for the principal target, despite the on-line sharing of child exploitation material 
being less than 24 hours prior. This resulted in the CMC not being able to identify the 
principal target’s precise location or true identity.’ (Queensland Crime and Misconduct 
Commission, Submission No 147, p. 8.) 
‘During 2010 an Operation obtained prospective call associated data (CAD) 
Authorisations in relation to a person suspected of war crime offences contrary to section 
7(2)(a) of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, namely torture, inhuman treatment and 
wilfully causing suffering or serious injury. The suspect was wanted for extradition to 
Croatia to face trial for these offences and was attempting to avoid location. The AFP’s 
CAD Authorisations did not involve the provision of any content of the suspect’s 
communications however the information the non-content data provided investigators 
regarding the general geographical location of the targets mobile handset was 
instrumental in assisting the AFP successfully locate the target.’ (Australian Federal 
Police, Submission No. 163, p. 17.) 
‘ASIO receives intelligence that a particular IP address is subject to cyber attack. ASIO 
would need to identify who that IP address is assigned to before it could warn them that 
their computer has been taken over and their information stolen, and to commence 
working with them to improve their IT security.’ (ASIO, Australian Crime Commission 
and Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 227, p. 6.) 
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Security 
Community views 
5.113 A very large number of the objections to data retention related to the security of 
the data retained.  
5.114 The Australian Privacy Foundation told the Committee that mandatory data 
retention was actually ‘contrary to security objectives’: 
Mandating the creation and storage of records of communications that 
would not otherwise be kept increases risk and vulnerability, creating 
additional ‘honeypots’ of valuable personal information that would be a 
target for hackers and risk multiple abuses.105 
5.115 Mr Bernard Keane told the Committee that such ‘honeypots’ would be a 
tempting target for criminals, regardless of the protections in place: 
Even assuming a strong commitment to data security by providers and a 
statutory law for data protection by government, such repositories of 
information would be highly‐prized treasure troves for organised crime, 
corporations and even foreign governments, and inevitably targeted by 
crackers.106 
5.116 Senator Ludlam was also concerned about the potential for retained data to be 
hacked, noting: 
The vast amounts of data that would be retained poses a security threat 
because it would be vulnerable to theft and hacking by unauthorised 
persons or governments, private entities or criminal actors.107 
5.117 The potential for hackers and other criminals to access retained data was also 
raised by Dr Bendall: 
Retaining the data would create a massive security risk if an ISP suffers a 
breach of security, including a significant risk of identity theft. The 
immense amount of data would also create an incentive for hackers to 
view ISPs as a target.108 
5.118 Mr Nazer considered the risks posed by hackers and criminals to be far greater 
than those posed by government agencies accessing the data: 
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If all Australian’s communications are stored, a security breach will 
expose data from hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of customers 
at once. Thus, while there is only very small probability that a particular 
user’s retained data will ever be useful to law enforcement, there is a 
much larger probability that the user’s data will be the subject of a 
security breach.109 
5.119 AMTA and the Communications Alliance noted at a public hearing that different 
C/CSPs have different capabilities when it comes to the security of any retained 
data: 
There are large entities within the industry that are very skilled and 
expert and experienced but, with the changing dynamics in this sector 
and the number of entities in the sector, under a data retention regime 
there would be a wide range of people who do not have those skills and 
there would be attendant risks to privacy.110 
5.120 Furthermore, the security threats to the retained data may originate within the 
telecommunications service providers themselves. Electronic Frontiers Australia 
(EFA) raised a recent incident where Telstra allegedly harvested ‘the URLs 
visited by customers of its NextG mobile service in order to provide this 
information to a foreign company’. According to EFA, this was illustrative of 
what could occur: 
This incident also demonstrates the risk of misuse of data by 
organisations for their own internal marketing purposes, which is a 
serious likelihood as they will seek to offset the significant costs 
associated with maintaining storage facilities for such large volumes of 
data.111  
5.121 Vodafone also commented on the potential for security breaches, particularly if 
the URLs associated with browsing histories were retained: 
At the moment the information is not particularly interesting—it is just an 
event—so very few rogues would get a significant benefit from hacking 
into our billing records, whereas if it starts to be about which URLs you 
went to and tracking your location in a lot of detail then that would be 
quite problematic.112 
5.122 EFA also noted that the security risks inherent in data retention vary according to 
the size and capabilities of the organisation retaining the data.  In EFA’s view, 
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given that ‘reports of significant data breaches’ occur ‘almost daily’, it is ‘all but 
guaranteed’ that the retained data would be compromised.113 NSW Young 
Lawyers noted that, in recent months, several major companies have had 
customer data stolen, including Twitter, Yahoo and Linkedin.114 Mr Quick noted 
his concern that, were Telstra to be similarly hacked, ‘millions of Australians 
would have their personal information shared across the globe’.115 Mr Daniel 
Black argued that C/CSPs do not have the ‘sufficient skill level’ to effectively 
protect data.116 
5.123 The Internet Industry Assocation (IIA), an industry body representing a wide 
range of businesses and individuals involved in internet commerce, also saw a 
potential for any retained data to be hacked were it not stored securely, noting 
that: 
…during the period of the Inquiry the international hacktivist group 
Anonymous has been reported to have laid claims to be responsible for a 
number of attacks on networks and websites to obtain secure data in 
protest of the [data retention] proposal.117 
5.124 The IIA raised a similar concern: 
Indeed most recently the vulnerability for further exposure was 
highlighted by the so-called hacktivist group ‘Anonymous’ who exposed 
data belonging to a prominent service provide.118 
5.125 Furthermore, the IIA told the Committee that these attacks: 
…highlight the need to ensure that any proposed reforms imposed on 
C/CSPs are cognisant of the level of security mechanisms required to 
protect such data.119 
5.126 Australian Lawyers for Human Rights also emphasised the security threat to any 
retained data, and noted that even large C/CSPs have some problems protecting 
their data from hacking: 
While the Committee’s terms of reference which contain the proposals 
suggest guidelines on security of stored data, there have been a 
substantial number of recent breaches of security, resulting in the 
disclosure of private user data. These disclosures have not been by small 
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businesses or organisations which lack the financial means to employ or 
train staff who are capable of managing secure environments.120 
5.127 Mr R Batten related his concerns about the security of retained data from hacking 
attempts to the privacy of customers. Mr Batten argued that data retention 
diminishes the ability of individuals to protect their information: 
With data and identity theft now such a serious risk for the community, 
people have the right to protect their information. By mandating that all 
service providers retain user data, you remove the ability of citizens to 
effectively protect themselves from data and identity theft… This 
proposal would create virtual treasure troves for such thieves to raid and 
citizens would be able to do nothing to protect themselves. 121 
5.128 Likewise, Mr R Wigan was concerned about the enticing effect such a repository 
of personal data would have on criminals, noting that such a concentration of 
data places ‘the community at risk’, especially if it includes internet browsing 
data: 
The ISP databases containing these materials will be a honeypot like no 
other, and breaches inevitable... with all the passwords and other security 
protocols undermined thereby.122 
5.129 Mr Mark Newton also expressed reservations about the security implications of 
creating ‘enormous silos’ of data: 
Data retention measures make our society less secure, by creating 
enormous silos of identifiable information in readily attackable locations. 
One single security breach risks losing everything, on a scale that leaves 
the United States’ experience with Wikileaks in the shade. It is 
contemptible that the Government has learned no lessons from its own 
Wikileaks exposure, and still believes that concentrating large troves of 
leakable, attackable private data is a good idea.123 
5.130 As a result of the concerns surrounding the ability of C/CSPs to effectively 
secure this data, and given that no C/CSP can ever be entirely certain the data is 
safe, Mr Daniel Black argued that it would be best if the data did not exist.124  
5.131 Similarly, the IIA argued that the data collected should be kept to a minimum: 
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Where ever there is an incentive for criminals to gain access to certain 
types of data then protecting and securing access to that data becomes 
more of a time, cost and technology burden. It is therefore important to 
ensure that data is not collected unnecessarily and that any proposals for 
retention of that data for extended periods can be justified by clearly 
demonstrating the necessity of that data to law enforcement activities.125 
5.132 Australian Lawyers for Human Rights agreed with this view, noting that: 
Focusing on privacy, security standards and providing that the minimum 
amount of confidential data is retained for the smallest period of time 
possible would afford legitimate users a greater expectation of privacy, 
safety and less scope for exploitation of their data by unscrupulous third 
parties.126 
5.133 According to Mr Bernard Keane, in some cases the data retained needs to be 
protected from lax processes within the organisations retaining the data: 
It has become clear over the last 18 months that even large corporations 
with strong incentives to keep data secure are vulnerable to cracking by 
organised crime, other states or activists, or simply lazy about security of 
personal information. This has included the Australia telecommunications 
provider Vodafone, which was revealed in early 2011 to have allowed – 
not via cracking or illegal action by outside actors, but through its own 
poor internal processes – widespread access to personal information 
about its 4 million customers.127 
5.134 These concerns about security could result in any retained data having limited 
evidentiary value, according to Mr Keane: 
The recent history of personal information security in Australia and 
overseas suggests that both citizens and law enforcement agencies, 
intelligence agencies and prosecutors can have little confidence that 
information compiled under data retention laws would be effectively 
secured by all companies required to hold it, either from a privacy or 
from a investigative/prosecutorial point of view.128 
5.135 Mr Black took a different approach, arguing that data breaches could lead to a 
loss of confidence of Australian internet users, and have a similar ‘chilling effect’ 
to that discussed in the previous section: 
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Should any number of high profile leaks or revelations occur in relation to 
data from this data retention scheme, then the confidence of the 
Australian internet user would be compromised. Such loss in public 
confidence could result in a ‘chilling effect’ as users turn away from using 
the Internet for personal affairs. Alternately some people could turn to 
more secure means of masking their identity such as proxies or [virtual 
private networks] which could actually result in a net negative effect on 
law enforcement efforts as people train themselves to become more 
conscious of potential surveillance and learn how to more effectively 
bypass such surveillance, mask their identity or cover their tracks.129 
5.136 Despite its opposition to mandatory data retention more generally, Blueprint for 
Free Speech argued that C/CSPs should not be responsible for storing any data 
retained, as they were ‘not adequately equipped to protect large quantities of 
information’. They elaborated on this concern: 
Imposing an obligation on service providers to protect data is not an 
adequate solution to this problem. If anyone is going to keep data for 
government purposes — and we do not believe anyone should — it 
should be the Government, not the private sector, and appropriate 
constraints on its storage, access and disposal must be put in place.130  
5.137 Senetas made a similar point, recommending:  
…that the government mandate how collected and retained data is 
secured – both in motion (when moving between locations) and at rest 
(when stored) through certified encryption technology and a regime for 
data breach notification to ensure the interests of all stakeholders is 
aligned.131 
5.138 The Pirate Party emphasised that the nature of the potential threats to the 
security of the data would require some form of controls to prevent unauthorised 
access: 
Data retained under this policy would need to be stored in a secure 
manner which would be capable of preventing unauthorised access; 
either internally by employees of the company or organisation, or any 
external party (e.g. hackers, organised crime, foreign intelligence 
organisations, etc). Access controls would be required to prevent 
unauthorised access and to provide a thorough audit trail of all access to 
the system. Access controls and logging systems would need to be 
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designed in a manner which prevents tampering with those logs in order 
to guarantee fidelity of those records.132 
5.139 Similarly, in addition to making sure the data was stored securely, iiNet saw a 
need for effective accountability measures to make sure the retained data was 
secure from misuse. iiNet argued that the government needs to ‘assure 
Australians that data retained under any such scheme will be subject to 
appropriate accountability and monitoring mechanisms’.133 
5.140 The Pirate Party noted that the data retained would ‘need to be securely backed 
up’ and that this backup system would be more complex than is the norm with 
backup systems.  It posited that it would need to include the following: 
 Backups older than the mandatory retention period would need to be 
purged in a similar manner to that of the data retention system. 
 The backups would need to be protected by similar access controls to 
the data retention system. 
 A means of ensuring that backups could not be ‘restored’ to another 
system by someone familiar with the system in order to freely access 
that data. Were that to occur they could retrieve any data, copy it and 
then wipe the system on which the backup had been restored to in 
order to conceal their actions. 
 The amount of data retained, even when limited to traffic data, would 
be huge, even if compression and encryption were used when storing 
the data.134 
5.141 The Pirate Party raised the need for the retained data to be securely destroyed 
once the retention period had expired: 
The data would also need to be stored in a manner such that data no 
longer covered by the mandatory retention period (e.g. more than two 
years old) can be securely destroyed.135 
Law enforcement and national security agencies’ views 
5.142 In regard to the security of the data captured and retained, the AFP, ASIO and 
the ACC stated that analogous data is retained and protected by providers 
already: 
Some data, including personal information such as subscriber details, is 
already collected and retained by industry. The protection of this data 
remains paramount and is one of the main drivers behind the proposed 
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Telecommunications Sector Security Reform which aim to increase the 
level of security in telecommunications networks.136 
5.143 Furthermore, the AFP, ASIO and the ACC noted that under the National Privacy 
Principles telecommunications and internet service providers are already 
required to ‘take reasonable steps to protect the personal information it holds 
from misuse, loss and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure’.137 
5.144 The Office of Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) also related the need 
for retained data to be stored security to the proposed telecommunications sector 
security reform, noting that: 
…the OAIC supports possible amendments to the Telecommunications 
Act to create an industry wide obligation on all C/CSPs to protect their 
infrastructure and the information held on it or passing across it from 
unauthorised interference.138 
5.145 The OAIC stated that this reform was particularly important in light of any 
future potential data retention regime.139  
5.146 Dr Bendall told the Committee that Australia does not have a data breach 
notification scheme, stating: 
…where there is a major data breach there is no specific legal impetus for 
those organisations to notify the individuals involved in order to mitigate 
their losses—for instance, even where it involves financial information 
and that sort of thing. My interpretation of the privacy legislation is that 
the information security principle would include some responsibility to 
do that because it mandates them to take reasonable steps to prevent 
misuse or unauthorised disclosure. But it is not a specific, unlike in other 
jurisdictions…140  
5.147 The AGD made a similar point, noting: 
Although many companies voluntarily report data breaches to the Office 
of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), there is no 
requirement under the Privacy Act to notify the OAIC or any other 
individual in the event of a data breach.141 
5.148 Similarly to Senetas, the OAIC suggested: 
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While notification of a data breach is currently not required by the 
Privacy Act, the OAIC suggests that it be considered as part of the 
proposed framework as an important mitigation strategy against privacy 
risks. 142 
5.149 In this regard, the AGD noted the role that mandatory data breach notification 
requirements could play: 
If enacted, mandatory data breach notification laws could complement 
the current legislative security requirements and a data retention regime 
in a least four ways by: (1) mitigating the consequences of a breach; (2) 
creating incentives to improve security; (3) tracking incidents and 
providing information in the public interest; and (4) maintaining 
community confidence in legislative privacy laws.143 
5.150 As such, AGD noted that: 
…on 17 October 2012, the Attorney-General released a Discussion Paper 
entitled Australian Privacy Breach Notification which has sought views 
by 23 November 2012 on the possible introduction of mandatory data 
breach notification laws. […]The Government is currently considering 
responses to the discussion paper.144 
5.151 Telecommunications sector security reform is discussed in Chapter Three of this 
report. 
Feasibility and efficacy 
Community views 
5.152 Several submitters raised concerns about the feasibility of any potential data 
retention regime, and whether it would be an effective tool for law enforcement 
and national security agencies. For instance, the Law Council noted that it was 
‘not clear’ how such a regime would be ‘technically feasible or even useful’.145 
5.153 In this regard, the Law Council raised several questions which it considered 
require an answer before any mandatory data retention regime is introduced: 
Once the data has been retained, how will it be matched with a particular 
person or communication? How will it be verified, and if it is used as 
evidence in court, how will it be protected from public disclosure? In 
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addition, how will authorised agencies deal with the sheer volume of data 
retained when attempting to identify and request the data needed for a 
particular investigation?146 
5.154 The Internet Society of Australia drew the volume of data that would be 
produced to the Committee’s attention, noting that it would be difficult to deal 
with: 
…the capacity of modern network equipment to produce terabytes of 
data with attendant storage, management and analysis costs for both the 
communications service providers as well as law enforcement agencies 
should not be underestimated. The potential for law enforcement agencies 
to be swamped by data is very real.147 
5.155 Likewise, Ms Stella Gray also commented on the volume of data that would be 
generated by capturing data on web browsing: 
A web browser hops through multiple IP addresses before reaching its 
destination to the page a user is navigating to. A web user is not in control 
of every IP address their web browser visits. Dozens of analytic trackers 
(measuring page view statistics) and advertising servers all run in the 
background on many websites that people frequent daily. That is a lot 
data that CSPs will need to be trusted to store, and a lot of data that law 
enforcement will need to sift through every time they are suspicions of 
someone.148 
5.156 It should be noted that these views on feasibility, particularly as they relate to the 
amount of data that would be generated, were based on the assumption that the 
data would include URLs. Given that the Attorney-General has subsequently 
ruled out retention of data relating to internet browsing histories, the volume of 
data that would be retained is significantly reduced. 
5.157 The Internet Industry Association raised the difficulties presented by the 
disaggregated nature of the data, particularly when its involves overseas 
countries: 
Another key issue is that service supply in the internet environment is 
disaggregated – there are many over the top (OTT) services ranging from 
things like Hotmail, Gmail, instant messaging, etc. to social networking 
such as Facebook, to Cloud storage and application hosting. If those 
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services are hosted outside of Australia, then data retention obligations 
have little to no effect.149 
5.158 Telstra raised a similar issue at a public hearing, noting that even if Australian 
providers were required to capture and retain communications data, it would 
still not be able to capture data from over the top services like Skype and other 
voice over the internet telephony services, YouTube or Google. Telstra elaborated 
on the effect this would have: 
The simple evolution of technology would mean that we could not 
capture or provide any metadata or any content around something like 
Gmail, because it is Google owned, it is offshore and it is over the top on 
our network. The real value of what we might have in our data-retention 
scheme would be greatly diminished as soon as the good, organised 
criminals and potential terrorist cells knew that we were not capturing 
that data.150 
5.159 However, iiNet told the Committee that it was still feasible to retain data relating 
to the source and destination of a particular communication, be it via traditional 
telephony or internet browsing: 
Technically anything is possible, it is just a question of how much money 
you want to throw at it. We have not said it is too expensive for us, but if 
we are forced to do it we will pass those costs through and that is 
normal.151 
5.160 One possible method of capturing and extracting relevant data that was raised 
during the course of this inquiry was Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). Telstra noted 
that, should a mandatory data retention regime proceed: 
Where additional information was required that does not form part of 
Telstra’s available pool of data then DPI could be one of the mechanisms 
available to meet these obligations.152 
5.161 Telstra described its understanding of DPI: 
DPI equipment is typically deployed for the purposes of inspecting [IP] 
traffic in detail (deep inspection of the IP packets). The results of such an 
inspection may be used, along with policy enforcement technology, to 
manage certain types of traffic. […] DPI equipment may be deployed 
either ‘in-line’ to achieve policy enforcement outcomes (manage traffic 
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based on its type or intended use, for example VOIP calls to the 
emergency call service) or DPI may be deployed ‘off to the side’. 
Deploying DPI ‘off to the side’ is used when carriers are analysing (but 
not altering) IP traffic on their network.153However, Telstra noted that, 
while it ‘would be possible for a carrier to capture and extract specific 
data using DPI’, this would depend on the ‘configuration of the DPI 
equipment’ and it would mean that ‘the volume of data subject to such 
capture and extraction would need to be constrained.’154  
5.162 In the context of the Draft Communications Data Bill currently under consideration 
in the UK, the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill noted: 
[DPI] would be used to isolate key pieces of information from data 
packets in a CSP’s network traffic. The Home Office seemed confident 
that this was technically possible.155 
5.163 The UK Joint Committee went on to note that the main technical challenge in 
terms of the feasibility of using DPI was ‘dealing with encrypted data’ captured 
from over the top service providers such as Gmail and Skype.156 
5.164 In terms of whether DPI could be used to capture only data and not content, 
Telstra advised the Committee that: 
DPI is able to be configured to perform in a range of different roles. It may 
be possible to configure DPI equipment to examine header data without 
inspecting content. This configuration is highly dependent on the 
volumes of data and specific meta-data being sought…this is a question of 
traffic volumes, equipment performance and cost.157 
5.165 In addition to stating that any potential data retention regime would be difficult, 
although not impossible, to implement due to the size and nature of the data 
needing to be retained, some groups also questioned whether the data would be 
effective in assisting to combat crime and terrorism. 
5.166 For instance, Telstra raised the possibility that the means C/CSPs use to obtain 
the data could result in issues if it is presented as evidence in courts: 
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With very few exceptions, the current communications data that C/CSPs 
provide to the [law enforcement and national security agencies] can be 
validated, by defence counsel, by comparison with a defendant’s 
telecommunications service account (‘bill’). This will no longer be the case 
with ‘created’ communications data and Telstra believes that prosecutors 
are highly likely to be challenged in court to substantiate the accuracy of 
the data in evidentiary proceedings.158 
5.167 EFA thought it ‘highly questionable’ whether data retention would aid in the 
investigation of terrorism, organised crime, or other serious illegal activities: 
It is worth noting that determined criminals will have little difficulty 
disguising or anonymising their communications. There are many 
relatively simple and very effective tools available that allow for the 
protection of communications from surveillance. While these tools will 
not be appealing to the vast majority of users as they can degrade 
connection speeds and reduce functionality, they are a viable option for 
those individuals that are determined to communicate in secrecy.159 
5.168 Dr Bendall also expressed scepticism as to whether data retention would aid law 
enforcement and national security agencies due to the incentive this would 
provide to anonymise communications: 
There is some evidence that I am aware of, from having read various 
reports, of that happening in other jurisdictions where people have 
engaged less with electronic transactions or they have done it in a way 
where they have used various devices to encrypt and anonymise their 
transactions. One of the concerns with that, of course, is that that actually 
lessens the amount of information available to law enforcement 
organisations.160   
5.169 iiNet was sceptical that data retention would be effective, due to the ease with 
which individuals can mask their identity. iiNet discussed one example with the 
Committee at a public hearing: 
We think it should be noted that in the internet environment a range of 
applications—apps—may run simultaneously over the same servers. 
These apps can emulate telephony or video communications, texts and 
other communications on the same platform using what is called internet 
protocol. Many of these apps allow a person wishing to mask either their 
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identity or location via wireless networks, proxy servers or other 
techniques to communicate in a covert way.161 
5.170 Blueprint for Free Speech provided the Committee with a large volume of 
material relating largely to the efficacy of the EU Data Retention Direction in 
preventing crime. This material led Blueprint for Free Speech to conclude that:  
There is no evidence to suggest data retention would assist with the 
prevention of crime or terrorism. A 2011 study of Germany’s Data 
Retention Directive found it had no impact on either the effectiveness of 
criminal investigations or the crime rate. Further, the study specifically 
found that countries without data retention laws are not more vulnerable 
to crime.162 
5.171 According to one analysis conducted by Arbeitskreius Vorratsdatenspeicherun of 
the effectiveness of data retention in Germany provided to the Committee by 
Blueprint for Free Speech: 
Blanket data retention can actually have a negative effect on the 
investigation of criminal acts. In order to avoid the recording of sensitive 
information personal information under a blanket data retention scheme, 
citizens increasingly resort to internet cafes, wireless internet access 
points, anonymisation services, public telephones, unregistered mobile 
telephone cards, non-electronic communications channels and suchlike. 
This avoidance behaviour can not only render retained data meaningless 
but even frustrate targeted investigation techniques (eg wiretaps) that 
would possibly have been of use to law enforcement in the absence of 
data retention. Because of this counterproductive effect, the usefulness of 
retained communications data in some investigation procedures does not 
imply that data retention makes the prosecution of serious crime more 
effective overall.163 
5.172 Mr Ben Lever cited the same report in his submission, noting that: 
It seems that under the current model - wherein most people are not 
surveilled, but certain persons suspected of crime are surveilled with 
warrants – many criminals will fail to take appropriate precautions, will 
use various telecommunication services, and will have that 
communication intercepted; however, under a data retention model - 
wherein all communication between citizens is monitored - criminals 
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know this and deliberately avoid using telecommunications, to the 
detriment of those listening in.164 
5.173 The Pirate Party agreed with these perspectives on efficacy, noting: 
It is likely that implementing data retention in Australia would have 
similar effects to those observed in Germany. The effect would not be to 
prevent organised crime or terrorism; it would merely result in greater 
concerted effort by organised criminals and terrorists to conceal their 
activities and communication. Meanwhile, the privacy and security of 
innocent, law abiding citizens would certainly be threatened and 
probably breached.165 
5.174 Similarly, Mr Ian Quick told the Committee that those seeking to commit crimes 
will simply use alternative methods to communicate: 
If everyone knows all internet traffic is monitored, people with things to 
hide - or who are just irritated with the government spying on everyone - 
will simply bypass the monitoring by either hiding what they are 
browsing or who is doing the browsing.166 
5.175 Furthermore, Mr Quick listed a range of ways to avoid having communications 
data retained: 
 Browsing with a public internet service ie internet café, public library. 
 Using some else’s wifi connection (many are not properly secured). 
 Using someone else’s computer, ie a friends or work colleague. 
 Using Tor or a similar online anonymity tool. 
 Using any number of open proxy services. 
 Using a [virtual private network] to somewhere outside of Australia 
and browsing over that.167 
5.176 Tor, originally developed by the US Navy, uses:  
…a network of virtual tunnels that allows people and groups to improve 
their privacy and security on the Internet. It also enables software 
developers to create new communication tools with built-in privacy 
features. Tor provides the foundation for a range of applications that 
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allow organizations and individuals to share information over public 
networks without compromising their privacy.168 
5.177 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are similar, in that they allow users to 
anonymise their internet use by ‘encrypt and tunnel their traffic to another 
country for retransmission’.169  
5.178 Likewise, Mr Johann Trevaskis notes that there are yet more ways in which 
persons seeking to do so can mask their identity during online communications: 
 A person who intended to communicate something about a serious 
offence on the internet could generate ‘millions’ of dummy exchanges 
on the internet. While those exchanges would all be recorded and 
available to law enforcement, the person could die of old age before 
the last exchange had been checked out by law enforcement. 
 Every person who objected to the data retention proposal on principle 
could generate ‘millions’ of dummy exchanges on the internet thereby 
making the data retention mechanism itself less practical. 
 Data retention for stored communications that are email can be 
avoided by anyone merely by not using the ISP for email. This is to be 
recommended anyway because anyone who uses their ISP’s email 
address then finds it more difficult to change ISP. That is, national 
economic efficiency says that people should not use an email address 
provided by their ISP. (Hence, for example, if a person used the 
gmail.com web site for all their email needs, the ISP would never see a 
single email. It is true that the web traffic to gmail.com instead would 
be seen by the ISP but that raises a number of practical difficulties for 
‘data retention’ as compared with simply keeping copies of emails that 
are being handled by the ISP.)170 
5.179 In light of the questions about whether any data retention regime would be 
worthwhile pursuing, Mr Nazer considered that a cost-benefit analysis should be 
conducted.171 
Law enforcement and security agency views 
5.180 The AGD responded to the concerns raised by telecommunications companies 
about over the top services, and the fact that the companies would have great 
difficulty capturing any data generated by these at a public hearing. The AGD 
noted that, because many of these over the top service providers are based in the 
United States: 
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There are ways through mutual assistance that we are able to access this 
information that has been held onto by the US providers. If they do retain 
the information offshore then it is unlikely that any law about data 
retention would apply to them, because the US law would actually 
override ours in that context. However, I think what we want to be 
satisfied of is that we can get access to the information. From what we 
understand from talking to the social network providers and these 
different providers in the US, they are happy to retain information as long 
as they are satisfied that a lawful order will come along at some point…172 
5.181 Furthermore, the AGD noted that: 
We have been advised, in the policy development work we were 
previously doing on this, that, if there is an obligation under Australian 
law which has extraterritorial application for these foreign service 
providers, they will actually be required—and we can compel them—to 
assist us in relation to the services they provide to Australians or provide 
in Australia. There will have to be a geographical boundary around this 
sort assistance. We cannot go and ask for assistance about something 
which is happening in another country. But, if the assistance is related to 
communications which, at some point, pass through the Australian 
telecommunications system, the advice we have had—or that we are 
working on—is that generally they will be able to be compelled. There are 
certainly ways—some as simple as terms and conditions of service. If they 
are Australian terms and conditions of service when you sign up in 
Australia, they will have the force of Australian law rather than the force 
of US law.173 
5.182 In regard to whether data retention would be an effective tool for law 
enforcement, the AFP told that Committee that it already is a vital tool. 
Furthermore, the AFP argued that, as the telecommunications sector changes, 
their ability to draw on communications data could potentially diminish: 
In the absence of urgent reform, agencies will lose the ability to effectively 
access telecommunications content and data, thereby significantly 
diminishing the collective ability to detect, investigate and prosecute 
threats to security and criminal activity. The diversification of the sector 
and technological change mean that while a greater array of non-content 
communications data is being created increasingly less is being retained. 
This negatively impacts investigations and is exploited by individuals 
involved in the commission of a range of serious offences including 
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cybercrime, terrorist activity and the exchange of child exploitation 
material.174 
5.183 Given that, as stated by ASIO, the AFP and the ACC, communications data is 
‘essential for the majority of investigations’: 
Loss of access to such data, for technical or legal reasons, would result in 
a loss of a fundamental investigative capability and the ability of security 
and law enforcement agencies to function effectively.175 
5.184 The AFP considered that if data retention were not made mandatory, it would 
lose important capabilities that would result in: 
 Limited ability to track and pursue offenders in a timely and effective 
way; 
 Limited ability to conduct thorough and complete investigations; 
 Inability to present best evidence to courts; 
 Inability for police to react to some life threatening situations; 
 Inability to follow through on potential leads and gather evidence and 
identify criminals, and 
 Ability for criminal enterprises / organised crime groups to exploit 
this vulnerability.176 
5.185 Thus, it was submitted that mandatory data retention will not necessarily result 
in a direct decrease in crime or terrorism, or a direct increase in clearance rates 
for criminal investigations, but that failure to mandate data retention will result 
in a diminution of law enforcement and security agencies’ ability to fulfil their 
functions over time. 
5.186 The AGD contested the view presented above that data retention in the EU has 
not assisted in investigations: 
The European Directive included a requirement for an evaluation of the 
application of the Directive and its impact which was to be prepared by 
the European Commission. This report was published on 18 April 2011. 
The report concluded that overall, the evaluation had demonstrated that 
data retention is a valuable tool for criminal justice systems and for law 
enforcement in the EU. The evaluation highlighted the lack of 
harmonisation in transposition of the directive in areas such as purpose 
limitation, retention periods and reimbursement of costs for industry 
(which is outside the scope of the Directive).177 
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5.187 In response to concerns about criminals and terrorists turning to anonymisers 
like Tor and VPNs, the AGD told the Committee that: 
…we are well aware that there are, unfortunately, as you mentioned, Tor 
and suchlike ways to very cleverly evade any level of detection. The 
advice that I have had from agencies is that still being able to determine 
patterns of behaviour through access to data, even if it is to get feels of 
where they are setting up their blockages, gives a pattern of particular 
behaviour.178 
Cost 
5.188 A range of individuals and organisations – particularly C/CSPs – raised concerns 
in regard to the potential costs that any data retention regime could impose on 
C/CSPs and consumers of telecommunications services. 
5.189 Telstra told the Committee that mandatory data retention would impose costs on 
C/CSPs: 
Telstra believes that the costs involved in any new data creation and 
retention regime will be significant and we will need to undertake large 
scale and detailed technical feasibility studies in order to understand 
what network, IT, vendor changes would be necessary and the costs of 
implementation and compliance with any new data creation and retention 
regime.179 
5.190 However, Telstra also noted that: 
…it is impossible for Telstra to speculate on the significant costs or 
timeframes for compliance until Government has settled on the final form 
of any data retention regime.180 
5.191 Mr Bruce Arnold, a lecturer in privacy law at the University of Canberra but 
submitting in a private capacity, discussed the reasons why mandatory data 
retention would impose costs on C/CSPs: 
It involves substantial costs for connectivity providers and content hosts 
in the public and private sectors (eg mobile phone service providers, 
webhosting services, libraries and universities) that are being asked to act 
as agents of the state. The network management systems used by those 
organisations typically feature billing and customer support facets. They 
are not concerned with long-term data storage, particularly storage in 
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forms that can be readily parsed by government agencies. Restructuring 
those systems to provide storage is non-trivial. Its implications involve a 
reduction of competition in the ISP sector, driving small ISPs out of 
business, and imposing a tangible regulatory burden on entrants to the 
social network service market along with other entities whose clients 
engage in electronic communication.181 
5.192 EFA was similarly concerned about the costs to ISPs: 
ISPs log certain types of data as part of their normal operations and for 
the purposes of billing or providing other services. However, maintaining 
records of all accessible data for long periods of time, as well as servicing 
law enforcement requests to access the data, would impose costs far 
above those of normal operations.182 
5.193 EFA also raised the cost estimates of UK C/CSPs in relation to the UK data 
retention scheme, and that these costs would inevitably be passed on to 
consumers: 
According to the UK Internet Service Providers’ Association one large 
UK-based ISP estimated that it would cost £26m a year to set up a data 
retention system along with £9m a year in running costs. These are costs 
that would inevitably be passed directly on to Australian businesses and 
consumers in the form of higher connectivity and other service charges.183 
5.194 AMTA and the Communications Alliance, basing their estimates on a data set 
similar to that of the EU Directive, attempted to quantify the likely  setup costs to 
industry: 
In terms of setup costs industry estimates place the cost of capture and 
retention at close to one hundred million dollars. If the source and 
destination IP addresses were to be included in the capture and retain 
requirement the setup costs would be likely to approach a figure in the 
region of five hundred to seven hundred million dollars ($500 million - 
$700 million). The inclusion of a single additional data element has the 
potential to increase the capture and retention cost by tens of millions of 
dollars.184 
5.195 Mr Nazer commented on the disproportionate effect mandatory data retention 
would have on smaller providers: 
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Smaller providers may not yet have the infrastructure to store the 
additional data. Large scale data storage requires expensive hardware, 
software, and data security expertise. This burden would be especially 
devastating to online service providers (such as social networking sites) 
that would not otherwise track the source data of communications. 
Moreover, many such companies are small start-ups and compete against 
companies from all over the world. Ultimately, the burden of data 
preservation could drive smaller communications companies out of 
business and send innovation overseas.185 
5.196 At a public hearing, iiNet discussed the likely costs it would incur as a smaller 
provider. Basing this estimate on several assumptions, including that internet 
browsing data would be retained and that the volume of data generated by 
internet browsing will continue to increase at current rates: 
We believe $20 million for the IT equipment and $10 million for the data 
centre building. That is to meet current levels. If we amortise the 
hardware over two years and the data centre over ten years, we estimate a 
cost of about $1 million per month, plus power and overheads.186 
5.197 Furthermore, Mr Dalby elaborated on the costs iiNet, and its customers, were 
likely to incur: 
…assuming that we are efficient about it, we would still need, because of 
the growth in traffic, to double that to cater for two years, and we are 
therefore looking at something more like $60 million for a start. That 
flows through to our customers. If we take that cost and determine what 
it will cost our customers when we pass it through, we are assuming an 
increase in the cost of a service—any one of our services—of about $5 per 
month. That would be an increase to our customers.187 
5.198 Telstra advised the Committee that even larger providers will incur significant 
costs as a result of mandatory data retention: 
There are significant costs involved in all of this. There is a variety of 
costs. There is the cost of collating the data: collecting it off the network to 
begin with. Then there is the cost of putting it into storage. Then we have 
the cost of putting the security around that such that we have the integrity 
of the data in terms of the privacy of the customers and also the integrity 
of the data for evidentiary reasons for the agencies. Then we have the cost 
of making that data available to the agencies in a form that they can use 
for their investigations. Then, not to be overlooked—and it can be a 
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significant cost—at the end of the whole life cycle of this we have the cost 
of construction of that data in a way in which the customers and others 
can be sure that we are looking after their interests. Equally, on the other 
side—and I do not think that this is a point should be lost in the debate 
here—is that the agencies themselves will face significant costs in that 
they will have costs of accessing that data and then manipulating and 
investigating it in a way that makes it usable for them and also their own 
destruction costs at the end of the process.188 
5.199 Vodafone commented that the costs expand significantly when URLs or internet 
browsing data needs to be captured and retained: 
In the case of data, the problem with data in this space is that a data 
stream can cover a whole number of URLs, a whole number of places you 
go onto the web. In location terms, if you are talking just about the cell, 
that is manageable; if you are talking about location within the cell and 
you are asking us to capture that data, that is an enormous expense. If it is 
as simple as a data session occurred and maybe if it went to the first URL 
then that is manageable. It would be expensive but it would be 
manageable. It if it was every single URL they went to, the amount of data 
that was used in particular downloading events and similarly with the 
location, that is when the costs across all your categories increase 
dramatically and capture becomes extremely expensive—actually having 
the systems to get information for the agencies that we would not 
otherwise be interested in storing or capturing.189 
5.200 Similarly, iiNet noted that there is a big difference between capturing data 
relating to internet telephony and other internet services: 
…when iiNet provide a telephony service to a customer we have a similar 
range of information available to us. Whether we are providing that 
service over a conventional copper loop or via an internet service, we 
know the IP address of our customer making the call. When we start 
shifting into other internet content, if we provide that service via a mobile 
phone and we resell services from Vodafone's network and Optus's 
network, then all we see from those carriers is that our customer used the 
internet for an unstated purpose generally—there is a little exception to 
that. All we see as the reseller is that they used it for an unstated purpose 
and moved a certain amount of data. So we know that our customer did 
something, we do not know what they did. We do not know what website 
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they connected to; we do not know what they downloaded; we just know 
that access happened.190 
5.201 Furthermore, a large part of these costs were not in retaining data, but rather in 
generating and retrieving the data to begin with, as much of the data to be 
retained in not currently captured for business purposes.  According to Telstra: 
The storage of data is one of the lesser elements of the cost, although it 
does give rise, as I have said, to the privacy and security risks to protect 
that data and, not least, to protect its integrity also. But, certainly, the 
costs—for the system to retrieve it and to then create a way of retaining it 
and then making it accessible and then on the other side, the agency side, 
creating the ability for them to access, understand and use it—would be 
substantial, in our view.191 
5.202 Ms Gray expressed a concern that potentially increased costs to consumers could 
‘deprive people of lower socio-economic backgrounds’ of their ability to connect 
to the internet.192 
5.203 In order to prevent any data retention regime negatively impacting C/CSPs and 
consumers, AMTA and the Communications Alliance noted their preference was 
for government to pay: 
…so far as data retention is concerned, we believe that any move down 
the track of additional data retention requirements should be based on 
full cost-recovery from government, just as is occurring today in the 
UK.193 
5.204 Similarly, the Australian Interactive Media Industry Association recommended: 
The costs of fulfilling law enforcement requests should be met by the law 
enforcement authorities that request the information, and not directly or 
indirectly on service users.194 
Committee comment 
5.205 The Committee received a great deal of evidence on the issue of a mandatory 
data retention regime. In addition to the public evidence presented in this 
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chapter, the Committee took classified evidence. Both the public and the 
classified evidence have informed the Committee’s consideration of this issue. 
5.206 Throughout its deliberations, the Committee has grappled with the issue of how 
best to reconcile the important national security interests which, the agencies 
were unanimous, would be served by an appropriate mandatory data retention 
regime, and on the other hand with the very significant alteration of the 
relationship between the state and the citizen, which the introduction of such a 
regime would arguably involve. As well, the Committee has had to approach this 
task in the absence of any draft legislation, which would have enabled it to focus 
its consideration with greater precision. This was a serious constraint upon the 
capacity of the Committee to form recommendations. 
5.207 There is no doubt that the enactment of a mandatory data retention regime 
would be of significant utility to the national security agencies in the 
performance of their intelligence, counter-terrorism and law enforcement 
functions. As well, it is clear that changes in the data retention practices of 
telecommunications providers mean that much data which was previously 
retained, in particular for billing purposes, is no longer retained; this has resulted 
in an actual degradation in the investigative capabilities of the national security 
agencies, which is likely to accelerate in the future. 
5.208 However, the utility of such a regime to the national security agencies is not the 
only consideration. A mandatory data retention regime raises fundamental 
privacy issues, and is arguably a significant extension of the power of the state 
over the citizen. No such regime should be enacted unless those privacy and civil 
liberties concerns are sufficiently addressed. 
5.209 Ultimately, the choice between these two fundamental public values is a decision 
for Government to make. 
5.210 The Committee would have been in a better position to assess the merits of such 
a scheme, and the public better placed to comment, had draft legislation been 
provided to it.  
5.211 There is a diversity of views within the Committee as to whether there should be 
a mandatory data retention regime. This is ultimately a decision for Government. 
If the Government is persuaded that a mandatory data retention regime should 
proceed, the Committee recommends that the Government publish an exposure 
draft of any legislation and refer it to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security for examination. Any draft legislation should include 
the following features: 
 any mandatory data retention regime should apply only to meta-data and 
exclude content; 
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 the controls on access to communications data remain the same as under the 
current regime; 
 internet browsing data should be explicitly excluded; 
 where information includes content that cannot be separated from data, the 
information should be treated as content and therefore a warrant would be 
required for lawful access; 
 the data should be stored securely by making encryption mandatory; 
 save for existing provisions enabling agencies to retain data for a longer 
period of time, data retained under a new regime should be for no more than 
two years; 
 the costs incurred by providers should be reimbursed by the Government;  
 a robust, mandatory data breach notification scheme; 
 an independent audit function be established within an appropriate agency to 
ensure that communications content is not stored by telecommunications 
service providers; and 
 oversight of agencies’ access to telecommunications data by the ombudsmen 
and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
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Recommendation 42 
 There is a diversity of views within the Committee as to whether there 
should be a mandatory data retention regime. This is ultimately a 
decision for Government. If the Government is persuaded that a 
mandatory data retention regime should proceed, the Committee 
recommends that the Government publish an exposure draft of any 
legislation and refer it to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security for examination. Any draft legislation should 
include the following features: 
 any mandatory data retention regime should apply only to 
meta-data and exclude content; 
 the controls on access to communications data remain the same 
as under the current regime; 
 internet browsing data should be explicitly excluded; 
 where information includes content that cannot be separated 
from data, the information should be treated as content and 
therefore a warrant would be required for lawful access; 
 the data should be stored securely by making encryption 
mandatory; 
 save for existing provisions enabling agencies to retain data 
for a longer period of time, data retained under a new regime 
should be for no more than two years; 
 the costs incurred by providers should be reimbursed by the 
Government;  
 a robust, mandatory data breach notification scheme; 
 an independent audit function be established within an 
appropriate agency to ensure that communications content is 
not stored by telecommunications service providers; and 
 oversight of agencies’ access to telecommunications data by 
the ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security. 
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Recommendation 43 
 The Committee recommends that, if the Government is persuaded that a 
mandatory data retention regime should proceed:  
 there should be a mechanism for oversight of the scheme by 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security; 
 there should be an annual report on the operation of this 
scheme presented to Parliament; and 
 the effectiveness of the regime be reviewed by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
three years after its commencement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hon Anthony Byrne MP 
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INTRODUCTION  
At the forefront of the Government’s commitment to Australia is protecting our national 
security. In recent years terrorism has been an enduring national security threat. The world 
and our region have suffered numerous major attacks. And significant terrorist plots have 
been foiled on our soil. We have developed significant national security capability in the 
fight against terrorism and other enduring threats such as espionage, serious and organised 
crime, and cyber crime. Our challenge is to ensure that, as Australia evolves as a 21st century 
society and economy, our national security capability similarly evolves with high levels of 
agility and adaptability and continues to meet emerging threats.  
As Australia advances, so too do threats to our wellbeing. Meeting the challenges of new 
technologies and methodologies is a key priority for the Australian Government in the 
national security sphere. Our law enforcement and security capabilities must keep ahead of 
terrorists, agents of espionage and organised criminals who threaten our national security 
and the safety of our citizens. So our law enforcement and intelligence agencies must be 
equipped with contemporary skills and technologies, and backed by necessary powers – 
coupled with the appropriate checks and balances and oversight mechanisms society rightly 
demands.  
This package of reform proposals, which comprises telecommunications interception 
reform, telecommunications sector security reform and Australian intelligence community 
reform, seeks to do just that. The common thread of national security runs through the 
proposals, which seek to respond to threats from international state and non‐state based 
actors, terrorism, serious and organised crime and cyber crime.  
Just as technology and methodology employed by terrorists, agents of espionage and 
organised criminals adapts and advances so too must the capabilities and powers of our law 
enforcement and security agencies.  In the absence of action, significant intelligence and 
evidence collection capabilities will be lost providing criminal elements with a technological 
upper hand. 
Telecommunications interception reform recognises that there are significant challenges 
facing intelligence and law enforcement agencies in accessing communications, particularly 
in keeping pace with rapid changes in the telecommunications environment.  New, 
emerging and future technologies impact on the ability of these agencies to access 
communications to collect intelligence and effectively detect and prosecute crimes.  The 
Australian Crime Commission’s Future of Organised Criminality in Australia 2020 assessment 
reveals that access to highly effective software, ciphers and other methodologies are 
increasingly being utilised by organised crime to impede detection by law enforcement. 
Lawful interception, therefore, is the most important tool in the investigation and 
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prosecution of serious and organised and other technology‐enabled crime, and is vital to 
effectively collect security intelligence.   Proposed reforms seek to allow those agencies to 
utilise modern technologies to maintain effective investigative techniques.    
Telecommunications sector security reform seeks to address the national security risks 
posed to Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure.  The security and resilience of such 
infrastructure significantly affects the social and economic well‐being of the nation. While 
advances in technology and communications have resulted in unquestionable benefits to 
society and the economy, they have also introduced significant vulnerabilities, including the 
ability to disrupt, destroy or alter critical infrastructure and the information held on it. As 
Australia’s telecommunications landscape continues to evolve, it is appropriate and timely 
to consider how best to manage risks to the data carried and stored on our 
telecommunications infrastructure to secure its availability and integrity in the long term. 
The ideas included in this discussion paper build on consultation with industry earlier in 
2012 about the most effective way to manage national security risks to telecommunications 
infrastructure.    
Australian intelligence agencies have made a significant contribution to our safety by 
constant and careful assessment of possible threats.  At least four planned terrorist attacks 
designed to achieve mass casualties on Australian soil have been thwarted by agencies since 
11 September 2001.  To continue this crucial role, it is imperative that Australia’s 
intelligence agencies remain robust and can effectively deal with the challenges presented 
by today’s and tomorrow’s international security environment. Following the 2008 Report 
of the Review of Homeland and Border Security conducted by Mr Ric Smith AO PSM, the 
Attorney‐General’s Department has worked with relevant agencies to determine the powers 
required to deal with current and future national security challenges. Australian intelligence 
community reform is about appropriately equipping and enhancing the operational 
capabilities of these agencies.   
This Discussion Paper contains the terms of reference for the PJCIS inquiry at Chapter One, 
followed by chapters on each of the proposals which comprise the package of proposals.  
Chapter Two, ‘Interception and the TIA Act’, deals with telecommunications interception 
reform and outlines the problems facing law enforcement and intelligence agencies that 
have arisen from the operation of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979. Chapter Three, ‘Telecommunications Sector Security Reform’ considers possible 
amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997 to establish a risk based regulatory 
framework to better manage national security challenges to Australia’s telecommunications 
infrastructure. Chapter Four considers ideas for reform of the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001. 
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Although the package is referred to the PJCIS in its totality, in considering the ideas the 
Attorney‐General has organised the proposals in three separate groupings: those the 
Government wishes to progress, those the Government is considering, and those on which 
the Government expressly seeks the PJCIS’ views. Chapter One elaborates on the content of 
each group.  Chapters Two, Three and Four refer to the groups within which the ideas sit, as 
determined by the Terms of Reference. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
TERMS OF REFERENCE ‐ INQUIRY INTO POTENTIAL 
REFORMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION 
Having regard to: 
• the desirability of comprehensive, consistent and workable laws and practices to 
protect the security and safety of Australia, its citizens and businesses,  
• the need to ensure that intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies are 
equipped to effectively perform their functions and cooperate effectively in today’s and 
tomorrow’s technologically advanced and globalised environment, and  
• the fact that national security brings shared responsibilities to the government and the 
private sector: 
 
1) The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is to inquire into 
potential reforms of National Security Legislation, as set out in the attachment and 
which include proposals relating to the: 
a) Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
b) Telecommunications Act 1997 
c) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
d) Intelligence Services Act 2001 
 
2) The inquiry should consider the effectiveness and implications of the proposals to 
ensure law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies can meet: 
a) the challenges of new and emerging technologies upon agencies’ capabilities  
b) the requirements of a modern intelligence and security agency legislative 
framework, and to enhance cooperation between agencies, and 
c) the need for enhancements to the security of the telecommunications sector. 
 
3) The Committee should have regard to whether the proposed responses: 
a) contain appropriate safeguards for protecting the human rights and privacy of 
individuals and are proportionate to any threat to national security and the security 
of the Australian private sector 
b) apply reasonable obligations upon the telecommunications industry whilst at the 
same time minimising cost and impact on business operations in the 
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telecommunications sector and the potential for follow on effects to consumers, the 
economy and international competition, and 
c) will address law enforcement reduction of capabilities from new technologies and 
business environment, which has a flow‐on effect to security agencies. 
 
4) The Committee should take account of the interests of the broad range of stakeholders 
including through a range of public, in camera and classified hearings. 
 
5) The Committee should provide a written report on each of the three elements of the 
National Security Legislation referral to the Attorney‐General. 
 
The National Security Legislation the subject of the inquiry has three different elements and 
Objectives.  They relate to: 
• modernising lawful access to communications and associated communications data 
• mitigating the risks posed to Australia’s communications networks by certain foreign 
technology and service suppliers, and 
• enhancing the operational capacity of Australian intelligence community agencies. 
 
The proposals across the three different packages are separated into three different 
groupings: 
A.  those the Government wishes to progress 
B.  those the Government is considering progressing, and 
C.  those on which the Government is expressly seeking the views of the PJCIS. 
 
A ‐ Government wishes to progress the following proposals: 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
1. Strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections under the lawful access to 
communications regime in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 (the TIA Act).  This would include the examination of: 
a. the legislation’s privacy protection objective  
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b. the proportionality tests for issuing of warrants 
c. mandatory record‐keeping standards 
d. oversight arrangements by the Commonwealth and State Ombudsmen 
2. Reforming the lawful access to communications regime. This would include:  
a. reducing the number of agencies eligible to access communications 
information 
b. the standardisation of warrant tests and thresholds 
3. Streamlining and reducing complexity in the lawful access to communications 
regime. This would include: 
a. simplifying the information sharing provisions that allow agencies to 
cooperate  
b. removing legislative duplication 
 
4. Modernising the TIA Act’s cost sharing framework to:  
a. align industry interception assistance with industry regulatory policy 
b. clarify ACMA’s regulatory and enforcement role 
 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
5. Amending the ASIO Act to modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant provisions 
a.  to update the definition of ‘computer’ in section 25A 
b. Enabling warrants to be varied by the AG, simplifying the renewal of the 
warrants process and extending duration of search warrants from 90 days to 
6 months. 
6. Modernising ASIO Act employment provisions by:  
a. providing for officers to be employed under a concept of a ‘level,’ rather than 
holding an ‘office.’ 
b. Making the differing descriptions (‘officer,’ ‘employee’ and ‘staff’) denoting 
persons as an ‘employee’ consistent 
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c. Modernising the Director‐General’s powers in relation to employment terms 
and conditions 
d. Removing an outdated employment provision (section 87 of the ASIO Act) 
e. Providing additional scope for further secondment arrangements 
 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 
7. Amending the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to clarify the Defence Imagery and 
Geospatial Organisation’s authority to provide assistance to approved bodies. 
 
B.  Government is considering the following proposals: 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
8. Streamlining and reducing complexity in the lawful access to communications regime 
– this would include:  
a. Creating a single warrant with multiple TI powers 
 
9. Modernising the Industry assistance framework –  
a. Implement detailed requirements for industry interception obligations 
b. extend the regulatory regime to ancillary service providers not currently 
covered by the legislation  
c. implement a three‐tiered industry participation model  
 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
10. Amending the ASIO Act to create an authorised intelligence operations scheme. This 
will provide ASIO officers and human sources with protection from criminal and civil 
liability for certain conduct in the course of authorised intelligence operations. 
 
11. Amending the ASIO Act  to modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant provisions to:  
a. Establish a named person warrant enabling ASIO to request a single warrant 
specifying multiple (existing) powers against a single target instead of 
requesting multiple warrants against a single target. 
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b. Align surveillance device provisions with the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 
c. Enable the disruption of a target computer for the purposes of a computer 
access warrant 
d. Enable person searches to be undertaken independently of a premises search 
e. Establish classes of persons able to execute warrants 
12. Clarifying ASIO’s ability to cooperate with the private sector.  
13. Amending the ASIO Act to enable ASIO to refer breaches of section 92 of the ASIO 
Act (publishing the identity of an ASIO officer) to authorities for investigation. 
 
C.  Government is expressly seeking the views of the Committee on the following 
matters: 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
14. Reforming the Lawful Access Regime 
a. expanding the basis of interception activities 
 
15. Modernising the Industry assistance framework   
a. establish an offence for failure to assist in the decryption of communications 
b. institute industry response timelines 
c. tailored data retention periods for up to 2 years for parts of a data set, with 
specific timeframes taking into account agency priorities, and privacy and 
cost impacts  
 
Telecommunications Act 1997 
16. Amending the Telecommunications Act to address security and resilience risks posed 
to the telecommunications sector. This would be achieved by: 
a. by instituting obligations on the Australian telecommunications industry to 
protect their networks from unauthorised interference 
b. by instituting obligations to provide Government with information on 
significant business and procurement decisions and network designs 
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c. Creating targeted powers for Government to mitigate and remediate security 
risks with the costs to be borne by providers 
d. Creating appropriate enforcement powers and pecuniary penalties 
 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
17. Amending the ASIO Act to modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant provisions by:  
a. Using third party computers and communications in transit to access a target 
computer under a computer access warrant. 
b. Clarifying that the incidental power in the search warrant provision 
authorises access to third party premises to execute a warrant 
c. Clarifying that reasonable force may be used at any time during the execution 
of a warrant, not just on entry. 
d. Introducing an evidentiary certificate regime. 
 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 
18. Amending the Intelligence Services Act to: 
a. Add a new ministerial authorisation ground where the Minister is satisfied 
that a person is, or is likely to be, involved in intelligence or counter‐
intelligence activities.   
b. Enable the Minister of an Agency under the IS Act to authorise specified 
activities which may involve producing intelligence on an Australian person or 
persons where the Agency is cooperating with ASIO in the performance of an 
ASIO function pursuant to a section 13A arrangement.  A Ministerial 
Authorisation will not replace the need to obtain a warrant where one is 
currently required. 
c. Enable ASIS to provide training in self‐defence and the use of weapons to a 
person cooperating with ASIS. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERCEPTION AND THE TIA ACT  
1. Introduction 
The primary objective of the current legislation governing access to communications is to 
protect the privacy of users of telecommunications services in Australia by prohibiting 
covert access to communications except as authorised in the circumstances set out in the 
TIA Act.    
The exceptions to the general prohibition against interception recognise the need for 
national security and law enforcement agencies to access the information necessary to 
protect community safety and security.  The limited focus of the exceptions reflects 
Parliament’s concern to balance the competing right of individuals to freely express their 
thoughts with the right of individuals to live in a society free from threat to personal safety.    
Interception of telecommunications content and data is a powerful and cost effective tool 
for law enforcement and security agencies to reduce threats to national security and to 
assist in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences.1  Access to interception is 
tightly regulated and, in relation to content, is limited to the investigation of serious 
offences under the authority of an independently issued warrant and subject to a range of 
oversight and accountability measures.   
However, the interception regime provided by the current Act reflects the use of 
telecommunications and the structure of the telecommunications industry that existed in 
1979 when the Act was made.  Many of these assumptions no longer apply, creating 
significant challenges for agencies in using and maintaining their investigative capabilities 
under the Act. 
In the absence of urgent reform, agencies will lose the ability to effectively access 
telecommunications, thereby significantly diminishing the collective ability to detect, 
investigate and prosecute threats to security and criminal activity.  
The Government is therefore considering the need for a new interception regime that 
better reflects the contemporary communications environment and is seeking the views of 
the Committee on the content of that regime.  Priority issues for consideration by the 
Committee are set out in the Terms of Reference, grouped into: 
                                                            
1 See Report of the Review of the regulation of access to communications (2005) (the Blunn Report) at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Pages/Blunnreportofthereviewoftheregulationofaccesstocommunications
August2005.aspx  
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• Matters the Government wishes to progress; 
o Examining the legislation’s privacy protection objective, the proportionality 
test for issuing warrants, mandatory record‐keeping standards, and oversight 
arrangements by the Commonwealth and State Ombudsmen 
o Reducing the number of agencies eligible to access communications 
information 
o Standardising warrant tests and thresholds 
o Simplifying the information sharing provisions that allow agencies to 
cooperate 
o Removing legislative duplication 
o Aligning industry interception assistance with industry regulatory policy 
o Clarifying the AMCA’s regulatory and enforcement role 
• Matters the Government is considering 
o Creating a single warrant with multiple TI powers 
o Implementing detailed requirements for industry interception obligations 
o Extending the regulatory regime to ancillary service providers not currently 
covered by the legislation 
o Implementing a three‐tiered industry participation model; and  
• Matters on which the Government expressly seeks the views of the Committee. 
o Expanding the basis of interception activities 
o Establishing an offence for failure to assist in the decryption of 
communications 
o Instituting industry response timelines 
o Applying tailored data retention periods for up to 2 years for parts of a data 
set, with specific timeframes taking into account agency priorities and privacy 
and cost impacts 
This chapter of the discussion paper describes the role played by access to communications 
content and data in protecting the community from threats to security and serious crime, 
summarises the key features of the current legislative regime and the challenges it is facing.  
The chapter concludes by suggesting that, to achieve a legislative regime that is effective in 
the contemporary communications environment, reforms may be developed to: 
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• Strengthen the safeguards and privacy protections  of the interception regime in line 
with contemporary community expectations; 
• Reform the lawful access regime for agencies;  
• Streamline and reduce complexity in the lawful access regime; and  
• Modernise the cost sharing framework.  
1.1 Effectiveness of lawful covert access to communications  
Lawful interception and access to telecommunications data are cost‐effective investigative 
tools that support and complement information derived from other methods.   
In 2010‐2011 there were 2441 arrests, 3168 prosecutions (2848 for serious offences) and 
2034 convictions (1854 for serious offences) based on lawfully intercepted material.2  Law 
enforcement agencies made 91 arrests, 33 prosecutions and obtained 33 convictions based 
on evidence obtained under stored communications warrants.3   
These figures may underestimate the effectiveness of interception because a conviction can 
be recorded without entering the intercepted material into evidence.4 Interception also 
allows agencies to identify criminal connections, co‐conspirators and organised crime 
associates and assists in establishing the methodology of criminal enterprises. It also plays 
an important role in identifying child exploitation material, sexual slavery and terrorist 
organisations.  The figures are specific to law enforcement agencies and do not take into 
account the use of intercepted information by ASIO in carrying out its functions (which is 
reflected in ASIO’s classified annual report).   
Telecommunications data is commonly the first source of important lead information for 
further investigations and often provides a unique and comprehensive insight into the 
behaviour of persons of interest.  
1.2 The national security environment 
Under the TIA Act, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) can ask the 
Attorney‐General to issue an interception warrant in order to investigate activities 
prejudicial to security or to collect foreign intelligence. 
Australia is, and will remain, a terrorist target for the foreseeable future with jihadist 
terrorism being the most immediate threat.5  The threat of a terrorist attack in Australia or 
14 
                                                            
2 AGD, TIA Act Report for the year ending 30 June 2011, p. 46. 
3 AGD, TIA Act Report for the year ending 30 June 2011, p. 60. 
4 AGD, TIA Act Report for the year ending 30 June 2011, p. 47. 
5 ASIO, ASIO Report to Parliament 2010‐11, p. xviii. 
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against Australian interests overseas remains real.6  Since 2001, four mass casualty attacks 
within Australia have been disrupted because of the joint work of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies.7   
Since 2001, 38 people have been prosecuted in Australia as a result of counter‐terrorism 
operations and 22people have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (the Criminal Code).8 
Intercepted information has played an important role in recent counter‐terrorism 
prosecutions and  in preventing planned terrorist attacks.  In 2008, several men who faced 
trial in Melbourne were convicted of being a member of a terrorist organisation.  The 
evidence that the group was engaged in preparing or fostering a terrorist act was largely 
contained in 482 intercepted conversations that were put before the jury.  Some of these 
communications were covertly recorded in the home of the organisation’s leader.  
While terrorism is a key issue, the ASIO Report to Parliament 2010‐11 notes that espionage 
is an enduring security threat to Australia, both through the traditional form of suborning 
persons to assist foreign intelligence agencies and new forms such as cyber espionage.  
Nation states, as well as disaffected individuals and groups, are able to use computer 
networks to view or siphon sensitive, private or classified information for the purpose of 
espionage, political, diplomatic or commercial advantage.  As the actors involved undertake 
this activity within ‘cyberspace’, the lawful interception of their communications is often a 
crucial aspect of any investigation aiming to resolve the nature of the activity and the 
identity of the perpetrators.   
1.3 Serious offences and serious contraventions – Commonwealth and State 
The precursor to the TIA Act focused on national security but with the emerging national 
drug crisis in the 1970s the current Act was passed to ensure that interception powers were 
also available to the Australian Federal Police to investigate narcotic offences.  Since its 
enactment the TIA Act has been amended to allow a broader range of law enforcement 
agencies to intercept communications to investigate other serious offences.   
Under the TIA Act, serious offences generally include Commonwealth, State and Territory 
offences punishable by imprisonment for seven years or more.  Particular examples of 
serious offences for which interception can be obtained are murder, kidnapping and 
offences involving serious personal injury.  There are also a range of other offences defined 
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6 ASIO, ASIO Report to Parliament 2010‐11, p. ix. 
7ASIO, ASIO Report to Parliament 2010‐11, pp. xviii, 5. 
8 PM&C, Counter‐Terrorism White Paper, 2010, p. 7. 
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as serious offences in the TIA Act where the use of the Australian telecommunications 
system is integral to the investigation of the offence.9 
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology (the AIC), in 2010 there were 260 
victims of homicide in Australia. There were also: 
• 171,083 victims of assaults,  
• 17,757 victims of sexual assaults; and  
• 14,582 victims of robberies10 
1.4 Organised crime  
An interception warrant can also be sought to detect, investigate, prevent and prosecute 
persons involved in organised crime.  Serious and organised crime refers to offences that 
involve two or more offenders, require substantial planning and organisation and the use of 
sophisticated methods and techniques and are committed in conjunction with other serious 
offences.   
The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) in its 2010 report Organised Crime in Australia, 
assessed the overall threat to Australia from organised crime as “High”, 11 estimating the 
cost of such crime at $10 to $15 billion per year.12   
The rapid adoption of telecommunications technology and high speed broadband internet 
has the potential to increase high‐tech crime in Australia, including both the use of 
technology to facilitate traditional crime and specific crimes directed at information and 
communication technologies.13  High tech crime covers a range of offences such as identity 
crime, sales of illicit products, credit card fraud, money laundering and child exploitation 
material.  
The individuals involved in many of these activities are highly sophisticated in their 
operations using multiple technologies and frequently changing their methodology to avoid 
detection.  Their adaptiveness means that the tools available under the interception regime 
provide the only investigative technique capable of identifying and disrupting their 
activities, many of which are conducted at the global level.   
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9 See s 5D of the TIA Act. 
10 AIC 2011Australian crime:Facts & figures  http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/0/B/6/%7B0B619F44‐B18B‐
47B4‐9B59‐F87BA643CBAA%7Dfacts11.pdf, p2.  
11 ACC, Organised Crime in Australia 2011, 
http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/OCA/2011/oca2011.pdf, p. 7. 
12 ACC, Organised Crime in Australia 2011, p. 3. 
13 ACC, Organised Crime in Australia 2011, p. 25. 
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Over the past 18 months, information obtained through interception activities in relation to 
a single money laundering investigation has helped the AFP to arrest 35 offenders and to 
seize 421 kilograms of drugs and over $8,000,000 in cash.   
Many transnational crimes, such as money laundering, also pose a threat to Australia’s 
national security interests with clear links between the proceeds of such crimes and the 
funding of terrorist activities overseas.   
1.5 Fundamentals of the current Act  
Research suggests that access to and the use of intercepted information will continue to 
play an important role in supporting the functions of national security and law enforcement 
agencies. The conduct of national security and law enforcement investigations 
demonstrates that lawful interception is a critical capability that cannot be replaced by 
other investigative methods.   
In the thirty years since its inception, the TIA Act has been able to accommodate emerging 
threats and changes in criminal behaviour because the legislation does not limit the concept 
of interception to a particular technology (such as a telephone).  By couching the Act this 
way the currency of the legislation has been maintained through amendments that have 
clarified the application of the Act as the telecommunications environment and what is 
necessary for agencies to properly protect the community have changed.   
Towards a new approach 
The pace of change in the last decade has meant the Act has required frequent amendment 
resulting in duplication and complexity that makes the Act difficult to navigate and which 
creates the risk that the law will not be applied as Parliament intended.     
Much of the need to amend the TIA Act stems from the contextual foundations of the Act.  
Many of those foundations no longer apply, creating significant challenges for agencies to 
maintain current investigative capabilities.  Agencies continue to adapt their capabilities 
within the constraints of the current legal framework but this has not ameliorated the 
impact of the rapid changes in the telecommunications environment and the ability of 
agencies to access communications.  
In recent years there have been significant advancements in technology and changes to 
industry structure, practices and consumer behaviour.  The communications landscape of 
the 1970s which was dominated by a single provider and focused on communications made 
by telephone no longer exists.  
The magnitude of change to the telecommunications environment suggests that further 
piecemeal amendments to the existing Act will not be sufficient.  Rather, holistic reform that 
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reassesses the current assumptions is needed in order to establish a new foundation for the 
interception regime that reflects contemporary practice.   
Telecommunications in 2012 
When the TIA Act was enacted, an agency could expect that it would be able to lawfully 
intercept most, if not all, of a person’s communications.  Today, changes in the way 
communications technology is delivered and used mean that the expectation is much lower.   
At the end of June 2011, there were 287 fixed‐line telephone service providers, three 
mobile network operators, 176 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers, 33 
satellite providers and 97 Internet Service Providers (only including ISPs with at least 1000 
subscribers).14  
Together they provided 29.28 million mobile services and 10.54 million fixed‐line telephone 
services and supported some 10.9 million internet subscribers.15  Around 12.7 million 
Australians (69% of the population) had access to a broadband internet connection at home, 
while around 3.9 million Australians (21% of the population) accessed the internet from 
their mobile phone.16 
Australian consumers are increasingly accessing multiple technologies and services to 
communicate.  As at June 2011, 57% of Australians were using at least three 
communications technologies (fixed‐line telephone, mobile phone and internet) and 26% of 
adults were using at least four communications technologies (fixed line telephone, mobile 
phone, VOIP and the internet).17   
There has also been a trend towards high speed internet services, with the proportion of 
internet subscribers on services of eight megabits per second or more increasing from 26% 
to 33% in 2009‐10.18  The increase in internet speed has resulted in a rise in data 
downloads.  The average user downloaded 25.1 gigabytes of data in the June quarter of 
2011, 56% more than in the June quarter of 2010.19  
In the June 2011 quarter, Australians downloaded 274,202 terabytes of data from fixed‐line 
wireless internet services, an increase of 76% from the June 2010 quarter.  Fixed‐line 
broadband accounted for 254,947 terabytes (around 93%), while wireless broadband 
18 
                                                            
14 ACMA, Communications report 2010‐11, p. 24. 
15 ACMA, Communications report 2010‐11, p. 25. 
16 ACMA, Communications Report 2010‐11, p. 18. 
17 ACMA, Communications report 2010‐11, p. 153. 
18 ACMA, Communications Report 2009‐10, p. 15. 
19 ACMA, Communications Report 2010‐11, p. 17. 
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accounted for 19,194 terabytes (around 7%).  There was an additional 3,695 terabytes of 
data downloaded on mobile handsets in the June 2011, an increase of 415% on the June 
2010 quarter.20 
Along with the increased use of multiple technologies, mobile phones are becoming a ‘truly 
converged consumer device’.21  The availability of iPhone and Smartphone technology has 
allowed handset models to offer a number of services including voice, SMS, internet access, 
email, e‐payment, video, music, photography, GPS, VOIP and access to social networking 
sites.  In 2010, smartphones represented 43% of all mobile phones sold in Australia.22  
Increased network coverage, speed and availability have allowed consumers to access VOIP 
services more effectively.  This technology involves communicating and transporting voice 
messages over the internet, rather than via the public switched telephone network. VOIP is 
available on many smartphones and internet devices, so mobile phone users can make calls 
or send text messages over the internet.  VOIP usage in Australia has increased from 2.9 
million users in June 2010 to 3.8 million users in June 2011.23  In the year leading up to June 
2011, mobile VOIP usage increased by 226%, with 274,000 users in June 2011.24   
Social media use has also increased, resulting in more user generated content and providing 
alternative communication channels to traditional voice services. During June 2011, 8.6 
million Australians accessed online social network sites from home, compared to 8.0 million 
during July 2010.25   
These trends are expected to continue.  In addition, the implementation of the NBN is likely 
to increase the amount of material that can be accessed through telecommunications 
devices, encourage competition and technological and service innovation, and drive further 
industry restructuring.  Work on the NBN rollout is planned to commence in over 1500 
communities and pass 3.5 million premises throughout Australia by 30 June 2015 and is 
scheduled to be completed by 2021.26   
19 
                                                            
20 ACMA, Communications Report 2010‐11, p. 26. 
21 ACMA, Communications report 2009‐10, p. 147. 
22 The Australian, ‘Apple’s iPhone leads Australia’s huge smartphone growth’, 15 March 2011,  
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian‐it/apples‐iphone‐leads‐australias‐huge‐smartphone‐
growth/story‐e6frgakx‐1226021287594  
23 ACMA, Communications report 2010‐11, p. 25. 
24 ACMA, Communications report 2010‐11, p. 16. 
25 ACMA, Communications report 2010‐11, p. 26. 
26 NBN Co. Media Release, 29 March 2012 at http://www.nbnco.com.au/news‐and‐events/news/nbn‐co‐
announces‐three‐year‐rollout‐plan.html 
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Legacy assumptions 
The complexity of the contemporary communications environment is not reflected in the 
current interception regime which instead assumes that: 
1. Communications to be intercepted are easily identified; 
2. A stream of traffic to be intercepted can be isolated from the rest of the 
communications passing over the network; 
3. Carriers and carriage service providers (telecommunications companies and internet 
service providers) control the traffic passing over their networks; 
4. Carriers and carriage service providers are the only entities which control public 
telecommunications networks; 
5. Intercepted communications are easily interpreted or understood; 
6. There are reliable sources of associated communications data that link people with 
identifiers and identifiers to communications; and 
7. A ‘one size’ approach to industry obligations is appropriate. 
These assumptions mean the TIA Act takes a technical approach to defining when an 
interception takes place which was appropriate to the prevailing technologies of the 1960s 
and 1970s but, with the rise of internet protocol communications, now causes uncertainty 
about the scope of the general prohibition against interception and fails to recognise the 
particular demands created by a diverse telecommunications sector.   
2.1 Problems with the current approach 
The limitations created by the assumptions inherent in the TIA Act impact on the capacity of 
agencies to: 
1. Reliably identify communications of interest and to associate them with 
telecommunications services; 
2. Reliably and securely access communications and associated data of interest within 
networks; and  
3. Effectively interpret the communications to extract the intelligence or evidence 
Identifying communications  
The TIA Act is based on an assumption that there is a unique, non‐ambiguous identifier, 
such as a phone number, linking the target of an interception warrant to the service (or 
device) to be intercepted and in turn to the carrier required to give effect to the warrant. 
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However, typically there are no longer clear, one‐to‐one relationships between the target of 
an interception warrant, telecommunications services used by the person, and 
telecommunications service providers because users of telecommunications services may 
have multiple ‘identities’, each of which may only be meaningful to a particular service 
provider.  
Persons seeking to avoid surveillance commonly exploit this situation. 
Access to communications content and communications data 
The TIA Act is also based on the assumption it is possible to reliably access communications 
which are the subject of an interception warrant at a convenient point on a carrier’s 
network through which the data must flow.  This is problematic as most networks are now 
based on Internet protocol (IP).  With this technology users can access communications via 
multiple access technologies (fixed networks, wireless, satellite, etc.), multiple physical 
locations and multiple access service providers, some part of which need not be owned, 
operated or accessible to regulated participants in the telecommunications industry, such as 
carriers and carriage service providers (or C/CSPs).  As a result, communications cannot be 
guaranteed to pass over any particular path and therefore it may be necessary to attempt to 
direct the communications over a particular path to facilitate interception.  
In addition, whereas telecommunications services were once provided by a single carrier, in 
many cases now each communication event typically involves a number of service 
providers.  In a single communications session, a person may access many application 
services such as a Google search engine portal, a webmail account, a Facebook account, and 
an online storage repository.  Each of these services is provided by a different service 
provider under separate subscriber accounts and with different unique subscriber 
‘identities’.  In general, the ISP and the access service providers have no knowledge of the 
application services passing over their infrastructure.  Further, many application service 
providers operate from offshore making the provision of assistance to Australian agencies 
challenging. 
Currently, authorised access to telecommunications data, such as subscriber details, 
generated by carriers for their own business purposes is an important source of information 
for agencies.  As carriers’ business models move to customer billing based on data volumes 
rather than communications events (for example number of phone calls made), the need to 
retain transactional data is diminishing.  Some carriers have already ceased retaining such 
data for their business purposes and it is no longer available to agencies for their 
investigations. 
At least part of the complexity can be ascribed to changes in the telecommunications 
industry.  It is no longer possible to always be able to clearly identify the industry participant 
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with a single target ‘identity’.  The ready availability of anonymous pre‐paid services, inter‐
carrier roaming agreements, resold services, calling cards and on‐line facilities to subscribe 
to new services all make it necessary for agencies to seek data from multiple providers to 
ascertain whether any data exists. 
Interpreting communications and communications data  
All of these variables, particularly when combined with increased data flows and volumes, 
mean it is now extremely complex and costly to reliably identify and access 
communications.   
Furthermore, once a communication has been accessed, its content is not necessarily clear.  
In IP‐based communications, the content of communications is embedded in data packets in 
a form which is not readily able to be reconstructed and interpreted outside of the 
transmitting and receiving terminal devices and the applications running on them.  Data 
used to route, prioritise and facilitate the communications is also embedded along with the 
content, in the communications packets.  This means that agencies must further process 
communications accessed under an interception warrant to extract and reconstruct the 
content. 
The use of encryption and propriety data formats and typically large data volumes, makes 
reconstructing communications into an intelligible form difficult for agencies. 
2.2 Creating a contemporary regime 
In order to preserve the effectiveness of lawful covert access to electronic communications 
as an investigative tool in the face of rapid developments in technology and the 
globalisation of the telecommunications industry, the assumptions underpinning the current 
legislative framework need to be reassessed to ensure they reflect the contemporary 
communications environment.  Realigning the foundations of the regime will address key 
operational challenges.   
Four main areas have been identified as requiring review: 
1. Strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections in line with contemporary 
community expectations;    
2. Reforming the lawful access regime for agencies; 
3. Streamlining and reducing complexity; and 
4. Modernising the cost sharing framework   
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Strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections in line with contemporary 
community expectations 
Historically, the TIA Act has protected the privacy of communications by prohibiting 
interception except as allowed under the Act. 
Over time the position of privacy in the interception regime has been affected by the 
balancing inherent in the Act between protecting privacy and enabling agencies to access 
the information necessary to protect the community.  Where the balance between these 
objectives should lie is left to Parliament to decide.   
The need to amend the Act to adapt to changes in the telecommunications environment has 
seen the range of exceptions to the general prohibition grow.  Accordingly, it may be timely 
to revisit whether the privacy framework within the Act remains appropriate. 
As people’s use and expectations of technology have changed since the TIA Act was enacted 
in 1979, so community views about the types of communications that can be accessed and 
the purposes for which they can be accessed may also have changed.   
Reviewing the current checks, balances and limitations on the operations of interception 
powers will ensure that the privacy needs of contemporary communications users are 
appropriately reflected in the interception regime.   
Consideration is also being given to introducing a privacy focused objects clause that clearly 
underpins this important objective of the legislation and which guides interpretation of 
obligations under the Act.  By taking these steps, the legislation will be positioned to meet 
the objective of protecting the privacy of Australian communications from unlawful access.   
Reforming the lawful access regime 
Telecommunications interception and access to communications data are unique and 
fundamental tools that cannot be replaced by other investigative techniques.  They are cost 
effective, timely, low risk and extremely successful tools in obtaining intelligence and 
evidence.  Substantial and rapid changes in communications technology and the business 
environment are rapidly eroding agencies’ ability to intercept.  Adapting the regime 
governing the lawful access to communications is a fundamental first step in arresting the 
serious decline in agencies’ capabilities.   
The TIA Act provides for four warrants for law enforcement agencies to access content. 
Three warrants relate to accessing real‐time content and one warrant relates to accessing 
‘stored communications’ (which includes emails and text messages accessed from the 
carrier after they have been sent).   
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Real‐time content based warrants are available to 17 Commonwealth and State and 
Territory agencies.  ASIO’s ability to intercept communications supports its functions 
relating to security.  The AFP and State and Territory police forces have access to 
interception powers as part of a nationally consistent approach to combating serious crime.  
The remaining agencies are a mix of agencies whose functions relate to investigating police 
integrity, anti‐corruption and serious and organised crime.   
While traditionally limited to an offence that carries a penalty of at least 7 years’ 
imprisonment (a ‘serious offence’), over time numerous legislative amendments have 
confused the policy in relation to the circumstances in which interception is available.  There 
are occasions where the general penalty threshold is too high to cover a range of offences 
for which it is already recognised that general community standards would expect 
interception to be available.  For example, child exploitation offences and offences that can 
only be effectively investigated by accessing the relevant networks (including offences 
committed using a computer or involving telecommunications networks) do not meet the 
general 7 year imprisonment policy threshold. 
The stored communications regime allows ‘enforcement agencies’ (criminal law 
enforcement agencies, civil penalty enforcement agencies and public revenue agencies) to 
access the content and associated data of a communication held by a carrier.   In addition to 
interception agencies, enforcement bodies include a range of regulatory bodies such as the 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Australian 
Taxation Office, Centrelink and a range of State and Territory government organisations.   
A stored communications warrant can only be issued for the investigation of an offence 
carrying a penalty of at least three year’s imprisonment or a fine of 180 penalty units.  The 
threshold for access is lower than for interception because it was considered at the time the 
provisions were introduced that communicants often have the opportunity to review or to 
delete these communications before sending them, meaning covert access can be less 
privacy intrusive than real‐time listening.  However, this logic, while valid several years ago, 
has become less compelling as technology use and availability has changed.   
Implementing a standard threshold for both content and stored communications warrants 
would remove the complexities inherent in the current interpretation of what is a serious 
offence, recognise the growing number of online offences and provide consistent protection 
for ‘live’ and ‘stored’ content.  Consideration is also being given to reducing the number of 
agencies able to access communications information on the basis that only agencies that 
have a demonstrated need to access that type of information should be eligible to do so.   
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Interception and stored communications warrants provide authority to receive the content 
of the communication and associated data.  The concept of ‘data’ is not defined in the TIA 
Act but is generally understood to refer to information about a communication that is not 
the content or substance of a communication.  Data is increasingly understood as falling into 
two categories: subscriber data, which provides information about a party to a 
communication such as name or billing address; and traffic data, which relates to how a 
communication passes across a network, such as the location from which the 
communication was made.   
How and for what purposes an interception agency can intercept a communication depends 
on limited characteristics or features of the communication relating to the type of service or 
device used or the name of a person.  Defining attributes by communicant, carrier‐provided 
service or technology made sense in an era where carriers, device types and users were 
limited but is more complex in the current environment where the carrier or means of 
conveyance is not always readily apparent.  This is both time‐consuming and costly for 
agencies in terms of analysing unnecessary information and potentially invasive from a 
privacy perspective as the communications of innocent parties may be unduly affected.  One 
way to address these concerns would be to introduce a simplified warrant regime that 
focuses on better targeting the characteristics of a communication that enable it to be 
isolated from communications that are not of interest.   
Streamlining and reducing complexity in the law 
The use and disclosure of information obtained from exercising powers under the TIA Act is 
strictly regulated.   
The Act prohibits the use and communication of information obtained under a warrant 
except for the purposes explicitly set out in the legislation.  Information obtained under the 
TIA Act is subject to more rigorous legislative protections than other forms of information in 
an agency’s possession.  The provisions are detailed and complex in relation to record 
keeping, retention and destruction and can present a barrier to effective information 
sharing both within an agency and between agencies.  This was not an issue when the Act 
was enacted and applied only to ASIO and the AFP, but with more agencies now defined as 
interception agencies and the national and transnational nature of many contemporary 
security and law enforcement investigations, effective co‐operation within and between 
agencies is critical.   
Simplifying the current information sharing provisions would support co‐operative 
arrangements between agencies and consideration could be given to the ways in which 
information sharing amongst agencies could be facilitated.    
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Record keeping and accountability obligations require law enforcement agencies27 to keep 
records relating to documents associated with the warrants issued and particulars relating 
to warrant applications (such as whether an application was granted or refused) and each 
time lawfully intercepted information is used, disclosed, communicated, entered into 
evidence or destroyed. Agency heads must also report to the Attorney‐General on the use 
and communication of intercepted information within three months of a warrant ceasing to 
be in effect.  The Attorney‐General’s Department must prepare an annual statistical report 
about the use of powers under the TIA Act, which the Attorney‐General tables in 
Parliament.   
Different record keeping requirements apply to stored communications.   
Oversight of law enforcement agencies’ use of powers is split between the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman and equivalent State bodies in relation to interception activities.  The 
Commonwealth Ombudsman inspects the records of both Commonwealth and State 
agencies in relation to stored communications.  This split in responsibility contrasts with the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004, where the Commonwealth Ombudsman inspects all agencies.   
The requirements are aimed at ensuring that agencies keep appropriate records necessary 
to demonstrate that agencies are using their powers lawfully.  However, many of the 
requirements reflect historical concerns about corruption and the misuse of covert powers 
and do not reflect the current governance and accountability frameworks within which 
agencies operate.    
The current regime is focused on administrative content rather than recording the 
information needed to ensure that a particular agency’s use of intrusive powers is 
proportional to the outcomes sought.  The existing provisions take a one size fits all 
approach, resulting in a lack of flexibility for each agency to determine the best way to 
record and report on information having regard to individual practices, procedures and use 
of technology.   
The same provisions also impede the Ombudsman’s ability to report on possible 
contraventions and compliance issues by prescribing detailed and time limited procedures 
that need to be checked for administrative compliance, rather than giving the Ombudsman 
scope to determine better ways of assisting agencies to meet their requirements.   
Consideration should be given to introducing new reporting requirements that are less 
process oriented and more attuned to providing the information needed to evaluate 
whether intrusion to privacy under the regime is proportionate to public outcomes.   
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Modernising the cost sharing framework 
Carriage and carriage service providers (C/CSPs), which are telecommunications industry 
participants subject to regulatory obligations under the TIA Act and the Telecommunications 
Act 1997, play an irreplaceable role in enabling agencies to access communications.  Under 
the Telecommunications Act, C/CSPs have an obligation to provide such help to agencies as 
is ‘reasonably necessary’ for enforcing the criminal law and laws imposing pecuniary 
penalties, protecting the public revenue and safeguarding national security.   
The TIA Act places an obligation on each C/CSP to have the capability to intercept 
communications and requires carriers and nominated carriage service providers to submit 
an annual interception capability plan outlining their strategy for complying with their 
obligation to intercept and to deliver communications to interception agencies.  The 
obligation extends to maintaining the capability to intercept communications that are 
carried by a service that they provide and to deliver those communications to the 
requesting agency consistent with a warrant.   
However, as networks have become more complicated and the types of services available 
have expanded, often beyond the C/CSPs’ own networks, challenges have evolved in 
applying a general obligation.  Consideration should be given towards introducing measures 
that implement more specific technical requirements to cater for a diverse and 
sophisticated telecommunications environment.   This includes developing requirements 
around administrative needs such as the timeliness of cost sharing to agencies and the 
security measures to be applied to the handling of sensitive information relating to 
interception operations.   
The capital cost of interception is shared between both industry and agencies.  The cost of 
developing, installing and maintaining interception capability is borne by the C/CSP.  The 
cost of developing, installing and maintaining delivery capability is borne by agencies.  Costs 
have been split on that basis because industry is best placed to find efficiencies and to 
minimise costs.  C/CSPs can recover the costs of providing day‐to‐day assistance to agencies 
on a no profit, no loss basis.    
The TIA Act only covers C/CSPs, rather than the broad range of current telecommunications 
industry participants, consistent with the Act’s focus on traditional services such as landline 
telephones.  However, the exclusion of providers such as social networking providers and 
cloud computing providers creates potential vulnerabilities in the interception regime that 
are capable of being manipulated by criminals.  Consideration should be given to extending 
the interception regime to such providers to remove uncertainty about the application of 
industry obligations in relation to agency requests and to better position Australia to meet 
domestic and international demands.   
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In reforming cost sharing, consideration must also be given to the current make‐up of the 
telecommunications industry.  The current requirements are predicated on the existence of 
one or few industry players and assume that all are resourced on a similar basis and have a 
similar customer base.  This does not reflect industry practice which better suits a tiered 
model that supports comprehensive interception and delivery capability on the part of 
larger providers, a minimum interception and delivery capability on the part of medium 
providers and only reasonably necessary assistance for interception on the part of smaller 
providers.   
A tiered model would also recognise that smaller providers generally have fewer customers 
and therefore have less potential to be required to execute an interception warrant and less 
capacity to store and retain information about communications and customers.  
Requirements on industry to retain current information and to assist agencies to decrypt 
information would greatly enhance agencies’ abilities to detect and disrupt criminal and 
other behaviours that threaten national wellbeing but should be implemented in a way that 
does not compromise business viability.   
The merits of introducing a tiered model should be considered, including the role such an 
approach could play in defining industry obligations in relation to activities such as retaining 
data.  A future framework for industry obligations would take into account not only 
regulatory best practice, but do so in a manner that minimises compliance costs for industry 
and maintains competitive neutrality.  The Committee should also consider whether there 
are any broader competition impacts arising from the framework and its effect on prices.   
Consideration should also be given to clarifying the role of the Australian Communications 
and Media Authority (ACMA) in regulating industry obligations under the interception 
regime.  The ACMA has rarely used its powers to enforce compliance with the TIA Act 
because the only effective power available to it under the Act is court action.  Court action is 
usually inappropriate or excessive in the circumstances and unhelpful from an agency 
perspective because it may publicly disclose that a particular C/CSP is not complying with its 
TIA Act obligations.  The ACMA’s role could be reinforced by expanding the range of 
regulatory options available and clarifying the standards with which industry must comply. 
3. Next Steps   
Access to communications content and data plays an important role in protecting the 
community against threats to security and serious criminal activity.  It is vital that the 
legislation regulating the use of this investigative tool be kept up to date with developments 
in technology and the contemporary communications environment.  Comprehensive reform 
of the current legislation is necessary, focusing particularly on the issues referred to the 
Committee by the Government and discussed in detail above. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
1. Introduction 
Australia’s national security, economic prosperity and social wellbeing is increasingly reliant 
on the Internet and other information and communications technologies (ICT). 
Underpinning our use of these technologies is our telecommunications infrastructure. 
However, there are very real challenges to ensuring its security in the face of criminal and 
strategic threats. Risks to the availability, confidentiality and integrity of our national 
telecommunications infrastructure can come from hardware vulnerabilities, accidental mis‐
configuration, external hacking and even trusted insiders.  
Australian citizens, businesses and public entities rely on telecommunication carriers and 
carriage service providers (C/CSPs) to handle information and data on their networks, 
including customer information, securely. Telecommunications users, including businesses 
and consumers, reasonably expect that the information they store on, and transmit across, 
telecommunications networks is adequately protected from national security threats. 
Failure to effectively manage  national security risks therefore has implications beyond 
individual C/CSPs; it is a negative externality affecting government, business and individual 
Australians.   
The Australian Government is considering whether telecommunications legislation, such as 
the Telecommunications Act (1997) (Telecommunications Act) and other relevant legislation 
should be amended to establish a risk based regulatory framework to better manage 
national security challenges to Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure.  
The desired outcomes of the proposed framework are that: 
• government and industry have a productive partnership for managing national 
security risks to Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure, 
• security risks relating to Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure are identified 
early, allowing normal business operations to proceed where there are no security 
concerns and facilitating expedient resolution of security concerns, 
• security outcomes are achieved that give government, business and the public 
confidence in their use of telecommunications infrastructure for both routine and 
sensitive activities,  
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• the protection of information, including customer information and information 
about customers, contained on or transmitted across telecommunications networks 
is better assured, and 
• compliance costs for industry are minimised. 
2. The context 
While advances in technology and communications have resulted in unquestionable 
benefits to society and the economy, they have also introduced significant vulnerabilities, 
including the ability to disrupt, destroy, degrade or alter the functioning of our critical 
telecommunications infrastructure and the information held on it. A clear understanding of 
the current telecommunications environment is essential to identifying network 
vulnerabilities and managing them effectively. This includes the composition and operation 
of the telecommunications industry, national security risks, and the current regulatory 
environment.  
2.1  Australia’s telecommunications industry 
Australia’s telecommunications industry consists of a wide range of services and participants 
— an increasing number of which are based outside Australia. The telecommunications 
industry is a highly dynamic one, and C/CSPs usually operate network environments that 
have been significantly expanded and modified from their original specifications. In a broad 
sense, global telecommunications network architecture has evolved over the past 30 years 
from a ‘siloed’ services model to one of ‘layered’ convergence (figure 1). In Australia today, 
our telecommunications industry has evolved to reflect this shift, while the standardisation 
and mass‐production of network equipment has also cut costs and opened up the range of 
suppliers with new entrants to the market gaining a stronger presence.  
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Figure 1: Convergence in network and service layers28 
 
The National Broadband Network (NBN) rollout will further transform Australian 
telecommunications infrastructure, with changes to the telecommunications market’s 
structure and functionality creating new opportunities for market participation. As such, 
Australia’s telecommunications industry is increasingly diverse, with a range of overlapping 
and interconnected platforms and networks. The Australian Government recognises that 
C/CSPs operate in an increasingly competitive, commercial environment and that security is 
only one factor in procurement and investment decision‐making. Although there are market 
incentives and customer expectations for network providers to ensure their infrastructure 
and services are secure, C/CSPs are working with incomplete information about the national 
security environment. There will always be information available to Government which is 
beyond industry’s reach.  
2.2  National security risks 
The ASIO Report to Parliament 2010‐2011 states that espionage by foreign intelligence 
services is an enduring security threat to Australia, both conventional and new forms, such 
                                                            
28 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2011, Broken Concepts: The Australian Communications 
legislative landscape, p6 http://engage.acma.gov.au/wp‐content/uploads/2011/08/ACMA_Broken‐
Concepts_Final_29Aug1.pdf  
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as cyber espionage. Our increasing reliance on communications technology to conduct the 
business of Government, commerce and our daily lives makes Australians more vulnerable 
to malicious attack. As such cyber security has emerged as a serious and widespread 
concern. 29 States, as well as disaffected individuals or groups, are able to use computer 
networks to view or siphon sensitive, private, or classified information for the purpose of, 
political, diplomatic or commercial advantage. 
Individual records or files stored or transmitted on telecommunications networks may not 
be classified or particularly sensitive in and of themselves but, in aggregate, they can give 
foreign states and other malicious actors a range of intelligence insights not otherwise 
readily available. This threat extends to information vital to the effective day‐to‐day 
operation of critical national industries and infrastructure, including intellectual property 
and commercial intelligence.30  
2.3  Current telecommunications regulatory environment 
For the purposes of security, Australia’s telecommunication industry is regulated primarily 
under two pieces of legislation — the Telecommunications Act (1997) administered by the 
Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy and the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act (1979) (TIA Act) administered by the 
Attorney‐General. 
Section 581 of the Telecommunications Act provides the Attorney‐General (in consultation 
with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy) the power to give written direction to C/CSPs to cease supply of a carriage service 
if the use of that service is or would be prejudicial to security. It is recognised that such 
action, would impact on both businesses and consumers. Section 581 is non‐specific, is not 
triggered by a specific set of circumstances and does not allow a practical graduated 
response to security risks. This sanction is a blunt instrument, and is not effective in 
encouraging C/CSPs to consider national security risks when making business decisions 
about the design of their networks. 
Under section 202B of the TIA Act, C/CSPs are obliged to notify Government of planned 
changes to a telecommunications service or system where these changes may affect their 
capacity to comply with their obligations under the TIA Act. The TIA Act does not specifically 
address supply chain risks, hardware and software vulnerabilities or security risks to the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of telecommunications infrastructure. 
32 
                                                            
29 ASIO, Director‐General’s speech at the Security in Government Conference, 7 July 2011 
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2.4  Analysis 
Engagement between Government and the telecommunications industry about national 
security risks currently occurs on an informal basis, relying on co‐operation between 
security agencies and C/CSPs in cases where security agencies become aware of potential 
risks. In most cases engagement between security agencies and C/CSPs has been 
constructive. However there is a lack of awareness of national security risks in business 
decisions by many C/CSPs, which means engagement often occurs late in the decision 
making process. A more defined framework for government’s engagement with industry 
would minimise disruption and resource impacts for industry and government.  It would also 
provide greater clarity for industry during a time of considerable structural change in the 
telecommunications industry.  
Government is concerned that the telecommunications industry is not fully informed about 
national security risks and is therefore not equipped to respond adequately to these risks. 
As both businesses and consumers are also exposed to the consequences of potential 
security risks, there is a compelling case to act now. Australia is at a critical stage of 
telecommunications infrastructure development driven by the NBN’s construction. Delaying 
action to make C/CSPs aware of managing national security risks will complicate long term 
management decisions made on the design and procurement of major telecommunications 
infrastructure, with potential negative impacts on national security.  
Accordingly, Government has a responsibility to intervene in the market to educate and 
assist C/CSPs to maintain a minimum level of security for the purpose of protecting the data 
on their networks and, ultimately to ensure mechanisms are in place to support the integrity 
and security of Australia’s national telecommunications infrastructure.  
3. Proposed approach 
One approach to address national security risks relating to telecommunications 
infrastructure may be achieved using a regulatory framework. Such an approach was 
developed earlier in 2012 for consultation with industry. 
A regulatory approach could be achieved by making amendments to telecommunications 
legislation, such as the Telecommunications Act and other relevant legislation, such that 
C/CSPs protect their networks from unauthorised interference with the following elements: 
1. an industry‐wide obligation on all C/CSPs to protect their infrastructure and the 
information held on it or passing across it from unauthorised interference to support the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of Australia’s national telecommunications 
infrastructure; 
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2. a requirement for C/CSPs to provide Government, when requested, with information to 
assist in the assessment of national security risks to telecommunications infrastructure; 
and 
3. powers of direction and a penalty regime to encourage compliance.  
In  designing  a  regulatory  framework,  the  following  principles  are  considered  important 
elements of an effective regulatory system: 
• be adaptable to a changing environment;  
• be clear to industry;  
• provide incentives for compliance;  
• be reasonably equitable and competitively neutral; and 
• not be resource‐intensive for industry to comply or for government to administer. 
The advantages of such a framework include that it could:  
• focus on security outcomes rather than absolute technical requirements, making it 
adaptable to changes in technology and the telecommunications market, 
• provide greater clarity, control and certainty for industry by focusing on self‐governance 
and demonstration of compliance, 
• can be applied equitably across the telecommunications sector, and 
• provide a more effective  incentive  for  industry  to place greater emphasis on national 
security considerations in its business decisions.  
The Government is aware that such a framework may have significant impacts for industry 
and agencies and welcomes input as it explores how such an approach could work in 
practice and what these impacts may be.  Government would also welcome input on any 
broader competition impacts that the proposal may have on the telecommunications 
market and consumers more generally.  
It should be noted that some classified national security information will only be able to be 
shared with companies that have entered into security agreements with Government, which 
have been negotiated on the basis of risk to the national interest. 
3.1  Industry consultation 
Preliminary targeted consultation with industry occurred in early 2012, during which C/CSPs 
demonstrated an understanding of the importance of protecting the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of their networks.  
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Other points raised by industry included: 
• the desire for a level playing field across the industry, 
• a desire for clear guidance about Government’s expectations and requirements for 
industry compliance, 
• the need for certainty to enable C/CSPs to undertake business decisions with 
confidence, and  
• flexibility for industry to explore and experiment with efficient and effective solutions 
for managing security risks.  
During the consultation about a possible regulatory framework that originally included a 
notification obligation in place of the requirement to provide information to Government on 
request, industry expressed a preference for an approach that avoids the need for 
government approval of network architecture at a technical or engineering level and instead 
focuses on the security outcome, leaving industry to choose the most effective way to 
achieve it.  As a consequence an alternative regulatory framework designed with less focus 
on administrative processes and technical requirements, but greater emphasis on 
outcomes, has been developed for consideration.  
3.2  Compliance framework 
C/CSPs are obliged to protect the privacy of their customers’ information; however there 
are many different ways that a C/CSP may be organised which will affect its ability to be able 
to confirm the security of its network and the information held on it. Where a C/CSP relies 
heavily on sub‐contracted, outsourced or off‐shored maintenance or services it will be more 
complicated to oversee the maintenance of security than a C/CSP that manages its network 
and information held on it in‐house.  
The industry consultation has led to consideration of whether a compliance framework, 
based on requiring C/CSPs to be able to demonstrate competent supervision and effective 
controls over their networks, may be a more effective approach.  Such an approach would 
focus on the ability of a C/CSP to manage the security of its infrastructure and the 
information held on it. Information about a possible ‘compliance framework’ is provided 
below. 
Competent supervision refers to the ability of a C/CSP to maintain technically proficient 
oversight (either in‐house or through a trusted third party) of the operations of their 
network, and the location of data; awareness of, and authority over, parties with access to 
network infrastructure ;and a reasonable ability to detect security breaches or 
compromises.  
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Effective control refers to the ability of a C/CSP to maintain direct authority and / or 
contractual arrangements which ensure that its infrastructure and the information held on 
itis protected from unauthorised interference (which refers to network access). This might 
include arrangements to: 
• cease contracts where there has been a security breach, 
• direct contractors to carry out mitigation or remedial actions, 
• oblige contractors to monitor and report breaches to the C/CSP, and 
• repatriate information and network systems where unauthorised interference to a 
network has occurred. 
Under such a compliance framework, Government would provide guidance to assist industry 
to  understand  and  meet  its  obligation,  and  to  inform  C/CSPs  how  they  can  maintain 
competent  supervision  and  effective  control  over  their  networks.  Guidance  would  be 
tailored  to  C/CSP  service  types  (for  example  internet  service  providers  (ISP),  backhaul 
service providers, and mobile virtual network operators) and distributed to C/CSPs prior to 
commencement of a framework.  
The aim of such a regulatory framework would be to promote risk informed management of 
security  in the telecommunications sector.   This could be achieved by educating C/CSPs on 
national  security  risks and encouraging ongoing awareness and  responsibility  for network 
security,  reducing  the  need  for  government  intervention.  Provision  of  general  security 
advice, briefings  and  the development of  guidance would be  intended  to be  an ongoing, 
iterative  process  conducted  in  cooperation  with  industry,  which  would  reflect  evolving 
technologies and markets. 
Under a regulatory framework Government would also disseminate information on specific 
security threats to affected C/CSPs on an as needs basis, including: 
• targeted briefings (specific threat and risk information), and 
• provision of specific mitigation information. 
In order  to monitor compliance with  the obligations under a  framework C/CSPs would be 
required upon request, to demonstrate compliance to Government. This could be done by 
compliance  assessments  and  audits,  based  on  a  risk  assessment  to  inform  the  level  of 
engagement required. The level of engagement would be informed by factors such as: 
• market share; 
• customer base; and 
• service offerings. 
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Government is giving consideration to the means by which it could be assured that industry 
had taken reasonable mitigations steps to address security risks.  It would benefit from the 
Committee’s  advice  on  appropriate  assurances  mechanisms.    These  might  include 
accreditation of industry for self‐assessment purposes or a role for third parties in providing 
audit  and  assurance  services.    For  example,  in‐depth  compliance  assessment  and  audits 
could focus on C/CSPs that security agencies consider are at greater risk of national security 
threats. Less  intensive  compliance assessment and audits would apply  to  selected C/CSPs 
from  the  broader  pool  of  lower  risk  entities.  This  approach would monitor  and  evaluate 
industry‐wide governance arrangements to ensure C/CSPs maintain competent supervision 
and effective control over their networks and facilities.  
3.3  Directions and penalties 
Government would seek to use advice and guidance to encourage risk informed 
management of security concerns. Where potential issues of concern are identified, the 
preferred approach would be to engage with the relevant C/CSPs to establish whether 
national security concerns can be co‐operatively addressed. Where this is not possible, one 
way to proportionately address various levels and forms of non‐compliance could be to 
provide a graduated suite of enforcement measures (including the power of direction). The 
availability of enforcement measures would provide industry with greater incentive to 
engage co‐operatively with Government.  
Under such an approach, in cases where engagement with C/CSPs proves to be ineffective, 
or a blatant disregard of security information jeopardises the Government’s confidence in 
the security and integrity of Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure, powers of 
direction could provide a proportionate means to achieve compliance. To safeguard such a 
power, it could require the Secretary of the Attorney General’s Department, to seek the 
concurrence of the Director General of Security and the Secretary of the Department of 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, before directing a C/CSP to alter its 
business practices or undertake other actions considered necessary to protect national 
security interests. This would generally follow a period of more direct and intensive 
engagement with the C/CSP concerned.  
Directions could involve targeted mitigation or remediation of security risks, including 
modifications to infrastructure, audit, and ongoing monitoring, with costs to be borne by 
the relevant C/CSP. Grounds for directing mitigation or alternative actions would ultimately 
be determined by security agencies, based on an assessment of risk following their 
engagement with a C/CSP. The powers of direction would serve as a means to support the 
existing powers in the Telecommunications Act relating to national interest matters. 
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To encourage C/CSPs’ recognition and compliance with their security obligations under this 
regulatory framework, financial penalties are proposed. Financial penalties could be used in 
situations where, for example, a C/CSP fails to take reasonable action to protect its 
infrastructure and the information held on it. These penalties could be modelled on existing 
civil penalties contained in the Telecommunications Act.  
As described earlier, the current provision under subsection 581(3) of the 
Telecommunications Act would remain available for the most serious security breaches.  
This enables the Attorney‐General, in consultation with the Prime Minister and Minister for 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, to direct C/CSPs to not use or supply, 
or cease using or supplying, particular services where such use or supply would be 
prejudicial to security. As this direction only applies to a service as a whole, however; it 
cannot be used to restrict service use or supply to a particular organisation, group or 
person. As such, subsection 581(3) is considered an option of last resort, applicable in very 
limited circumstances.  
Should a graduated suite of enforcement measures be made available under a regulatory 
framework, the following circumstances provide an illustration of where the Government 
may consider taking enforcement action: 
• where a breach has occurred, for example a CSP’s data is accessed and published, 
demonstrating a failure to protect its infrastructure and the information held on it from 
unauthorised interference; 
• where a C/CSP fails to provide reasonable assistance to Government to demonstrate 
compliance when requested; 
• where there is failure by a C/CSP to undertake mitigation activities that Government 
has determined are necessary to protect its infrastructure and the information held on it 
from unauthorised interference; or 
• where there is failure by a C/CSP to otherwise satisfactorily demonstrate it has 
competent supervision or effective control over its networks. 
The framework is intended to maximise cooperative engagement between C/CSPs and 
Government on matters of national security. Where such a relationship works effectively, 
there may be no need to invoke more formal directive powers. Administrative penalties or 
directions to C/CSPs would only be imposed where a risk has been assessed as significant 
and prior engagement has proved ineffective. 
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3.4  Transition arrangements 
Should any legislative changes be agreed, this would require all C/CSPs to comply with the 
security obligations. In some instances this will require the application of mitigation 
measures to existing infrastructure. The security obligations would apply to existing and 
new infrastructure. Government recognises that it would need to work closely with industry 
to ensure that there is a reasonable transition period. 
4. Next Steps 
Government recognises that a regulatory framework would include a cost to industry, which 
may increase prices for consumers and it is working to understand these costs through 
targeted consultation. This work will be complemented by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security’s consideration.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
LEGISLATION REFORM  
1. Introduction 
It is the responsibility of Government to protect society against threats to our national 
security. The Government must be vigilant and take appropriate action to ensure that any 
threats to our national security do not materialise. Australian intelligence agencies have 
made a significant contribution to our safety by constant and careful assessment of possible 
threats.  
However, the security environment is continually evolving and becoming increasingly 
diversified. Security legislation, and the ability of intelligence agencies to protect the 
security and safety of Australians and our democratic institutions, must also adapt and keep 
pace with these changes. To enable Australia’s intelligence agencies to continue to protect 
national security, it is imperative that these agencies are appropriately equipped with the 
necessary statutory powers to uphold Australia’s vital national security interests.    
The Attorney‐General’s Department and Australian Intelligence Community agencies —
including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), and the Defence Imagery 
and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)—have identified a number of practical difficulties with 
the legislation governing the operation of these agencies, specifically the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) and the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act).    
Addressing the problems outlined in this chapter of the Discussion Paper is necessary to 
maintain the intelligence gathering capabilities of the Australian intelligence agencies, 
ensuring they remain able to adeptly respond to emerging and enduring threats to security.  
Proposed reforms seek to continue the recent modernisation of security legislation to 
ensure the intelligence community can continue to meet the demands of government in the 
most effective manner.   
At the same time, it is important that legislation governing intelligence agencies continues 
to include appropriate checks and balances on the exercise of their powers. Ensuring these 
agencies remain accountable for their actions helps to maintain public confidence in and 
support for the crucial work of intelligence agencies.  The proposed reforms seek to 
maintain a strong and accountable legislative regime under which intelligence agencies can 
respond effectively when threats to our community emerge.   
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This chapter of the Discussion Paper outlines the problems identified in the operation of 
both the ASIO and IS Acts and contains three sections relating to matters the Government 
wishes to progress, matters the Government is considering, and matters on which the 
Government expressly seeks  the views of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security (PJCIS). 
2. Matters the Government wishes to progress  
2.1  Modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant provisions  
Division 2 of Part III of the ASIO Act contains a range of powers that ASIO can use under 
warrant in carrying out its statutory functions.  The powers include search warrants, 
computer access warrants, listening and tracking device warrants, and the power to inspect 
postal or delivery service articles.  Although there have been several amendments to each of 
these powers in the past, the amendments have been piecemeal and have not kept pace 
with technological advancements.  To maintain effective intelligence gathering techniques 
and capabilities, these powers require modernising to provide a statutory framework which 
facilitates intelligence collection by the most technologically effective and efficient means. 
References to ‘computer’ in section 25A  
Computer access warrants under section 25A of the ASIO Act are limited to data stored on 
‘a computer’ (‘computer’ is defined to mean a computer, a computer system or part of a 
computer system).  Therefore, if an individual has more than one computer which is not 
part of the same computer system, or data is stored on a computer network, more than one 
warrant may be necessary.  For example, if there are multiple computers on a premises, and 
it is only discovered upon entering the premises for the purpose of executing a warrant that 
a particular computer is not connected to the computer system specified in the warrant, it 
would be necessary to seek another warrant (and enter the premises a second time) to 
access the data on that particular computer.  This is inefficient and does not increase the 
level of accountability around the issue of warrants.    
A possible solution to this issue could be to amend the ASIO Act so that a computer access 
warrant may be issued in relation to a computer, computers on a particular premises, 
computers connected to a particular person or a computer network.  
Variation of a warrant  
Currently, the ASIO Act does not specifically provide for a warrant to be varied if the 
circumstances justify such a variation.  A new warrant is required in every instance where 
there is a significant change in circumstances.  A variation provision may be appropriate to 
ensure sufficient operational flexibility while maintaining appropriate accountability. 
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Duration of warrants  
All warrants under the ASIO Act currently last for a maximum of six months, except for a 
search warrant which must be executed within 90 days.  A warrant enabling a search to take 
place within a six month period would provide operational benefits as the exact timing of 
the search may depend on a range of unknown and fluid operational factors.  Indeed, there 
have been instances where ASIO was unable to execute a search warrant within the 90 day 
limit for reasons beyond its control, and a new warrant would be required. . 
To address this, the maximum duration of a search warrant could be increased from 90 days 
to six months, making it consistent with the other warrant powers in the ASIO Act.   
Renewal of warrants  
Certain threats to security can endure for many years, requiring a significant proportion of 
warrants issued under the ASIO Act to continue beyond the initial authorisation period.  
However, the current provisions in the ASIO Act do not enable a warrant to be extended.   
In such circumstances, ASIO must apply for a new warrant which necessitates restating the 
intelligence case and completely reassessing the legislative threshold in instances where 
there has not been a significant change to either, and where the assessment of the 
intelligence case remains unchanged.  A renewal process would provide appropriate 
oversight and accountability without requiring excessive administrative resources.  
2.2  Modernise the ASIO Act employment provisions  
Part V of the ASIO Act provides for the employment of ASIO officers and employees.  These 
provisions do not align with the Australian Public Service (APS) framework as they were 
largely drafted over 30 years ago.  Specific examples are discussed below.   
Requirement to hold an “office” 
Section 85 of the ASIO Act provides that the Director‐General may determine the 
designation of officers in ASIO.  Under subsection 85(1) of the ASIO Act, an officer must hold 
an ‘office’ that has been designated by the Director‐General.  With the exception of the 
Director‐General, ASIO employees are no longer employed under the concept of the 
designation of ‘office’.  In practice, ASIO employees are employed under a concept of level. 
As it is no longer relevant, this section could be considered for deletion from the ASIO Act.   
Descriptors of employment in the ASIO Act 
The ASIO Act uses several descriptors to denote a person as an ‘employee’ of ASIO.  These 
descriptors include ‘officer,’ ‘employee’ and ‘staff’ and are not separately defined in the 
ASIO Act.  The use of the separate terms reflects the various amendments made to the ASIO 
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Act since 1979 but causes confusion as to whether differences between the terms are 
intended. 
The use of the single term ‘employee’ throughout the ASIO Act would clarify and ensure 
consistency in the Act.  
Special provisions relating to ASIO employees  
Section 87 of the ASIO Act provides that the terms and conditions, under which ASIO 
employees were employed immediately before the date of commencement of the ASIO Act, 
continue to apply until they are varied by agreement.  There are no longer any ASIO 
employees affected by section 87 and it could be considered for deletion from the Act.  
Modernise the Director‐General’s powers in relation to employment terms and 
conditions 
The Director‐General’s powers and responsibilities could be modernised so they are similar 
to those given to the CEO of a Commonwealth department or agency under the Public 
Service Act.  This would ensure that, subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney under 
paragraph 8A(1)(b) of the ASIO Act, the Director‐General has the power to engage 
employees on behalf of the Commonwealth, the rights, duties and powers of an employer 
and may determine terms and conditions of employment. 
Proposed secondment arrangements  
In order to access specialist skills and as part of arrangements whereby ASIO works closely 
with other agencies, ASIO often places staff of other agencies to work within ASIO, or agrees 
to its staff members working in other agencies.  Legal complexities can arise in making such 
arrangements because of the specified scope of the functions and powers of ASIO and the 
other organisation involved. 
If the ASIO Act were amended to expressly enable staff to be ‘seconded’ to and from ASIO 
and to clarify that, during the secondment, a seconded staff member carries out only the 
functions of the host organisation in accordance with any procedures or restrictions that 
apply under legislation to the host organisation, it would enhance ASIO’s ability to engage 
with other agencies, and overcome administrative difficulties ASIO currently experiences in 
relation to existing secondment arrangements. 
Such a secondment regime would operate independently from section 19A of the ASIO Act 
and section 13A of the IS Act.  Section 19A enables ASIO to cooperate with and assist 
intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies and prescribed Commonwealth and State 
authorities.  An ASIO officer working in a multi agency task force operating under section 
19A continues to carry out the functions of ASIO.  Those functions would (as a consequence 
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of section 19A) include carrying out the functions of the other agencies involved in the task 
force.  It is suggested that, unlike section 19A arrangements, these secondment 
arrangements would not be limited to intelligence, law enforcement and prescribed 
agencies. 
2.3  Clarify the authority of the Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation  
Minor amendments to DIGO’s function under section 6B(e) of the IS Act would make some 
minor clarifications to ensure that DIGO has clear legislative support to undertake its 
geospatial and imagery related functions.  
At present the IS Act enables DIGO under its subsection 6B(e) function to: 
a.  provide imagery and geospatial data to produce non‐intelligence products for use by 
Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities, as well as for certain 
non government bodies and foreign governments approved by the Minister 
(paragraph 6B(e)(i)) 
b.  provide technical assistance to the Australian Defence Force, Commonwealth, State 
and Territory agencies (as well as to certain approved non‐government bodies and 
foreign governments approved by the Minister) in relation to the production and use 
of imagery and geospatial products, not being ‘intelligence information’ obtained for 
the purposes of subsections 6B(a), (b) or (c) (para. 6B(e)(ii)), and 
c.  provide assistance in relation to Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities (as 
well as for certain non‐government bodies and foreign governments approved by 
the Minister) in relation to the performance of these authorities or bodies of 
emergency response functions (as defined by the IS Act). 
DIGO's work under this function may therefore involve collecting imagery and other data in 
relation to locations inside and outside Australia, but what distinguishes its subsection 6B(e) 
function from DIGO's 'intelligence functions' under subsections 6B(a) to (d), is that the work 
is not done for the purpose of providing information about a particular person or entity.  
This does not mean that intelligence sources or capability are not utilised for the function, 
but rather DIGO's intent, or the activities which are undertaken for the purposes of this 
function, do not fall within the scope of 'intelligence information' purposes (as defined by 
the IS Act.)  
It is proposed that, amending paragraph 6B(e)(ii) of the IS Act would clarify the activities 
that are included in the scope of this function.  These amendments would seek to:  
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a.  Clarify the scope of application of paragraph 6B(e)(ii) ‐ The current wording of 
paragraph 6B(e)(ii) is; ‘assistance in relation to the use of such imagery and products’.  The 
inclusion of the word 'such' in this subsection has given rise to an unintended encumbrance, 
as it has the effect of linking this function to the preceding paragraph 6B(e)(i) function.  The 
original intent of paragraph 6B(e)(ii) was to enable DIGO to provide expert technical 
assistance and advice on the production and use of all DIGO imagery and geospatial 
products, not only with respect to its ‘non‐intelligence information’ activities and products 
covered by paragraph 6B(e)(i). 
Paragraph 6B(e)(ii) could be amended to remove the word ‘such’, so as to avoid any doubt 
that DIGO is enabled to provide Commonwealth and State authorities, and other approved 
bodies, assistance in relation to the production and use of both non intelligence and 
intelligence imagery and geospatial products. 
b.  Include an express reference to specialised imagery and geospatial technologies ‐ 
DIGO has an express function under paragraph 6B(e)(ii) to provide assistance in relation to 
the production and use of imagery and other geospatial products to Commonwealth, State 
and Territory authorities and bodies approved in writing by the Minister. 
In line with this function (and implied under DIGO’s ‘communication’ function in subsection 
6B(d) for the purposes of subsections 6B(a) to (d)), DIGO assists Commonwealth, State and 
Territory authorities (as well certain non‐government bodies and foreign governments as 
approved by the Minister) with the use and application of specialised imagery and 
geospatial technologies, including geospatial web‐based services. However, this is not 
expressly provided for as a function of DIGO.   
An express reference to this activity would avoid any doubt that DIGO is able to assist in this 
way and to ensure the prevention of any perceived gaps in DIGO’s functions.  These changes 
would further provide DIGO with the scope and flexibility to meet White Paper objectives, 
including the proposed acquisition of domestic satellite collection capability by Defence.  
The proposed amendments do not change the original intended operation of section 6B of 
the IS Act.  The existing safeguards in the IS Act would remain unaffected and in place.  The 
suggested changes involve minor clarifications to provide more certainty and practical 
utility.  By making the legislation clearer, it would be easier for the Inspector‐General of 
Intelligence and Security to effectively review whether DIGO is operating within its powers, 
and ensure accountability is maintained. 
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3. Matters the Government is considering  
3.1  Amend the ASIO Act to create an authorised intelligence operations 
scheme  
ASIO’s continued ability to collect useful and relevant intelligence on the most serious 
threats to the security of Australia and Australians, hinges on its capacity to covertly gain 
and maintain close access to highly sensitive information.  This activity often involves 
engaging and associating closely with those who may be involved in criminal activity and 
therefore has the potential to expose an ASIO officer or human source to criminal or civil 
liability, in the course of their work.   
With the enactment of broad overarching laws criminalising security related issues, many of 
those targets under investigation are involved in activities that breach the criminal law.  
Increasingly, those laws are capable of capturing the activities of persons who are 
associating covertly with targets, notwithstanding that their activities are for lawful 
intelligence collection purposes.  
For example, under Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code, it is an offence to intentionally provide 
training to or receive training from a terrorist organisation where the person is reckless as to 
whether the organisation is a terrorist organisation.  Therefore, if an ASIO officer or human 
source is tasked to collect covert intelligence in relation to a terrorist organisation, they may 
be open to criminal liability under the Criminal Code if, in the course of collecting the 
relevant intelligence, they receive training from that organisation.    
An authorised intelligence operations scheme would significantly assist covert intelligence 
operations that require undercover ASIO officers or human sources to gain and maintain 
access to highly sensitive information concerning serious threats to Australia and its citizens. 
A scheme similar to the controlled operations scheme under the Crimes Act 1914 could be 
developed to apply to ASIO officers and human sources operating under the ASIO Act, with 
appropriate modifications and safeguards that recognise the scheme would operate in the 
context of covert intelligence gathering investigations or operations.  
Should an authorised intelligence operations regime be pursued, it will be critical that it 
achieves an appropriate balance between operational flexibility and appropriate oversight 
and accountability.  Key features that may contribute to such could include: 
• the Director‐General of Security to issue authorised intelligence operation certificates 
which would provide protection from criminal and civil liability for specified conduct for 
a specified period (such as 12 months) 
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• oversight and inspection by the Inspector‐General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), 
including notifying the IGIS once an authorised intelligence operation has been 
approved by the Director‐General 
• specifying conduct which cannot be authorised (eg, intentionally inducing a person to 
commit a criminal offence that the person would not otherwise have intended to 
commit and conduct that is likely to cause the death of or serious injury to a person or 
involves the commission of a sexual offence against any person), and 
• independent review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of any such 
scheme, which could be conducted five years after the scheme’s commencement. 
3.2  Modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant provisions  
Named person warrants  
In approximately one third of cases, more than one ASIO Act warrant type is sought against 
a particular target.  Under the current provisions, this requires the preparation of multiple 
applications, each re‐casting the available intelligence case to emphasise the relevant facts 
and grounds to satisfy the different legislative requirements of the various warrant types, 
which is administratively burdensome.   
The same outcome could be achieved with greater efficiency and with the same 
accountability by enabling ASIO to apply for a single warrant covering all ASIO Act warrant 
powers where the relevant legislative thresholds are satisfied.  
Surveillance Devices – use of optical devices  
Legislation governing ASIO’s capabilities with respect to electronic surveillance has not been 
updated to align with legislation governing the use of electronic surveillance by law 
enforcement.  ASIO’s ability to use optical surveillance devices is tied to its ability to use 
listening devices.  This is a relic of the time in which the ASIO Act was first drafted.  
Additionally, the administrative and procedural provisions governing the use of listening and 
tracking devices in the ASIO Act are not aligned with provisions governing the use of 
surveillance devices by law enforcement.  
In practice, this acts as an impediment to effective cooperation and collaboration with law 
enforcement partner agencies.  For example, the differences in scope and terminology 
between the ASIO Act and the Surveillance Devices Act limit actions which can be taken by 
each agency in working with partner agencies.  Aligning the surveillance device provisions in 
the ASIO Act with the more modern Surveillance Devices Act could assist in overcoming 
these impediments to cooperation. 
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Authority for acts necessary to execute a computer access warrant  
The increasingly complex nature of the global information technology environment and the 
use by some targets of sophisticated computer protection mechanisms can adversely impact 
ASIO’s ability to execute a computer access warrant for the purpose of obtaining access to 
data relevant to security.  
Subsection 25A(5) currently restricts ASIO from doing anything under a computer access 
warrant that adds, deletes or alters data or interferes with, interrupts, or obstructs the 
lawful use of the target computer by other persons.  This prohibition operates regardless of 
how minor or inconsequential the interference, interruption or obstruction may be.   
To address this, section 25A could be amended so that the prohibition does not apply to 
activity proportionate to what is necessary to execute the warrant.  
Person searches  
The ASIO Act currently contains the power to search a premises (section 25).  Contained 
within this is the power to search a person who is at or near the premises where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has, on his or her person, records or other 
things relevant to the security matter (subsection 25(4A)).  
Where ASIO assess that a particular person may be carrying items of relevance to security, a 
search warrant relating to a particular premises must be sought.  It is only on or near the 
premises specified in the warrant that a person may be searched.  However, it is not always 
feasible to execute a search warrant on a person of interest while they are ‘at or near’ the 
premises specified in the warrant.   
For example, some persons of interest employ counter‐surveillance techniques such that 
predicting the likely timing and location at which a search would yield the desired 
intelligence dividend is not always possible.  The existing limitation could be addressed by 
enabling ASIO to request a warrant to search a specified person rather than premises 
(subject to existing safeguards in subsections 25(4B) and 25AA) so that there would be 
sufficient operational flexibility while maintaining appropriate accountability via the warrant 
process. 
Authorisation lists for warrants  
Section 24 of the ASIO Act provides that the Director‐General (or senior officer authorised in 
writing by the Director‐General for the purposes of this section) may approve certain 
officers and employees to execute warrants issued under Division 2 of Part III of the ASIO 
Act.   
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The requirement to maintain a list of the individual names of each officer who may be 
involved in executing a warrant can create operational inefficiencies for ASIO.  For example, 
sometimes the execution of a warrant takes place in unpredictable and volatile 
environments and ASIO needs to be able to quickly expand the list of authorised persons. 
The problem could be overcome in large part if the Director‐General could approve classes 
of people to execute a warrant.  For example, the Director‐General could authorise officers 
of a certain level within a particular Division of ASIO.  Such persons at any one time would 
be readily ascertainable ensuring the level of accountability is not diminished, while 
improving operational efficiency. 
3.3  Clarify ASIO’s ability to cooperate with the private sector  
Subsection 19(1) of the ASIO Act enables ASIO to cooperate with authorities of the 
Commonwealth, as well as Departments, police forces and authorities of the States, where 
it is necessary or conducive to the functions of ASIO.  It is unclear whether section 19 could 
be read to imply that ASIO should not cooperate with organisations outside of government. 
This concerns ASIO given the important role the private sector plays in Australia’s national 
security, including by owning and operating a significant proportion of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure.  Furthermore, it is conducive to ASIO’s functions to cooperate with the 
private sector.  For example, ASIO’s Business Liaison Unit (BLU), provides an interface 
between Australian business and the Australian Intelligence Community.  The BLU provides 
intelligence backed reporting that can be used for risk management decision making.  Such 
reports include reporting on the current security environment and threats to particular 
industry sectors.   
It may be desirable to amend subsection 19(1) to avoid any doubt about ASIO’s ability to 
cooperate with the private sector. 
3.4  Amend the ASIO Act to enable ASIO to refer breaches of section 92 of 
the ASIO Act  
Section 18 of the ASIO Act limits the circumstances in which a person can communicate 
information or intelligence acquired through their association with ASIO.  In particular, 
information may only be passed to law enforcement agencies in relation to a ‘serious crime’ 
(defined as an offence punishable by imprisonment exceeding 12 months).  Section 92, 
which makes it an offence for a person to publish the identity of an ASIO officer, is 
punishable by 12 months imprisonment.  By virtue of section 18, ASIO is precluded from 
passing information about the possible commission of this offence to law enforcement 
agencies.  
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4. Matters on which the Government expressly seeks the views of 
the PJCIS  
4.1  Modernise and streamline ASIO’s warrant provisions  
Use of third party computers and communications in transit  
The ASIO Act recognises the importance of ensuring ASIO is able to access computers where 
necessary for the performance of its statutory functions and where approved by the 
Attorney‐General.   
However, advancements in technology have made it increasingly difficult for ASIO to 
execute its computer access warrants.  Where a target is security conscious, innovative 
methods of achieving access to the target computer have to be employed.  In the same way 
that access to a third party premises may be necessary to execute a search warrant, it may 
be necessary to use a communication that is in transit or use a third party computer for the 
purpose of executing a computer access warrant.   
To overcome this problem, it may be appropriate to amend the ASIO Act to enable a third 
party computer or communication in transit to be used by ASIO to lawfully access a target 
computer.  Noting that using a communication in transit or a third party computer may have 
privacy implications, appropriate safeguards and accountability mechanisms would need to 
be incorporated into such a scheme.  
Incidental Entry  
Sections 25 and 25A of the ASIO Act currently enable an officer, in the execution of a search 
or computer warrant, to do any thing that is reasonably incidental to the exercise of powers 
under that warrant.  It is not clear whether this incidental power includes entry to a third 
party’s premises for the purposes of executing the search or computer warrant.  
Additionally, it may be necessary to enter a third party premises for the purposes of 
installing a surveillance device.  Clarification of the scope of the incidental power would 
assist ASIO in executing search and computer warrants. 
Use of force  
Subsections 25(7), 25A(5A), 26B(4) and 26C(4) relate to the use of force when exercising a 
power under a warrant and when entry into a premises is authorised under the warrant.  
The headings to each of those subsections suggest that the powers in those subsections are 
limited to entry to the target premises.  The provisions relating to use of force are not 
limited in such a way.  Technical amendments may therefore be necessary to correct this 
drafting anomaly. 
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Evidentiary Certificates  
Currently, protecting information that reveals sensitivities about the identity of ASIO officers 
and capabilities used in the course of exercising special warrant powers relies on successful 
public interest immunity claims or, where available, orders obtained under the National 
Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004.  Unlike the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access Act) 1979 (TIA Act) and the Surveillance 
Devices Act 2004 (SD Act), there is no consistent regime to protect ASIO information, 
capabilities and officer identities under the ASIO Act.  
An evidentiary certificate regime could be introduced in the ASIO Act, similar to those which 
exist under the TIA and SD Acts, to provide a legislative basis for assisting ASIO to protect 
the identity of officers and sensitive capabilities involvied in the execution of warrant 
powers.   
4.2  Amend the Intelligence Services Act 2001  
Australia’s foreign intelligence agencies, ASIS, DSD and DIGO, collect intelligence in 
accordance with requirements set by Government and operate under the IS Act. These 
agencies have identified problems arising out of the operation of the IS Act, which are 
considered below.  
Ministerial Authorisations   
The IS Act imposes strict controls on the ability of those agencies to produce intelligence on 
an Australian person.  The Minister responsible for each Australian foreign intelligence 
agency is required to direct that the agency obtain authorisation from the Minister before 
undertaking an activity, or a series of activities, for the specific purpose, or for purposes 
which include the specific purpose, of producing intelligence on an Australian person.  
Before giving an authorisation to produce intelligence on an Australian person, the 
responsible Minister must be satisfied under section 9(1) that:  
• any activities which may be done in reliance on the authorisation will be necessary for 
the proper performance of a function of the agency concerned, and  
• there are satisfactory arrangements in place to ensure that 
• nothing will be done in reliance on the authorisation beyond what is necessary for 
the proper performance of a function of the agency, and  
• the nature and consequences of acts done in reliance on the authorisation will be 
reasonable, having regard to the purposes for which they are carried out.  
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According to section 9(1A)(a), before giving an authorisation to produce intelligence on an 
Australian person, the responsible Minister must be satisfied that the Australian person is, 
or is likely to be, involved in one or more of the following activities: 
• activities that present a significant risk to a person’s safety;  
• acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power;  
• activities that are, or any likely to be, a threat to security (for this ground the Minister 
must also obtain the agreement of the Attorney‐General);  
• activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the movement 
of goods listed from time to time in the Defence and Strategic Goods List (within the 
meaning of regulation 13E of the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958);  
• committing a serious crime by moving money, goods or people;  
• committing a serious crime by using or transferring intellectual property;  
• committing a serious crime by transmitting data or signals by means of guided and/or 
unguided electromagnetic energy; and  
• activities related to a contravention, or an alleged contravention, by a person of a UN 
sanction enforcement law.  
These activities do not specifically cover the situation where a person is or is likely to be 
involved in intelligence or counter‐intelligence activities.  
A new item could be added to the list in section 9(1A)(a) of the IS Act which would allow the 
Minister to give an authorisation if he or she is satisfied that the person is, or is likely to be, 
involved in intelligence or counter‐intelligence activities.  This would allow the Minister to 
issue an authorisation where the current grounds, for example, ‘activities that present a 
significant risk to a person’s safety,’ are not available because the risk is to ASIS operations 
or is not specific to a person’s safety. 
In particular, this would assist ASIS to perform its existing function of conducting 
counter‐intelligence activities under section 6(1)(c) of the IS Act and allow DSD and DIGO, at 
the request of ASIS and with approval from their Minister, to assist ASIS.  In turn this would 
enable these agencies to protect their operations and those involved in them by allowing 
the agencies to produce intelligence on a person who the Minister is satisfied is, or is likely 
to be, involved in intelligence or counter‐intelligence activities. This activity may detect the 
interference of a foreign power, in which case ASIO would normally become involved in 
assessing any threat to security.   
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It is imperative that Australia’s intelligence agencies are appropriately equipped to protect 
Australia’s vital national security interests.  This includes the ability for Australia’s foreign 
intelligence and security services to interact and work seamlessly together.   
In March 2011, the Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation 
Amendment Act 2011 made amendments to the ASIO Act and the IS Act to enable 
Australia’s intelligence agencies to more closely cooperate and assist one another in the 
performance of each other’s functions.  Specifically, section 13A of the IS Act was 
introduced to facilitate greater cooperation in multi‐agency teams, such as under the 
Counter Terrorism Control Centre, which is hosted by ASIO, and enable agencies to harness 
resources in support of key national security priorities.  
However, there are differences in the legislative regimes which apply to ASIS, DSD and DIGO 
under the IS Act and to ASIO under the ASIO Act when they produce intelligence on 
Australian persons. In part these differences reflect the different nature and functions of the 
IS Act agencies and ASIO. When the agencies are cooperating and assisting ASIO in the 
performance of ASIO’s functions, these differences have led to situations being identified 
where ASIO is able to undertake an activity for the purposes of its functions but an agency 
subject to the IS Act may not be able to fully cooperate with and assist it.  
To better meet the intention of enabling Australia’s intelligence agencies to cooperate and 
assist each other in the performance of each other’s functions to protect Australia and 
Australians, section 13A of the IS Act could be amended.  For example, section 13A could be 
amended to enable the Minister responsible for an IS Act agency to authorise specified 
activities where the agency is cooperating with ASIO in the performance of an ASIO 
function.  A Ministerial Authorisation will not replace the need to obtain a warrant where 
one is currently required. This change would create greater consistency between the 
ministerial approval regime that applies to the IS Act agencies and the approval regime 
which applies to ASIO.  
The proposal is principally intended for ASIS and ASIO cooperation relating to the 
capabilities, intentions and activities of people or organisations outside Australia.  Given 
existing Defence agencies’ functions and capabilities, and the nature of the activities to 
which the proposal is sought to address, it is unlikely that Defence would utilise the 
proposed change. 
The existing safeguards in the IS Act could apply to the proposed section 13A authorisation. 
These include the requirement for all ministerial authorisations to be provided to the IGIS 
who oversees the legality and propriety of the operations of the intelligence agencies. 
Additionally, the communication and retention of intelligence collected under the 
ministerial authorisation would be subject to the Privacy Rules.  
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The proposed changes to section 13A could also operate in a limited set of circumstances:  
• A ministerial authorisation under the proposed changes to section 13A would usually 
only be issued for a discrete activity for a specified purpose where ASIS is 
cooperating with ASIO in connection with the performance of its  functions. This 
category of ministerial authorisation will not be able to be issued to ASIS, DSD and 
DIGO to assist another IS Act agency, or a prescribed Commonwealth authority, or a 
State authority.  
• A ministerial authorisation under section 13A will not replace the need to obtain a 
warrant where a warrant would currently be required under the ASIO Act or the TIA 
Act.  
• Renewal could be sought, but where a ministerial authorisation under a section 
9(1A) ground could be sought, further ministerial authorisation would need to be 
sought under sections 8 and 9 of the IS Act rather than as a renewal of the section 
13A authorisation.   
ASIS co‐operation on self‐defence and weapons training  
ASIS operates in a number of very dangerous locations overseas.  In recognition of this, the 
IS Act was amended in 2004 to enable ASIS staff members and agents to receive training in 
the use of weapons and self‐defence techniques, subject to a number of important 
safeguards (schedule 2).   
However, under this regime, ASIS is only permitted to provide training in the use of 
weapons to ASIS staff members and agents. The IS Act does not currently enable ASIS staff 
members to participate in joint training in the use of weapons with persons cooperating 
with ASIS, even though ASIS staff members are authorized to use weapons to protect such 
persons.  At a practical level, the current inconsistency restricts joint training activities 
because ASIS trainers cannot run training that includes individuals who are not ASIS staff 
members.   
Such cooperation would not enable ASIO officers to carry weapons or receive training from 
ASIS in the use of weapons.  Co‐operation on weapons training would be limited to 
Commonwealth, State and Territory bodies that have, under some other law, a right to carry 
weapons in the course of their duties. This will cover training with law enforcement and 
military personnel.  
Such cooperation would enable ASIS to cooperate with a limited number of approved 
overseas authorities in the delivery of training in self defence and weapons.  Such 
cooperation could be limited to authorities approved by the Foreign Minister under section 
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13(1A) of the IS Act.  Such an approval requires the Foreign Minister to first consult with the 
Prime Minister and Attorney‐General.   
5. Next Steps 
This Chapter has discussed the Australian Intelligence Community legislative reform aspect 
of the package of reform proposals referred to the PJCIS for inquiry and consultation.  The 
Government recognises that some of the reforms are controversial and may attract 
significant media interest.  To avoid public misunderstanding as to the nature of these 
reforms, it is imperative that the PJCIS take into account a wide range of views on the 
proposals from public stakeholders and government agencies.  This will ensure that any 
measures brought forward to enhance the intelligence gathering capabilities of our 
intelligence agencies continue to be subject to appropriate checks and balances on these 
powers.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
The preceding chapters of this Discussion Paper have elaborated on the complex 
international security environment in which our intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
operate. Ideas for telecommunications interception reform (Chapter 2), 
telecommunications sector security reform (Chapter 3) and Australian intelligence 
community reform (Chapter 4) seek to equip these agencies with the capability to meet 
today’s emerging national security challenges.  
In light of the issues discussed, the Government seeks the views of the PJCIS on the package 
of ideas.  This Discussion Paper will prove useful as a basis for stakeholder consultation.  A 
number of key industry representatives and Government agencies will seek to provide their 
views on the proposals to the PJCIS.  
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 
 
The ACMA – The Australian Communications and Media Authority 
Ancillary service providers 
Telecommunications industry participants who are not carriers or carriage service providers. 
Anonymous pre‐paid services 
A mobile phone or other communications service where credit is purchased in advance of the 
service being used. In circumstances where the pre‐paid service can be obtained without providing 
personal details, or by providing false details, the service is an ‘anonymous’ pre‐paid service. 
ASIO – Australian Security Intelligence Organisation  
ASIS – Australian Secret Intelligence Service  
ASIO Act – Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979  
Calling cards 
Otherwise known as telephone cards, are pre‐paid cards which allow payment for telephone 
services. Calling cards are typically intended for use by travellers. 
Carriage service providers  
A CSP is an entity that supplies a carriage service to the public using a telecommunications network 
unit. CSPs can include organisations that resell time on a carrier network for phone calls, provide 
access to the internet (Internet Service Providers) or provide telephone services over the internet 
(VoIP service providers). 
Carrier  
A carrier is an owner of a telecommunications network unit that is used to supply carriage services 
to the public. Carrier licences are granted by the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) under section 56 of the Telecommunications Act. 
Ciphers  
A method of transforming text in order to conceal its meaning. 
Communications Packets 
A formatted unit of data which comprises a communication passing over a packet‐switched network. 
Content  
The substance of a communication, for example the subject line and body of an e‐mail or what is 
said during a phone call 
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Data  
Information about a communication that is not the content or substance of a communication 
Data retention   
The storage of telecommunications data for prescribed periods of time. 
Data set  
The specific set of data that would be required to be retained under a data retention regime 
Decryption  
The act of decoding of encrypted information into a meaningful form. 
DIGO – Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation  
DSD – Defence Services Directorate  
Encryption  
The encoding of data so that it cannot be decoded without appropriate software or hardware, so as 
to prevent authorised access. 
e‐payment 
Payment for buying and selling goods or services offered through the Internet, or more broadly, any 
type of electronic funds transfer. 
Gigabytes 
For digital information or computer storage a gigabyte represents 1 billion bytes.  
GPS ‐ The Global Positioning System 
A space‐based satellite navigation system that provides location and time information anywhere on 
Earth 
ICT – Information and communications technology 
Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used in the automatic 
acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, 
interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information. 
Identifiers to communications 
Information such as a phone number or email address, linking the target of an interception warrant 
to the service or device to be intercepted. 
Industry Participant 
Any member of the telecommunications industry, including carriers, carriage service providers and 
ancillary service providers. 
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Inter‐carrier roaming agreements  
An agreement between carriers to ensure that wireless devices remain connected to the network 
despite changing locations. 
IS Act – Intelligence Services Act 2001  
ISP – Internet Service Provider 
An ISP is any entity that provides access to the Internet. 
IP – Internet Protocol 
A standard protocol for transmission of data from source to destinations in packet switched 
communications networks and interconnected systems of such networks. 
Megabits  
For digital information or computer storage a megabit represents 1 million bits. 
NBN – National Broadband Network 
The National Broadband Network is a next‐generation broadband network. The network comprises 
three technologies – optic fibre, fixed wireless and next‐generation satellite – and will provide more 
reliable, high‐speed broadband access to all Australians. 
Penalty Units 
An amount of money used to determine a pecuniary penalty – currently $110. 
Propriety data formats 
A file or communication format that is the intellectual property of an individual or organisation. 
PSTN ‐ Public switched telephone network 
The network of the world's public circuit‐switched telephone networks. It consists of telephone 
lines, fibre optic cables, microwave transmission links, mobile networks, communications satellites, 
and undersea telephone cables, all inter‐connected by switching centres, allowing any telephone in 
the world to communicate with any other.  
Resold services 
A service which is provided by a wholesaler and resold to customers via another telecommunications 
industry participant. 
SD Act – Surveillance Devices Act 2004  
Serious offence   
An offence that carries a penalty of at least 7 years’ imprisonment or a range of offences for which it 
is already recognised that general community standards would expect interception to be available, 
such as child exploitation offences and offences that can only be effectively investigated by 
accessing the relevant networks 
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Smartphone Technology 
Mobile phones built with mobile computing capabilities. 
Stored communications  
Communications which are no longer passing over the telecommunications system, held on carrier 
equipment and cannot be accessed on the equipment by a person who is not a party to the 
communication without the assistance of an employee of the carrier. 
Stored communications Warrant  
A warrant authorising access to stored communications. 
Suborning  
Bribery or procurement of a person to commit some unlawful or wrongful act. 
Subscriber data  
Information about a subscriber to a communications service, such as name or billing address. 
Telecommunications System  
A system over which telecommunications are transmitted.  It comprises of three primary units, a 
transmitter, a transmission medium and a receiver. 
Terabytes 
For digital information or computer storage a gigabyte represents 1 trillion bytes. 
Terminal device 
A device which the end user interacts with that terminates one end of a communication, such as a 
phone or computer. 
TI – telecommunications interception 
TIA Act – Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
Traffic data – information relating to how a communication passes across a network, such as the 
time, duration or location from which the communication was made. 
Transactional data 
Data describing an event, including when it occurred. 
TSSR – Telecommunications Sector Security Reform 
TSSR refers to the proposed regulatory framework being explored by Australian Government, which 
aims to manage and mitigate national security risks associated with telecommunications 
infrastructure. 
VoIP – Voice over Internet Protocol 
A technology that allows real‐time voice conversations over the Internet. 
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